Shigeru Honjo: Difference between revisions

From Citizendium
Jump to navigation Jump to search
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz
No edit summary
(PropDel)
(3 intermediate revisions by one other user not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{PropDel}}<br><br>
{{subpages}}
{{subpages}}
{{TOC|right}}
{{TOC|right}}
'''Shigeru Honjo''' (1887-1945) was an [[Imperial Japanese Army]] officer, a protege of Emperor [[Taisho]] and Military Academy classmate of [[Sadao Araki]], who headed the [[Kwangtung Army]] during the [[Manchuria Incident]]. From 1933 to 1936, he was Chief Aide-de-Camp to Emperor [[Hirohito]], but resigned due to his nephew's involvement in the [[February 26, 1936 Incident]].  The nature of his resignation was such that he did not lose Imperial favor, and was an informal adviser until the end of [[World War Two in the Pacific]].<ref name=DB1091>{{citation
'''Shigeru Honjo''' (1887-1945) was an [[Imperial Japanese Army]] officer, a protege of Emperor [[Taisho]] and Military Academy classmate of [[Sadao Araki]], who headed the [[Kwangtung Army]] during the [[Manchurian Incident]]. From 1933 to 1936, he was Chief Aide-de-Camp to Emperor [[Hirohito]], but resigned due to his nephew's involvement in the [[February 26, 1936 Incident]].  The nature of his resignation was such that he did not lose Imperial favor, and was an informal adviser until the end of [[World War Two in the Pacific]].<ref name=DB1091>{{citation
  | title= Japan's Imperial Conspiracy
  | title= Japan's Imperial Conspiracy
  | author = David Bergamini
  | author = David Bergamini
Line 8: Line 9:
At an August 1931 conference of field commanders at the Summer palace, Honjo, taking command of the Kwangtung Army, was briefed, along with [[Teiichi Suzuki]] and [[Seishiro Itagaki]], on clandestine communication with the Palace.  War Minister [[Jiro Minami]] was not aware of the planning, and the generals were advised not to tell him too much, since he would be the intermediary between the Palace and the Cabinet.<ref>Bergamini, pp. 418-419</ref>
At an August 1931 conference of field commanders at the Summer palace, Honjo, taking command of the Kwangtung Army, was briefed, along with [[Teiichi Suzuki]] and [[Seishiro Itagaki]], on clandestine communication with the Palace.  War Minister [[Jiro Minami]] was not aware of the planning, and the generals were advised not to tell him too much, since he would be the intermediary between the Palace and the Cabinet.<ref>Bergamini, pp. 418-419</ref>


He was succeeded, in 1932, by [[Nobuyoshi Muto]]. Muto was reassigned from his position as [[Inspector-General of Military Education]] after cadets assassinated Prime Minister [[Tsuyoshi  Inukai]]<ref>{{citation
He was succeeded, in 1932, by [[Nobuyoshi Muto]]. Muto was reassigned from his position as [[Inspector General of Military Education]] after cadets assassinated Prime Minister [[Tsuyoshi  Inukai]].<ref>{{citation
  | url = http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,744123,00.html
  | url = http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,744123,00.html
  | journal = Time
  | journal = Time
  | title = JAPAN: Murder, Muto & Manchuria
  | title = JAPAN: Murder, Muto & Manchuria
  | date = 8 August 1932}}</ref>
  | date = 8 August 1932}}</ref>
==February 1936==
==February 1936==
During the February 1936 incident, he was a go-between and presented the Young Officers' view, "The spirit in which it was done was one of esteem for Emperor and country and we should not blame them", but had to convey Hirohito's reaction, <blockquote>Why should we forgive them when these brutal officers kill our right-hand advisers? ... All my most trusted retainers are dead and [the mutineers'] actions are aimed directly at me...We ourselves will lead the Imperial Guards and suppress them.<ref>{{citation
During the February 1936 incident, he was a go-between and presented the Young Officers' view, "The spirit in which it was done was one of esteem for Emperor and country and we should not blame them", but had to convey Hirohito's reaction, <blockquote>Why should we forgive them when these brutal officers kill our right-hand advisers? ... All my most trusted retainers are dead and [the mutineers'] actions are aimed directly at me...We ourselves will lead the Imperial Guards and suppress them.<ref>{{citation

Revision as of 13:13, 11 September 2024

This article may be deleted soon.
To oppose or discuss a nomination, please go to CZ:Proposed for deletion and follow the instructions.

For the monthly nomination lists, see
Category:Articles for deletion.


This article is developing and not approved.
Main Article
Discussion
Related Articles  [?]
Bibliography  [?]
External Links  [?]
Citable Version  [?]
 
This editable Main Article is under development and subject to a disclaimer.

Shigeru Honjo (1887-1945) was an Imperial Japanese Army officer, a protege of Emperor Taisho and Military Academy classmate of Sadao Araki, who headed the Kwangtung Army during the Manchurian Incident. From 1933 to 1936, he was Chief Aide-de-Camp to Emperor Hirohito, but resigned due to his nephew's involvement in the February 26, 1936 Incident. The nature of his resignation was such that he did not lose Imperial favor, and was an informal adviser until the end of World War Two in the Pacific.[1]

Manchuria

At an August 1931 conference of field commanders at the Summer palace, Honjo, taking command of the Kwangtung Army, was briefed, along with Teiichi Suzuki and Seishiro Itagaki, on clandestine communication with the Palace. War Minister Jiro Minami was not aware of the planning, and the generals were advised not to tell him too much, since he would be the intermediary between the Palace and the Cabinet.[2]

He was succeeded, in 1932, by Nobuyoshi Muto. Muto was reassigned from his position as Inspector General of Military Education after cadets assassinated Prime Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai.[3]

February 1936

During the February 1936 incident, he was a go-between and presented the Young Officers' view, "The spirit in which it was done was one of esteem for Emperor and country and we should not blame them", but had to convey Hirohito's reaction,

Why should we forgive them when these brutal officers kill our right-hand advisers? ... All my most trusted retainers are dead and [the mutineers'] actions are aimed directly at me...We ourselves will lead the Imperial Guards and suppress them.[4]

Postwar

Informed that he was to be arrested as a major war criminal by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, he committed seppuku in 1945.

References

  1. David Bergamini (1971), Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, Morrow, p. 1089
  2. Bergamini, pp. 418-419
  3. "JAPAN: Murder, Muto & Manchuria", Time, 8 August 1932
  4. Merion and Susie Harris (1991), Soldiers of the Sun: the Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army, Random House, p. 190