Gulf War (Iraq, 1991)

Formally beginning with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and ending with the cease-fire on 6 April 1991, the Iraq War was preceded by the Iran-Iraq War, with tensions following that conflict's end in 1988, and followed by new tensions culminating with the U.S.-led Gulf War in 2003. The Gulf War involved the occupation of Kuwait and Kuwaiti resistance, the defense of Saudi Arabia by a growing coalition led by the United States, an intensive air campaign reducing Iraq's military, and a ground campaign that ejected the Iraqis and led to a cease-fire. Following the cease-fire was a period of interactions with a truculent Iraq, ensuring the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction and enforcing "no fly zones" in the North and South of Iraq. Eventually, Iraq was invaded in the 2003 Iraq War, with the disarming of the regular Iraqi military, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government, and an open-ended occupation and attempts at nation-building.

The war was notable for the extremely high level of technology used by the Coalition, with lopsided victories in every tactical engagement. Coalition combat casualties were minimal, the number from fratricide and non-battle accidents comparable to those inflicted by the Iraqis. The war was also notable for not creating a clear peace, although the politics of the region prevented a replacement of the Hussein government.

Background

Leading up to the Iraqi invasion was a period of brinksmanship and diplomatic miscommunication starting not long after the end of the Iran-Iraq War.

U.S. command structures

At the time of the invasion of Kuwait, the region was the responsibility of United States Central Command, formed in 1983. Earlier, there had been a lack of focus in U.S. military command and control; the volatile Middle East had variously been parceled out to United States European Command, and a general Strike Command that was described as a contingency rather than geographic headquarters.

Even after Central Command had formed, most planning focused on blocking Soviet moves, especially a southern move to the Iranian oil fields, and then across the Zagros Mountains into Iraq. In July 1989, eight months after being named head of Central Command, H Norman Schwarzkopf rethought the fundamental problems. Eventually, he presented an alternative emphasis to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense, suggesting contingency planning with Iraq as the aggressor, Schwarzkopf found that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell was an ally in rethinking the requirements.

Moving quite quickly for a large command, Schwarzkopf was able to reorient war plans and schedule the annual command post exercise (i.e., war games involving command staffs, not field deployments), INTERNAL LOOK, to address, in in the summer of 1990, an attack by Iraq. Schwarzkopf said that the exercise, conducted in July 1990, had simulated intelligence about Iraq that came so close to the reality that the communications center had to stamp the INTERNAL LOOK messages with a bold EXERCISE ONLY.

Hussein-Glaspie meetings

On July 25, 1990, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, met with Saddam Hussein. There are different accounts of whether Saddam was warned not to open hostilities, or if things could have been construed as the U.S. remaining neutral. Iraq had issued a transcript that suggested that the U.S. gave no strong warning. The New York Times reported that U.S. State Department issues, on receiving Glaspie's account, were unclear how strong a warning had been given, but that Administration sources said they did not want to make an issue of it at the time, because that might interfere with coalition-building.

In the hearing, Representative Lee H. Hamilton, (Democrat, Indiana) the Ambassador if she had ever told Saddam that the U.S. would fight if Iraq invaded, and she said she did not explicitly do so. In response to Hamilton's question about his being deterred, she said: " I told him we would defend our vital interests. He complained to me for one hour about fleet movements and American neo-imperialism and militarism. He knew perfectly well what we were talking about, and it would have been absolutely wrong for me, without consulting with the President, to inform anybody of a change in our policy. Our policy was that we would defend our vital interests. It's up to the President to decide how we would do it. Saddam Hussein, who is a man who lives by the sword, believed that we were going to do it by the sword."

Specific indications of imminent invasion

U.S. intelligence moved to a specific attack warning on August 1.

Considering the U.S. Response

On August 4, Schwarzkopf and his air commander, Chuck Horner, met with President George H.W. Bush, Powell, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Vice President Dan Quayle, [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State James Baker, White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft and Director of Central Intelligence William Webster. Schwarzkopf described the phases of commitment:

1. immediate: U.S. "tripwire" presence of a 4,000 soldier division ready brigade from the [[82nd Airborne Division, followed by Marines with somewhat heavier equipment
2. 1-3 months: a tank-killing air assault brigade, a brigade of mechanized infantry, hundreds of aircraft on Saudi airfields, and two carrier task groups. This was the minimum to fend off a full-scale Iraqi offense.
3. 8-10 months (minimum): at least 6 more divisions, probably 2-3 corps headquarters, and much more air. This was the requirement to eject Iraq from Kuwait.

The attendees were surprised at the size of forces needed, and there was not yet any guarantee the Saudis would accept them. Nevertheless, the highest levels of the U.S. government heard, and apparently listened to, professional estimates of reality. Note that even the largest force mission was to eject the Iraqis and leave. No continuing large-scale presence was considered, which would later become a key factor for Saudi agreement.

The Iraqi Government and Military

Iraq's civilian, security, and military apparatus was under the strongly centralized control of Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle, many of whom came from clansmen from Tikrit, Iraq. As such, Hussein was the center of gravity of the entire Iraqi structure.

Iraq, as a result of the Iran-Iraq War, was considered to have an experienced military, generally operating under centralized Soviet doctrine. It should be remembered, however, that the Iran-Iraq War was largely a bloody stalemate. Neither side carried out effective deep operations on land or in the air. Iraq did demonstrate an ability to build very good static defensive lines, which, when attacked frontally, inflicted great numbers of Iranian casualties. It should not be forgotten, however, that the Maginot Line was capable of inflicting great numbers of German casualties, if the Germans had obliged the French assumptions by striking into that defensive line, rather than going around it. Saddam, whose opinions were decisive, did not fully understand how mobile a modern force could be, especially if it avoided static defenses and did not try to conduct an occupation of hostile territory.

Security and military organizations

Iraq security and military organization formed concentric circles around Saddam, the innermost concerned only with his security, only leaving Baghdad to escort him. Moving outwards, conventional military units, some of substantial capability, were equipped and trained proportionately to the political reliability of their leadership. In addition, there were a wide range of intelligence and secret police organizations outside these circles.

Beyond his immediate bodyguards, the circles of land units, the first two of which stayed with Saddam, were:

1. Special Security Organization
2. Special Republican Guard
3. Republican Guard
4. Regular military divisions
5. Conscript divisions

KARI: Iraqi air defense

French Thomson-CSF had built what appeared to be an extensive integrated air defense system (IADS) for Iraq, called KARI. The Iraqis, however, used it with a more Soviet doctrine that discouraged local decisionmaking.

The overall defense had three levels:

1. National/strategic, operated by the Iraqi Air Force
2. Key point defense, operated by the Republican Guard
3. Mobile, operated by the Iraqi Army

Iraqi air defense weapons and infrastructure were substantial,; their training and doctrine were the most limiting factors. The Iraqis began with:

• the KARI IADS
• roughly 7,000 SAMs
• 10,000 anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) guns.
• Aircraft including Mirage F1, Su-24, MiG-25 and MiG-29
• twenty four very large and heavily fortified main operating bases and a further thirty major dispersal airfields. "virtually impossible to close for an extended period even with advanced weapons and large numbers of aircraft."

Category	Quantity	Type(s)
KARI IADS	--	French and Russian electronics, mostly Russian doctrine
surface-to-air missiles	Approximately 7,000	Soviet SA-2 GUIDELINE, SA-3 GOA, SA-5 GAMMON, SA-6 GAINFUL;
anti-aircraft artillery	Approximately 10,000	-
Fighter aircraft		French Mirage F-1; Soviet MiG-25,MiG-29

If the Allied numerical superiority over the Iraqi air forces was very great, their technological superiority in terms both of platforms and weapons was even more marked. At the outbreak of hostilities, the technological level of Iraqi order of battle was variable. Although the Iraqis possessed advanced aircraft, perhaps half of their Air Force's front line consisted of variants of obsolescent MiG and Sukhoi designs.

(According to the IISS Military Balance 1990/1991 the Iraqi Air Force order of battle in Autumn 1989 consisted of two squadrons of bombers equipped with eight Tu-22s, four Tu-16s and four Chinese H-6Ds; Twenty two squadrons of fighter ground attack aircraft (equipped with ninety MiG-23BNs, sixty four Mirage F-1s, thirty Su-7s, seventy Su-20s, sixteen Su-24s and sixty Su-25s) and seventeen squadrons of air defence fighters (equipped with twenty five MiG-25s, forty J-7s, one hundred and fifty MiG-21s, thirty Mirage F-1s and thirty MiG-29s).

Area defense

Early warning radars, at this level, included the SPOON REST, SQUAT EYE and FLAT FACE radar. At the next level, the individual SAM regiments had search and coordination radars appropriate to the specific missile type (e.g., SA-2 GUIDELINE, SA-3 GOA, SA-5 GAMMON, SA-6 GAINFUL). Individual firing batteries and launchers also had electronics appropriate to the missiles.

SA-2 and SA-3 missiles were the major systems, with the low-to-medium altitude SA-6 placed in likely gaps through which hostile aircraft were apt to try to "leak".

Point defense

Critical but fixed targets were covered by a total of approximately 250 Franco-German Euromissile Roland and Soviet SA-8 GECKO missiles with their appropriate radars. Using Soviet air defense doctrinal assumptions, these would be organized into from 65 to 140 firing batteries.

Roland and Gecko both have radars on each Transporter-Erector-Launcher, known as a TELAR configuration.

Mobile

Some Rolands and Geckos were assigned to mobile Army roles, along with vehicle mounted SA-9 GASKIN/9K31 Strela-1 and their replacement, the SA-13 GOPHER/ZRK-BD Strela-10.

The remaining Army weapons were man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS): SA-5 GRAIL of two versions plus the Chinese HN-5A, and the later Russian SA-14 GREMLIN.

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

air assault and armored movements

Saddam closed the borders of Iraq and Kuwait on August 9, trapping approximately 13,000 foreigners, as he continued to send reinforcements into Kuwait. Iraqi forces were estimated as 130,000 troops, 1,200 tanks, and 900 artillery pieces with chemical warfare capability.

Defense of Saudi Arabia

It took negotiation at the highest levels before the Saudis agreed to have foreign troops in their country. King Fahd asked for a briefing on August 4, and agreed to the deployment on August 6.

On August 7, OPERATION DESERT SHIELD formally began.Once there was approval, the first units that arrived were United States Air Force F-15 Eagle air superiority fighters and E-3 Sentry early warning radar and air battle command post aircraft. The Saudis themselves operated versions of both aircraft types. There appears to have been initial surprise by the Saudis on the size of the ground support organization needed just for these aircraft.

Aircraft carriers and warships capable of launching cruise missiles deployed to international waters. The first significant land forces unit was the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, the division ready brigade of which arrived on 14 August, with the full division in theater on 29 August. The 82nd was variously called a tripwire, or, more cynically, a "speed bump", as a paratroop division could not have directly fought Iraqi armored units. Until U.S. armored units, such as the 24th Infantry Division could arrive, the 82nd could only stay in light contact with Iraqi units, with carrier aircraft being the major weapon.

On August 23, before the Saudis had agreed to the full force, the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions pulled back from the Kuwait-Saudi border. This was not a move of fear, but a consolidation of forces and putting the strongest troops into a position where they could maneuver. . U.S. News described this as "withdrawing".

Had Saddam chosen to move immediately into Saudi Arabia, especially for a short distance, little could stop him until more forces arrived. His thinking has never really been explained.

Attempts to prevent all-out hostilities

Following the invasion, there were a number of diplomatic initiatives to find a peaceful solution, and hopes that the formation of what became a 34-nation coalition might give second thoughts to Saddam Hussein.

The United Nations, in an unprecedented way, had played a crucial role throughout the eight-month international crisis, which began on 2 August 1990 when Iraq invaded, occupied and annexed its neighbour--the tiny, oil-rich State of Kuwait--calling it an "integral part" of Iraq.

After the Iraqi invasion but before Coalition combat operations began, the UN Security Council, with majority votes, adopted 15 resolutions related to the crisis, among other things: condemning the initial invasion; calling for Iraqi troop withdrawal and protection of prisoners of war, diplomas and civilians; imposing strong, mandatory, comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq until it complied with its demands; arranging for aid to innocent victims of the conflict and countries economically affected by the embargo; and setting a deadline before authorizing the use of "all necessary means" to restore international peace and security in the area.

The deadline passed. And a seven-week war took place--waged by a coalition of troops representing 34 nationalities--to oust Iraq from Kuwait.

Preparing for operations against Iraq

From the first deployment of foreign troops into Saudi Arabia, a variety of options were considered to force the Iraqis out of Kuwait. While some of the air planners believed, perhaps for the first time with the technology to have a real chance of following through, that they could put enough pressure on the Iraqis, Schwarzkopf, Powell, and other senior commanders assumed a ground attack would be needed if diplomacy failed.

The nature of a ground offensive, however, was controversial in the U.S. military, to say nothing of the Saudis and other coalition members. At first, until the tanks of the 24th Division arrived in September 12, there was much concern about the light forces of the 82nd Airborne Division even holding ground. When the XVIII Airborne Corps was present, Schwarzkopf and the planners still felt that a single corps, and not a heavy corps, really did not give a good counteroffensive option.

Eventually, the highest U.S., Saudi, and other national levels agreed a stronger force would be needed. An active defense, followed by an air offensive, was seen as the way to bring in adequate ground force.

Air Planning

GEN Schwarzkopf asked for assistance in planning an air counterattack, and COL John Warden III presented the original draft concept, called INSTANT THUNDER, for the 1991 Gulf War air campaign to GEN (ret.) Chuck Horner, then a lieutenant general commanding Schwarzkopf's air component (CENTAF) for United States Central Command. According to a book by Horner (coauthored by Tom Clancy), Horner found his personality immediately clashed with Warden's, although there wee good ideas in the presentation. Sound thinking was involved, one member of the Checkmate. David Deptula, teamed stayed in Saudi Arabia, and now is himself a lieutenant general, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, United States Air Force. Horner looked further for a compatible air operations planners, and selected Buster Glosson.

The problems first seemed a matter of personalities. GEN H Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., commanding United States Central Command during the Gulf War, spoke well of Warden's original air war concepts. Schwarzkopf did express concern that Warden saw the air component winning the war, and did not provide enough support to land forces.

In his August 10 presentation, Warden modeled the Iraqi system as a set of five concentric circles, with Saddam and his C3I at the center. Next came the industrial and other infrastructure needed to sustain a war, such as the electrical grid. In the third ring was transprtation, with the fourth ring as the civilian population and its food supply. The outermost, and to Warden the least important, ring was the enemy's conventional military forces. Warden was not insistent that the centers of gravity would always be the same:

The enemy's air [in the sense of air targeting] center of gravity may lie in equipment...in logistics...geography...in personnel...or in command and control.

Putting the Iraqi army as the lowest priority clashed with Schwarzkopf, who, while an advisor to South Vietnamese forces, objected that his unit did not have enough air support. A U.S. colonel, not in Schwarzkopf's chain of command, asked Schwarzkopf, sarcastically, what would be enough. Schwarzkopf, then a captain, replied:

Sir, when it's my a** out there on the ground, about a hundred B-52s circling around would be just barely adequate. Now, I'm willing to settle for something less, but I'm not willing to settle for nothing.

Throughout the Gulf War, Schwarzkopf wanted most support plans to include area bombing by B-52s against troops in the field, even when more modern precision-guided munitions might be more effective for a specific objective, and an objective, such as Saddam's communications, might be more critical than the Republican Guard. This is not meant as serious criticism of Schwarzkopf, but to illustrate the kinds of cultural conflicts that take place between different services, or even between different branches of different services — Schwarzkopf, who came up from a regular Infantry background, disliked Army Special Forces, although he commended them for their performance at the end of the Gulf War. Warden had written

if our tools in the Iraq case had been similar to those available in World War II, we would have been compelled to attack Iraq serially, and we would have started with some part of its air defense system. If we were very lucky, after a long period of time, we might have been able to start the reduction of the key inner rings but that would have been far into the future.

The actual campaign attacked both inner and outer rings simultaneously, but Glosson was able to present these ideas in a way acceptable to Horner and Schwarzkopf.

Ground forces: active unit deployment, reserve callups

Central Command's Army Component (ARCENT) was formed around the headquarters, Third United States Army (LTG John Yeosock). In the first phase of building up U.S. forces, the main conventional ground units were the XVIII Airborne Corps (LTG Gary Luck) and its constituent 82nd Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 24th Infantry Division, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Armored Division and 1st Cavalry Division.

In addition, the I Marine Expeditionary Force (LTG Walter Boomer), a corps-sized formation including more aircraft than a comparable Army organization, deployed. A brigade-sized Marine force remained afloat, on ampbibious ships.

The issue of land forces command

While all air and naval forces in CENTCOM had their own components, there was a disunity of command in land forces, with the Army regular troops under III Army, and the Marines under I MEF. In the 1944 invasion of Europe, Dwight D. Eisenhower elected to have an overall land forces commander, Bernard Law Montgomery, reporting to him, with the armies and army groups reporting through Montgomery.

Schwarzkopf chose to wear the "dual hats" of CENTCOM commander and land forces commander.

Buildup of land forces

Schwarzkopf asked for a planning team to work out advanced options, and received four officers, recent graduates of the new School of Advanced Military Studies. Arriving on September 14, what became the Special Plans Group prepared the two-corps plan.

CENTCOM had roughed out the one-corps "high-risk" offensive option on 6 October, using the XVIII Airborne Corps and I MEF CENTCOM's chiefs of operations and planning respectively, were Navy and Air Force officers, and there was concern that the staff, without augmentation, could develop a strong land warfare plan. <Gordon & Trainor, p. 125</ref> Air warfare was in much better shape.

A fundamental challenge was the CENTCOM position that a second, armor-heavy corps would be necessary to take offensive action against the Iraqis in Kuwait. This was briefed to the White House on October 11, and, according to Powell, advisors thought CENTCOM had enough force, and called Schwarzkopf another " [George]" McClellan, a Union commander in the American Civil War who was hesitant to go on the offensive. Gordon and Trainor reported that the Civil War critic was National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, an Air Force lieutenant general

On October 29, Schwarzkopf recounted that Powell told him that a frustrated Cheney had come up with his own plan, judged of extreme risk. Criticism flowed back and forth for a week. On 2 November, Schwarzkopf met with the Saudi leadership over the delicate question of ultimate command authority in a coalition. The compromise was that Schwarzkopf and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Khalid bin Sultan al-Saud, were to be co-equals, but the CENTCOM commander would have final authority for operational decisionms.

After significant discussion, on November 8, CENTCOM was authorized even a larger force than originally requested, VII Corps (LTG Fred Franks), which was being demobilized as part of draw-downs in Europe, was designated as the second Army corps. Commitments also were made to upgrade all M1 Abrams tank guns to the newer 120mm version; civil servant volunteers from the U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Command set up an overhaul facility, at the port of entry into Saudi Arabia, to upgrade guns, armor, and other systems.

The President used his authority to call up reserves, but, in practice, only combat support and combat service support units actually deployed to the theater of operations. Three National Guard combat brigades intended to "round out" U.S. Army divisions proved not to be combat ready.

Initial strikes

By the time combat started, the Coalition had approximately 2,400 aircraft based either within the theatre of operations or close enough to be capable of projecting power into it. In contrast, the Iraqis had around 650.

Most of the initial air activity was aimed at suppression of enemy air defense, disrupting the leadership and its communications, and WMD targets. The first shots to hit Iraq came from U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, led to an early warning radar station on the Saudi border by U.S. Air Force MH-53 PAVE LOW special operations helicopters.

With some limited exceptions on the outskirts, only stealth F-117 aircraft flew into the Baghdad area, along with cruise missiles fired from ships and submarines in international waters, as well as from B-52 bombers flying 36-hour round trip missions from their U.S. bases. Non-stealthy aircraft, however, ranged all over Iraq, simply avoiding the strongest air defenses in Baghdad.

Suppressing KARI: Poobah's Party

Other than flying into the teeth of the Baghdad IADS, Coalition warplanes attacked all over Iraq and Kuwait, the Arab and Canadian pilots primarily in Kuwait alone. It may have seemed cheering to the Baghdad air defenders when they finally saw aircraft targets and turned on their targeting radars. What they were seeing, however, was a large proportion of all the drone aircraft in the U.S. Air Force and Navy inventory. Once the fire control radars revealed themselves, large numbers of SEAD aircraft on the outskirts of Baghdad showered those radars with AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles.

U.S. intelligence assets such as the RC-135 RIVET JOINT and EC-130 COMPASS CALL, as well as national-level satellite and other systems, constantly characterized the Iraqi system, even as the planning was in progress.

The SEAD plan, developed under the leadership of Glosson's deputy for electronic warfare, BG Larry Henry (call sign Poobah), had five main objectives:

1. Destroy/disrupt enemy command and control nodes
2. Disrupt electronic warfare/ground controlled intercept coverage and communications
3. Force Air Defensive Assets into Autonomous Modes (i.e., cut the missile and gun shooters away from the command and control network linking radars and senior air defense officers to the actual defenses)
4. Use expendable drones for deception
5. Employ maximum available AGM-88 HARM shooters

A number of these ideas came from the June 1982 Israeli campaign against the Syrian air defense system in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. While the actual damage figures are argued, destruction of 19 missile batteries and 87 fighters, with no Israeli losses, often is cited.

Leadership targeting

While there was argument about the order of taking down parts of the Iraqi system, there was little argument that if Saddam could be neutralized, either by killing him or cutting his communications, Iraqi forces would be thrown into chaos. The multiple modes of attack against C3I have been described as "hyperwar":

Operation Desert Storm witnessed another unprecedented fusion of technology and strategy that was so intense; so destructive; that it has been called "Hyperwar." The primary offensive technological components of Hyperwar are stealthy aircraft and precision guided munitions. ...The first goal is politico-military decapitation of the enemy, achieved by destroying C3I (command, control, communication and information) targets. These assets include leadership and the assets that allow them to communicate with other decision-making cells and military resources.

Realities of stealth

There is a perception that stealth aircraft such as the F-117 Nighthawk move in electronic and infrared silence, but, in complex strikes, that is not the case. If a stealthy aircraft is hard to find on radar when there are no other targets in the sky, imagine how much it is harder to find if there are radar jammers, blasting away at one's radar systems. The problem is rather like hearing the squeak of a timid mouse during a very noisy celebration.

While Glosson objected at first, the F-117 wing commander, COL Alton C. Whitney Jr., wanted supportive jamming to distract the Iraqis from the incoming "Black Jets" in the night, adding to the distraction already spread by cruise missiles (Air Force and Navy, most with explosive warheads), drone decoys, and anti-radiation missiles. The combined approach worked well.

Exotic weapons

A warhead does not always need explosives to be devastating. Iraqi air defense and C3I generally depended more on commercial electrical power than countries that not only have complete generators, but backup generators for their military systems. The Navy had developed the KIT-18 carbon filament spool payload for BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Vaguely reminiscent of spiders spinning webs, the cruise missiles flew across power lines, spooling out the thin filament, which still could cause massive circuits on the power lines. This had the advantage of knocking out power, but not destroying the hard-to-replace generators and other large components needed to restore civilian service.

SCUD surprises

Iraq was known to have both imported versions of the Soviet SS-1 SCUD ballistic missile, as well as domestic clones and derivatives. The derivatives gave up already small payload for increased range, and usually with reduced accuracy. U.S. intelligence knew about most of the fixed SCUD bases, but badly underestimated the number of mobile launchers and the skill of their crews.

The concern was not so much that the SCUD was a truly dangerous weapon. It was at the level of sophistication of a World War II V-2 missile, considered to operate with adequate accuracy if it could hit something as small as a metropolitan area. Had it had a nuclear warhead, the power of the warhead could have compensated for the inaccuracy -- but the Iraqis did not have any. There was also concern that they mught have chemical or biological warheads, but, again, while they had a WMD development program, they had not worked out the details of weaponizing. As one example, while a ton of nerve agent in a warhead is frightening, the reality is that it cannot simply be burst with an explosive charge and expected to have a tactical effect. If for no other reason, nerve agents are inflammable and a burster charge may simply cause them to burn harmlessly.

The real danger

Given that the SCUD family were merely psychological weapons that still could cause casualties, when Iraq started shooting SCUDs at Israel, there was intense Israeli political reaction. At first, the Israelis demanded the right to go after the launchers, but there was very real concern that the overt participation of Israel could split off the Arab members of the Coalition.

Countermeasures

Detection

U.S. Defense Support Program (DSP) early warning satellites, which detected sudden heat bursts such as that generated by a missile launch, did detect the SCUD launches, and sent the information to the strategic warning center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. The information was then radioed, on a high-priority basis, to the theater of operations.

What remains somewhat unclear is whether the DSP satellites only gave a general warning, or if they located the launch points with enough precision so that special operations troops and attack aircraft had a chance to get to the launch site and destroy the launcher, before the Iraqis moved it.

Ground and air operations

During the 1991 Gulf War, British SAS and United States Army Special Forces units were sent on SR to find mobile Iraqi SCUD launchers, originally to direct air strikes onto them. When air support was delayed, however, the patrols might attack key SCUD system elements with their organic weapons and explosives.

During this conflict, the US senior commanders, Colin Powell and [H Norman Schwarzkopf Jr.]], were opposed to using ground troops to search for Iraqi mobile Scud launchers. This was a part of Schwarzkopf's greater disdain for special operations. Under Israeli pressure to send its own SOF teams into western Iraq, and the realization that British SAS were already hunting Scuds, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney proposed using US SR teams as well as SAS

On February 7, US SR teams joined British teams in the hunt for mobile Scud launchers . Open sources contain relatively little operational information about U.S. SOF activities in western Iraq. Some basic elements have emerged, however. Operating at night, Air Force MH-53 Pave Low and Army MH-47E helicopters would ferry SOF ground teams and their specially equipped four-wheel-drive vehicles from bases in Saudi Arabia to Iraq . The SOF personnel would patrol during the night and hide during the day. When targets were discovered, United States Air Force Combat Control teams accompanying the ground forces would communicate over secure radios to E-3 Sentry airborne command posts.

Ballistic missile defense

In principle, the available version of the United States Army MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile had a capability against short-range ballistic missiles. Patriots were deployed in Saudi Arabia, but, as an emergency measure to mollify the Israelis, several batteries were sent to Israel.

There were reports, at the time, that the Patriots were stopping every SCUD, and later reports they had no effect at all. The answer is somewhere in between. Part of the problem was the SCUDs, and especially the SCUD derivatives, tended to break up in flight. The missile would home on the larger pieces of fuel tank, rather than the actual warhead.

In the most serious incident, where a single SCUD hit a U.S. barracks in Dharain, killing 28 and wounding over 100 soldiers, it was later found that a software bug had caused the Patriot system to decide that particular SCUD was not a threat, and it was not engaged. The software fix was known, but simply was not installed on the launchers and radars protecting Dharain.

Khafji: an attempted counteroffensive

Khafji is a coastal city inside Saudi Arabia, which was deserted on January 29, 1991. Iraq launched its only organized ground offensive into Saudi Arabia, apparently to capture Khafji. At the time, and even today, the Iraqi intentions are not completely clear. Drawing on patterns from the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq had a pattern of sending an armored probe against Iran, inviting a pursuit, and then leading the enemy into strong defensive areas, covered by preregistered Iraqi artillery.

Given the ineffectiveness of Iraqi air, Saddam may have decided that since his regular army III Corps was still intact, a limited ground attack, drawing Coalition forces into his defensive belt, might be just the thing to cause the casualties he believed would break the opponents' will.

It took several days to assemble the attack force, which was under constant surveillance, especially by the E-8 Joint STARS. United States Marine Corps forces had been in the Khafji area, with some large and important logistics bases outside the city. When the Iraqi forces began moving toward Khafji, a number of Marine forces fell back to a prepared defensive line, although two small observation teams, led by corporals, stayed in Khafji.