Attacks on RSA: Difference between revisions
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Any efficient solution to the [[integer factorisation]] problem would break RSA; see the [[RSA#RSA_and_factoring | RSA article]] for discussion. The difficulty with that approach is that no efficient solution is known. Cracking a large (say 1024 bits or more) RSA key with current factoring algorithms is not practical, even with massive parallelism. | Any efficient solution to the [[integer factorisation]] problem would break RSA; see the [[RSA#RSA_and_factoring | RSA article]] for discussion. The difficulty with that approach is that no efficient solution is known. Cracking a large (say 1024 bits or more) RSA key with current factoring algorithms is not practical, even with massive parallelism. | ||
== Weiner attack == | |||
Michael Weiner proposed an attack <ref>{{cite paper | |||
| title=Cryptanalysis of short RSA secret exponents | |||
| author=Wiener, M.J. | |||
| journal=IEEE Transactions on Information Theory | |||
| volume=36 | |||
| issue=3 | |||
| date=May 1990}}</ref> based on [[continued fraction]]s which is effective if the exponent in the secret key is small. There have since been many papers proposing improvements on or variants of that attack. | |||
== TWIRL == | |||
'''The Weizmann Instiute Relation Locator''' <ref>{{cite paper | |||
| author=Adi Shamir & Eran Tromer | |||
| title=On the cost of factoring RSA-1024 | |||
| journal=RSA CryptoBytes | |||
| volume=6 | |||
| date=2003 | |||
| url=http://people.csail.mit.edu/tromer/ | |||
}}</ref>, developed by [[Adi Shamir]] (The 'S' in RSA) and [[Eran Tromer]], is a machine designed to speed up the seiving step in the [[number field seive]] technique for [[integer factorisation]]. | |||
RSA Security have commented [http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2004]. | |||
==References== | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
== Weiner attack == | == Weiner attack == |
Revision as of 09:17, 3 March 2010
A number of methods have been proposed for attacking the RSA cryptosystem. This article describes them.
Any efficient solution to the integer factorisation problem would break RSA; see the RSA article for discussion. The difficulty with that approach is that no efficient solution is known. Cracking a large (say 1024 bits or more) RSA key with current factoring algorithms is not practical, even with massive parallelism.
Weiner attack
Michael Weiner proposed an attack [1] based on continued fractions which is effective if the exponent in the secret key is small. There have since been many papers proposing improvements on or variants of that attack.
TWIRL
The Weizmann Instiute Relation Locator [2], developed by Adi Shamir (The 'S' in RSA) and Eran Tromer, is a machine designed to speed up the seiving step in the number field seive technique for integer factorisation.
RSA Security have commented [1].
References
- ↑ Wiener, M.J. (May 1990). "Cryptanalysis of short RSA secret exponents".
- ↑ Adi Shamir & Eran Tromer (2003). On the cost of factoring RSA-1024.
Weiner attack
Michael Weiner proposed an attack [1] based on continued fractions which is effective if the exponent in the secret key is small. There have since been many papers proposing improvements on or variants of that attack.
TWIRL
The Weizmann Instiute Relation Locator [2], developed by Adi Shamir (The 'S' in RSA) and Eran Tromer, is a machine designed to speed up the seiving step in the number field seive technique for integer factorisation.
RSA Security have commented [2].
References
- ↑ Wiener, M.J. (May 1990). "Cryptanalysis of short RSA secret exponents".
- ↑ Adi Shamir & Eran Tromer (2003). On the cost of factoring RSA-1024.