View source for Missile Technology Control Regime

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According to its webpage, the '''Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR)''' is an informal and voluntary association of countries which share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and which seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. The MTCR was originally established in 1987 by [[Canada]], [[France]], [[Germany]], [[Italy]], [[Japan]], the [[United Kingdom]] and the [[United States of America]]. Since that time, the number of MTCR partners has increased to a total of thirty-four countries, all of which have equal standing within the Regime." <ref name=MCTRintro>{{citation
 | title = The Missile Technology Control Regime
 | url = http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html}}</ref>. [[Canada]] funds and operates the  project; its current Chairman  is Special Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Fischer of [[Denmark]].

The MCTR complements other treaties and enforcement regimes for WMD ''payloads'', such as:
:*[[Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons]] 
:*[[Chemical Weapons Convention]]
:*[[Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention]]
by controlling the most threatening long-range ''delivery mechanisms'' for such payloads.
==Technical scope==
Two document sets define the Regime's scope. Its '''Guidelines''' create the overall framework. The '''Equipment, Software and Technology Annex''' identifies items and technologies needing control, divided into two categories by risk. <ref name=MCTRannex>{{citation
 | author = Missile Technology Control Regime
 | title = Equipment, Software and Technology Annex
 | date = 23 March 2007
 | url = http://www.mtcr.info/english/annex.html}}</ref>

The Guidelines specifically state that the Regime is <blockquote>"not designed to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction." MTCR partners are careful with [space launch vehicle] SLV equipment and technology transfers, however, since the technology used in an SLV is virtually identical to that used in a ballistic missile, which poses genuine potential for missile proliferation.</blockquote>

The MCTR recognizes that many of the things in the Annex are "dual-use", with both military and civilian applications.   A purpose-built tactical missile is far easier to categorize than a rocket that could either be used for atmospheric research or to function as a [[guided missile]]. Dual-use decisions need to be made on a case-by-case basis. 
===Category I===
Items of greatest concern include rockets or UAVs that can deliver a 500 KG or greater payload over a 300 KM or greater distance. These two parameters are intended to cover the weight of a first-generation nuclear weapon, delivered over a minimally strategic distance:<ref name=ProConMCTR>{{citation
 | publisher = International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation
 | title =Bulletin 21 – Lessons from Control Regimes: Pros and Cons of the MTCR, and Efforts to Move Forward
 | first = Mark | last = Smith 
 | date = January 24-26, 2003
 | url = http://www.inesap.org/bulletin21/bul21art23.htm}}</ref>
:*complete rocket systems (including [[ballistic missile]]s, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets)
:*unmanned air vehicle (UAV) systems (including [[cruise missile]]s systems, target and reconnaissance drones)with the range/payload capability of concern; 
:*production facilities for such systems
:*major sub-systems including rocket stages, re-entry vehicles, rocket engines, guidance systems and warhead mechanisms.

===Category II===
Of lesser, but real, concerns are rockets and UAVs that have range greater than 300 KM, but cannot carry a heavy payload. An assortment of other dual-use technologies are covered. 
==Verification==
No specific means of verification are prescribed by the MCTR itself.
==Effectiveness==
Most missiles available to non-signatory states are of the World War II [[V-2]] technology exemplified by the Soviet-designed [[SCUD]]. The major nonsignatory exporter of missiles and technology is the [[Democratic People's Republic of Korea]] (North Korea). 

As of 2002, China, the DPRK, [[Egypt]], [[Israel]], Iran, [[India]], Pakistan, and [[Syria]] were not covered. Libya was the one exception of a state, desiring missiles, that cooperated. <ref name=ProConMCTR />
==References==
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