Gulf War (Iraq, 1991)

work in progress

Formally beginning with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and ending with the cease-fire on 6 April 1991, the Gulf War was preceded by the Iran-Iraq War, with tensions following that conflict's end in 1988, and followed by new tensions culminating with the U.S.-led Iraq War in 2003. It is not definitively known if Saddam deliberately ended the Iran-Iraq war to prepare for the Gulf War.

The Gulf War involved the occupation of Kuwait and Kuwaiti resistance, the defense of Saudi Arabia by a growing coalition led by the United States, an intensive air campaign reducing Iraq's military, and a ground campaign that ejected the Iraqis and led to a cease-fire. Following the cease-fire was a period of interactions with a truculent Iraq, ensuring the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction and enforcing "no fly zones" in the North and South of Iraq. Eventually, Iraq was invaded in the 2003 Iraq War, with the disarming of the regular Iraqi military, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government, and an open-ended occupation and attempts at nation-building.

The war was notable for the extremely high level of technology used by the Coalition, with the use of SS-1 SCUD missiles as psychological weapons for attack. Coalition combat casualties were minimal, the number from fratricide and non-battle accidents comparable to those inflicted by the Iraqis. The war was also notable for not creating a clear peace, although the politics of the region prevented a replacement of the Hussein government.

Background

Leading up to the Iraqi invasion was a period of brinksmanship and diplomatic miscommunication starting not long after the end of the Iran-Iraq War.

U.S. command structures

At the time of the invasion of Kuwait, the region was the responsibility of United States Central Command, formed in 1983. Earlier, there had been a lack of focus in U.S. military command and control; the volatile Middle East had variously been parceled out to United States European Command, and a general Strike Command that was described as a contingency rather than geographic headquarters.

Even after Central Command had formed, most planning focused on blocking Soviet moves, especially a southern move to the Iranian oil fields, and then across the Zagros Mountains into Iraq. In July 1989, eight months after being named head of Central Command, H Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. rethought the fundamental problems. Eventually, he presented an alternative emphasis to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense, suggesting contingency planning with Iraq as the aggressor, Schwarzkopf found that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell was an ally in rethinking the requirements.

Moving quite quickly for a large command, Schwarzkopf was able to reorient war plans and schedule the annual command post exercise (i.e., war games involving command staffs, not field deployments), INTERNAL LOOK, to address, in in the summer of 1990, an attack by Iraq. Schwarzkopf said that the exercise, conducted in July 1990, had simulated intelligence about Iraq that came so close to the reality that the communications center had to stamp the INTERNAL LOOK messages with a bold EXERCISE ONLY.

Hussein-Glaspie meetings

On July 25, 1990, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, met with Saddam Hussein. There are different accounts of whether Saddam was warned not to open hostilities, or if things could have been construed as the U.S. remaining neutral. Iraq had issued a transcript that suggested that the U.S. gave no strong warning. The New York Times reported that U.S. State Department issues, on receiving Glaspie's account, were unclear how strong a warning had been given, but that Administration sources said they did not want to make an issue of it at the time, because that might interfere with coalition-building.

In the hearing, Representative Lee H. Hamilton, (Democrat, Indiana) the Ambassador if she had ever told Saddam that the U.S. would fight if Iraq invaded, and she said she did not explicitly do so. In response to Hamilton's question about his being deterred, she said: " I told him we would defend our vital interests. He complained to me for one hour about fleet movements and American neo-imperialism and militarism. He knew perfectly well what we were talking about, and it would have been absolutely wrong for me, without consulting with the President, to inform anybody of a change in our policy. Our policy was that we would defend our vital interests. It's up to the President to decide how we would do it. Saddam Hussein, who is a man who lives by the sword, believed that we were going to do it by the sword."

Specific indications of imminent invasion

On July 19, the CIA National Intelligence Daily reported "Baghdad is Threatening Effective Sanctions against UAE and Kuwait", followed on July 24 with "Iraq has adequate forces and supplies for military operations [in Kuwait]".

On July 17th, two weeks prior to the invasion, a US KH-11 imagery intelligence reconnaissance satellite "passing over the previously empty desert area between Iraq and Kuwait spotted Iraqi troops assembling on the Iraqi side of the border." In the next week, imagery interpreters "identified over the next week a formidable Iraqi force that included 300 of Saddam Hussein's most modern T-72 tanks, an elite Republican Guard division, and about 35,000 Iraqi troops poised in a coil formation on Kuwait's northern border. Even more ominous, a long line of fuel trucks had joined the tail of the coil, indicating the force was prepared to move an extended distance."

U.S. intelligence moved to a specific attack warning on August 1. One of the indicators was satellite imagery intelligence that showed tanks and other tracked vehicles had:

• moved off the wheeled tank transporters used to protect their tracks from wear
• on many vehicles, changed to a new set of tracks, an exhausting, dirty job that may save one's life going into battle.

The Republican Guard, meanwhile, had moved several divisions south, on tank transporters, as well as a large amount of field bridge construction equipment for crossing obstacles.

Walter (Pat) Lang, DIA Defense Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, reported large numbers of Iraqi troops moving into an area in southern Iraq, where the Iraqis had a training facility but also could be using as a staging area.

Along with Lang, Charles Eugene Allen, the Central Intelligence Agency national intelligence officer for warning. They had little doubt that this was an invasion force preparing to attack Kuwait. By July 23 the DIA was conducting twice-a-day briefings on the Iraqi deployments. On August 1, Allen (correctly) warned the National Security Council's staff that Iraq would invade Kuwait with 24 hours.

Considering the U.S. Response

On August 4, Schwarzkopf and his air commander, Chuck Horner, met with President George H.W. Bush, Powell, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Vice President Dan Quayle, [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State James Baker, White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft and Director of Central Intelligence William Webster. Schwarzkopf described the phases of commitment:

1. immediate: U.S. "tripwire" presence of a 4,000 soldier division ready brigade from the [[82nd Airborne Division, followed by Marines with somewhat heavier equipment
2. 1-3 months: a tank-killing air assault brigade, a brigade of mechanized infantry, hundreds of aircraft on Saudi airfields, and two carrier task groups. This was the minimum to fend off a full-scale Iraqi offense.
3. 8-10 months (minimum): at least 6 more divisions, probably 2-3 corps headquarters, and much more air. This was the requirement to eject Iraq from Kuwait.

The attendees were surprised at the size of forces needed, and there was not yet any guarantee the Saudis would accept them. Nevertheless, the highest levels of the U.S. government heard, and apparently listened to, professional estimates of reality. Note that even the largest force mission was to eject the Iraqis and leave. No continuing large-scale presence was considered, which would later become a key factor for Saudi agreement.

The Iraqi Government and Military

Iraq's civilian, security, and military apparatus was under the strongly centralized control of Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle, many of whom came from clansmen from Tikrit, Iraq. As such, Hussein was the center of gravity of the entire Iraqi structure.

Iraq, as a result of the Iran-Iraq War, was considered to have an experienced military, generally operating under centralized Soviet doctrine. It should be remembered, however, that the Iran-Iraq War was largely a bloody stalemate. Neither side carried out effective deep operations on land or in the air. Iraq did demonstrate an ability to build very good static defensive lines, which, when attacked frontally, inflicted great numbers of Iranian casualties. It should not be forgotten, however, that the Maginot Line was capable of inflicting great numbers of German casualties, if the Germans had obliged the French assumptions by striking into that defensive line, rather than going around it. Saddam, whose opinions were decisive, did not fully understand how mobile a modern force could be, especially if it avoided static defenses and did not try to conduct an occupation of hostile territory.

Security and military organizations

Iraq security and military organization formed concentric circles around Saddam, the innermost concerned only with his security, only leaving Baghdad to escort him. Moving outwards, conventional military units, some of substantial capability, were equipped and trained proportionately to the political reliability of their leadership. In addition, there were a wide range of intelligence and secret police organizations outside these circles.

Beyond his immediate bodyguards, the circles of land units, the first two of which stayed with Saddam, were:

1. Special Security Organization
2. Special Republican Guard
3. Republican Guard
4. Regular military divisions
5. Conscript divisions

KARI: Iraqi air defense

French Thomson-CSF had built what appeared to be an extensive integrated air defense system (IADS) for Iraq, called KARI. The Iraqis, however, used it with a more Soviet doctrine that discouraged local decisionmaking.

The overall defense had three levels:

1. National/strategic, operated by the Iraqi Air Force
2. Key point defense, operated by the Republican Guard
3. Mobile, operated by the Iraqi Army

Iraqi air defense weapons and infrastructure were substantial,; their training and doctrine were the most limiting factors. The Iraqis began with:

• the KARI IADS
• roughly 7,000 SAMs
• 10,000 anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) guns.
• Aircraft including Mirage F1, Su-24, MiG-25 and MiG-29
• twenty four very large and heavily fortified main operating bases and a further thirty major dispersal airfields. "virtually impossible to close for an extended period even with advanced weapons and large numbers of aircraft."

Category	Quantity	Type(s)
KARI integrated air defense system	--	French and Russian electronics, mostly Russian doctrine
surface-to-air missiles	Approximately 7,000	Soviet SA-2 GUIDELINE, SA-3 GOA, SA-6 GAINFUL;
anti-aircraft artillery	Approximately 10,000	-
Fighter aircraft		French Mirage F-1; Soviet MiG-25,MiG-29

If the Allied numerical superiority over the Iraqi air forces was very great, their technological superiority in terms both of platforms and weapons was even more marked. At the outbreak of hostilities, the technological level of Iraqi order of battle was variable. Although the Iraqis possessed advanced aircraft, perhaps half of their Air Force's front line consisted of variants of obsolescent MiG and Sukhoi designs.

(According to the IISS Military Balance 1990/1991 the Iraqi Air Force order of battle in Autumn 1989 consisted of two squadrons of bombers equipped with eight Tu-22s, four Tu-16s and four Chinese H-6Ds; Twenty two squadrons of fighter ground attack aircraft (equipped with ninety MiG-23BNs, sixty four Mirage F-1s, thirty Su-7s, seventy Su-20s, sixteen Su-24s and sixty Su-25s) and seventeen squadrons of air defence fighters (equipped with twenty five MiG-25s, forty J-7s, one hundred and fifty MiG-21s, thirty Mirage F-1s and thirty MiG-29s).

Area defense

Early warning radars, at this level, included the SPOON REST, SQUAT EYE and FLAT FACE radar. At the next level, the individual SAM regiments had search and coordination radars appropriate to the specific missile type (e.g., SA-2 GUIDELINE, SA-3 GOA, SA-6 GAINFUL). Individual firing batteries and launchers also had electronics appropriate to the missiles.

SA-2 and SA-3 missiles were the major systems, with the low-to-medium altitude SA-6 placed in likely gaps through which hostile aircraft were apt to try to "leak".

Point defense

Critical but fixed targets were covered by a total of approximately 250 Franco-German Euromissile Roland and Soviet SA-8 GECKO missiles with their appropriate radars. Using Soviet air defense doctrinal assumptions, these would be organized into from 65 to 140 firing batteries.

Roland and Gecko both have radars on each Transporter-Erector-Launcher, known as a TELAR configuration.

Mobile

Some Rolands and Geckos were assigned to mobile Army roles, along with vehicle mounted SA-9 GASKIN/9K31 Strela-1 and their replacement, the SA-13 GOPHER/ZRK-BD Strela-10.

The remaining Army weapons were man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS): SA-5 GRAIL of two versions plus the Chinese HN-5A, and the later Russian SA-14 GREMLIN.

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

air assault and armored movements

Saddam closed the borders of Iraq and Kuwait on August 9, trapping approximately 13,000 foreigners, as he continued to send reinforcements into Kuwait. Iraqi forces were estimated as 130,000 troops, 1,200 tanks, and 900 artillery pieces with chemical warfare capability. In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 664 on 18 August 1990, demanding that Iraq allow third party nationals to depart Kuwait.

Defense of Saudi Arabia

It took negotiation at the highest levels before the Saudis agreed to have foreign troops in their country. King Fahd asked for a briefing on August 4, and agreed to the deployment on August 6.

On August 7, OPERATION DESERT SHIELD formally began.Once there was approval, the first units that arrived were United States Air Force F-15 Eagle air superiority fighters and E-3 Sentry early warning radar and air battle command post aircraft. The Saudis themselves operated versions of both aircraft types. There appears to have been initial surprise by the Saudis on the size of the ground support organization needed just for these aircraft.

Aircraft carriers and warships capable of launching cruise missiles deployed to international waters. The first significant land forces unit was the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, the division ready brigade of which arrived on 14 August, with the full division in theater on 29 August. The 82nd was variously called a tripwire, or, more cynically, a "speed bump", as a paratroop division could not have directly fought Iraqi armored units. Until U.S. armored units, such as the 24th Infantry Division could arrive, the 82nd could only stay in light contact with Iraqi units, with carrier aircraft being the major weapon.

On August 23, before the Saudis had agreed to the full force, the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions pulled back from the Kuwait-Saudi border. This was not a move of fear, but a consolidation of forces and putting the strongest troops into a position where they could maneuver. . U.S. News described this as "withdrawing".

Had Saddam chosen to move immediately into Saudi Arabia, especially for a short distance, little could stop him until more forces arrived. His thinking has never really been explained.

Attempts to prevent all-out hostilities

Following the invasion, there were a number of diplomatic initiatives to find a peaceful solution, and hopes that the formation of what became a 34-nation coalition might give second thoughts to Saddam Hussein.

The United Nations, in an unprecedented way, had played a crucial role throughout the eight-month international crisis, which began on 2 August 1990 when Iraq invaded, occupied and annexed its neighbour--the tiny, oil-rich State of Kuwait--calling it an "integral part" of Iraq.

After the Iraqi invasion but before Coalition combat operations began, the UN Security Council, with majority votes, adopted 15 resolutions related to the crisis, among other things: condemning the initial invasion; calling for Iraqi troop withdrawal and protection of prisoners of war, diplomas and civilians; imposing strong, mandatory, comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq until it complied with its demands; arranging for aid to innocent victims of the conflict and countries economically affected by the embargo; and setting a deadline before authorizing the use of "all necessary means" to restore international peace and security in the area.

UNSC Resolution 665, of August 25, authorized a maritime blockade. Resolution 678, passed November 29, invokes Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which can include military action.

The deadline passed. And a seven-week war took place--waged by a coalition of troops representing 34 nationalities--to oust Iraq from Kuwait. Resolution 686, of 2 March 1991 after the cease-fire, demanded provocative overflights stop and provided the basis of no-fly operations.

Preparing for operations against Iraq

From the first deployment of foreign troops into Saudi Arabia, a variety of options were considered to force the Iraqis out of Kuwait. While some of the air planners believed, perhaps for the first time with the technology to have a real chance of following through, that they could put enough pressure on the Iraqis, Schwarzkopf, Powell, and other senior commanders assumed a ground attack would be needed if diplomacy failed.

The nature of a ground offensive, however, was controversial in the U.S. military, to say nothing of the Saudis and other coalition members. At first, until the tanks of the 24th Division arrived in September 12, there was much concern about the light forces of the 82nd Airborne Division even holding ground. When the XVIII Airborne Corps was present, Schwarzkopf and the planners still felt that a single corps, and not a heavy corps, really did not give a good counteroffensive option.

Eventually, the highest U.S., Saudi, and other national levels agreed a stronger force would be needed. An active defense, followed by an air offensive, was seen as the way to bring in adequate ground force.

Air Planning

GEN Schwarzkopf asked for assistance in planning an air counterattack, and COL John Warden III presented the original draft concept, called INSTANT THUNDER, for the 1991 Gulf War air campaign to GEN (ret.) Chuck Horner, then a lieutenant general commanding Schwarzkopf's air component (CENTAF) for United States Central Command. According to a book by Horner (coauthored by Tom Clancy), Horner found his personality immediately clashed with Warden's, although there wee good ideas in the presentation. Sound thinking was involved, one member of the Checkmate. David Deptula, teamed stayed in Saudi Arabia, and now is himself a lieutenant general, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, United States Air Force. Horner looked further for a compatible air operations planners, and selected Buster Glosson.

The problems first seemed a matter of personalities. GEN H Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., commanding United States Central Command during the Gulf War, spoke well of Warden's original air war concepts. Schwarzkopf did express concern that Warden saw the air component winning the war, and did not provide enough support to land forces.

In his August 10 presentation, Warden modeled the Iraqi system as a set of five concentric circles, with Saddam and his C3I at the center. Next came the industrial and other infrastructure needed to sustain a war, such as the electrical grid. In the third ring was transprtation, with the fourth ring as the civilian population and its food supply. The outermost, and to Warden the least important, ring was the enemy's conventional military forces. Warden was not insistent that the centers of gravity would always be the same:

The enemy's air [in the sense of air targeting] center of gravity may lie in equipment...in logistics...geography...in personnel...or in command and control.

Putting the Iraqi army as the lowest priority clashed with Schwarzkopf, who, while an advisor to South Vietnamese forces, objected that his unit did not have enough air support. A U.S. colonel, not in Schwarzkopf's chain of command, asked Schwarzkopf, sarcastically, what would be enough. Schwarzkopf, then a captain, replied:

Sir, when it's my a** out there on the ground, about a hundred B-52s circling around would be just barely adequate. Now, I'm willing to settle for something less, but I'm not willing to settle for nothing.

Throughout the Gulf War, Schwarzkopf wanted most support plans to include area bombing by B-52s against troops in the field, even when more modern precision-guided munitions might be more effective for a specific objective, and an objective, such as Saddam's communications, might be more critical than the Republican Guard. This is not meant as serious criticism of Schwarzkopf, but to illustrate the kinds of cultural conflicts that take place between different services, or even between different branches of different services — Schwarzkopf, who came up from a regular Infantry background, disliked Army Special Forces, although he commended them for their performance at the end of the Gulf War. Warden had written

if our tools in the Iraq case had been similar to those available in World War II, we would have been compelled to attack Iraq serially, and we would have started with some part of its air defense system. If we were very lucky, after a long period of time, we might have been able to start the reduction of the key inner rings but that would have been far into the future.

The actual campaign attacked both inner and outer rings simultaneously, but Glosson was able to present these ideas in a way acceptable to Horner and Schwarzkopf.

Increasing the tension, Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Dugan gave an interview, published on September 16, not only suggesting that the Air Force could be decisive, but giving clues to the evolving INSTANT THUNDER plan. Cheney immediately fired him.

Ground forces: active unit deployment, reserve callups

Central Command's Army Component (ARCENT) was formed around the headquarters, Third United States Army (LTG John Yeosock). Cole interprets Atkinson as saying that Schwarzkopf also disliked Yeosock's methodical, refused to make him land forces commander, and often bypassed Yeosock and gave direct orders to Yeosock's subordinate corps. Cole, however, says Atkinson overemphasized Schwarzkopf's personality as an issue. In the first phase of building up U.S. forces, the main conventional ground units were the XVIII Airborne Corps (LTG Gary Luck) and its constituent 82nd Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 24th Infantry Division, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. 2nd Armored Division and 1st Cavalry Division were in CENTCOM reserve.

In addition, the I Marine Expeditionary Force (LTG Walter Boomer), a corps-sized formation including more aircraft than a comparable Army organization, deployed. A brigade-sized Marine force remained afloat, on ampbibious ships.

The issue of land forces command

While all air and naval forces in CENTCOM had their own components, there was a disunity of command in land forces, with the Army regular troops under III Army, and the Marines under I MEF. In the 1944 invasion of Europe, Dwight D. Eisenhower elected to have an overall land forces commander, Bernard Law Montgomery, reporting to him, with the armies and army groups reporting through Montgomery.

Schwarzkopf chose to wear the "dual hats" of CENTCOM commander and land forces commander, rather than assign it to John Yeosock, ARCENT and Third United States Army commander.

Buildup of land forces

Schwarzkopf asked for a planning team to work out advanced options, and received four officers, recent graduates of the new School of Advanced Military Studies, whose graduates were known, inside the army, as the "Jedi Knights".. Arriving on September 14, what became the Special Plans Group prepared the two-corps plan.

CENTCOM had roughed out the one-corps "high-risk" offensive option on 6 October, using the XVIII Airborne Corps and I MEF CENTCOM's chiefs of operations and planning respectively, were Navy and Air Force officers, and there was concern that the staff, without augmentation, could develop a strong land warfare plan. <Gordon & Trainor, p. 125</ref> Air warfare was in much better shape.

A fundamental challenge was the CENTCOM position that a second, armor-heavy corps would be necessary to take offensive action against the Iraqis in Kuwait. This was briefed to the White House on October 11, and, according to Powell, advisors thought CENTCOM had enough force, and called Schwarzkopf another " [George]" McClellan, a Union commander in the American Civil War who was hesitant to go on the offensive. Gordon and Trainor reported that the Civil War critic was National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, an Air Force lieutenant general

On October 29, Schwarzkopf recounted that Powell told him that a frustrated Cheney had come up with his own plan, judged of extreme risk. Criticism flowed back and forth for a week. On 2 November, Schwarzkopf met with the Saudi leadership over the delicate question of ultimate command authority in a coalition. The compromise was that Schwarzkopf and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Khalid bin Sultan al-Saud, were to be co-equals, but the CENTCOM commander would have final authority for operational decisionms.

After significant discussion, on November 8, CENTCOM it was made public that it had been given even a larger force than originally requested, VII Corps (LTG Fred Franks), which was being demobilized as part of draw-downs in Europe, was designated as the second Army corps. Commitments also were made to upgrade all M1 Abrams tank guns to the newer 120mm version; civil servant volunteers from the U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Command set up an overhaul facility, at the port of entry into Saudi Arabia, to upgrade guns, armor, and other systems.

According to Cole's review of Rich Atkinson's book, Crusade,

From the moment Franks arrived in Saudi Arabia, if not before, Schwarzkopf took an immediate dislike to the man. Atkinson says that Schwarzkopf privately dismissed Franks as a pedant with an ability to mask battlefield timidity with verbose and theoretical lectures on tactics and operational maneuvering.

Without judging pedantic styles, it should be noted that Schwarzkopf's staff experience was in operations, finance, or personnel; he taught engineering at West Point. After Desert Storm, Franks was promoted to the four-star commander of Training and Doctrine Command, the pinnacle of Army concept development. Simply comparing their assignments shows them to have very different personalities.

The President used his authority to call up reserves, but, in practice, only combat support and combat service support units actually deployed to the theater of operations. Three National Guard combat brigades intended to "round out" U.S. Army divisions proved not to be combat ready.

The ground concept emerges

Scouting the desert, to the west of Kuwait, found little Iraqi presence. Terrain reconnaissance showed that the ground would support M1 Abrams tanks and heavier vehicles. While Cheney's original brainstorm of a move in the extreme west of Iraq, with forces moving to the western base, seemed too risky, there was more and more reason to believe that Saddam simply would not expect a "left hook" well to the west of Kuwait, which would then drive eastwards.

Some analysts believe Saddam had fixated on a Marine amphibious landing from the east, coupled with a frontal attack on Kuwait. CENTCOM was doing all they could to encourage his incorrect thinking, with visible amphibious rehearsals, such as an October 1 exercise, called Camel Sand, in Oman. While the Marines never made an combat landing, their activity drew Iraqi eyes, and, during the actual ground phase, Navy SEALs placed demolitions and other special effects on beaches, simulating a pre-landing bombardment.

Essential to the success of the left hook was that the Iraqis had to be unaware of the movement of the XVIII Corps from its positions near the Persian Gulf coast, to well inland, west of the Kuwait border with Iraq. CENTCOM took every possible step to deprive Iraq of any intelligence sensors more sophisticated than a pair of binoculars. Passing one military unit through another is always complex, and it became even more complex when the western force had to move through rear areas without detection. Making it even more difficult is that supply dumps had to be in position, along the route to the west, before the main troop units reached them.

Initial air strikes

By the time combat started, the Coalition had approximately 2,400 aircraft based either within the theatre of operations or close enough to be capable of projecting power into it. In contrast, the Iraqis had around 650.

Most of the initial air activity was aimed at suppression of enemy air defense, disrupting the leadership and its communications, and WMD targets. The first shots to hit Iraq came from U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, led to an early warning radar station on the Saudi border by U.S. Air Force MH-53 PAVE LOW special operations helicopters.

With some limited exceptions on the outskirts, only stealth F-117 aircraft flew into the Baghdad area, along with cruise missiles fired from ships and submarines in international waters, as well as from B-52 bombers flying 36-hour round trip missions from their U.S. bases. Non-stealthy aircraft, however, ranged all over Iraq, simply avoiding the strongest air defenses in Baghdad.

Suppressing KARI: Poobah's Party

Other than flying into the teeth of the Baghdad IADS, Coalition warplanes attacked all over Iraq and Kuwait, the Arab and Canadian pilots primarily in Kuwait alone. It may have seemed cheering to the Baghdad air defenders when they finally saw aircraft targets and turned on their targeting radars. What they were seeing, however, was a large proportion of all the drone aircraft in the U.S. Air Force and Navy inventory. Once the fire control radars revealed themselves, large numbers of SEAD aircraft on the outskirts of Baghdad showered those radars with AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles.

U.S. intelligence assets such as the RC-135 RIVET JOINT and EC-130 COMPASS CALL, as well as national-level satellite and other systems, constantly characterized the Iraqi system, even as the planning was in progress.

The SEAD plan, developed under the leadership of Glosson's deputy for electronic warfare, BG Larry Henry (call sign Poobah), had five main objectives:

1. Destroy/disrupt enemy command and control nodes
2. Disrupt electronic warfare/ground controlled intercept coverage and communications
3. Force Air Defensive Assets into Autonomous Modes (i.e., cut the missile and gun shooters away from the command and control network linking radars and senior air defense officers to the actual defenses)
4. Use expendable drones for deception
5. Employ maximum available AGM-88 HARM shooters

A number of these ideas came from the June 1982 Israeli campaign against the Syrian air defense system in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. While the actual damage figures are argued, destruction of 19 missile batteries and 87 fighters, with no Israeli losses, often is cited.

It has been said that the Bekaa Valley lessons made more of an impact on Navy than Air Force planners, with the Navy thinking more of taking down air defense befoe anything else, and with naval aviation being part of a larger campaign. Glosson, as well as other Air Force officers, hoped that air power alone could bring down Saddam.

Leadership targeting

While there was argument about the order of taking down parts of the Iraqi system, there was little argument that if Saddam could be neutralized, either by killing him or cutting his communications, Iraqi forces would be thrown into chaos. The multiple modes of attack against C3I have been described as "hyperwar":

Operation Desert Storm witnessed another unprecedented fusion of technology and strategy that was so intense; so destructive; that it has been called "Hyperwar." The primary offensive technological components of Hyperwar are stealthy aircraft and precision guided munitions. ...The first goal is politico-military decapitation of the enemy, achieved by destroying C3I (command, control, communication and information) targets. These assets include leadership and the assets that allow them to communicate with other decision-making cells and military resources.

Realities of stealth

O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible,

through you inaudible; and hence hold the enemy's fate in our hands.

— Sun Tzu,The Art of War, c. 500 B.C.

Some might say that the "Black Jet", or F-117 Nighthawk stealth attack bomber, was an icon of the Gulf War, striking critical targets. Others might argue that an invisible icon is a contradiction in terms. Nevertheless, stealth aircraft with precision-guided munitions were the only manned aircraft that went "downtown" to Baghdad, and hit a high proportion ofthe key targets. In many cases, the issue was more being aware of a target and getting its position, not hitting the target once its position was known. With certain "brilliant fuzes" on guided bombs, position did not simply mean latitude and longitude — a bomb could know that it had to penetrate four floors of a building, and only then explode.

There is a perception that stealth aircraft such as the F-117 Nighthawk move in electronic and infrared silence, but, in complex strikes, that is not the case. If a stealthy aircraft is hard to find on radar when there are no other targets in the sky, imagine how much it is harder to find if there are radar jammers, blasting away at one's radar systems. The problem is rather like hearing the squeak of a timid mouse during a very noisy celebration.

While Glosson objected at first, the F-117 wing commander, COL Alton C. Whitney Jr., wanted supportive jamming to distract the Iraqis from the incoming "Black Jets" in the night, adding to the distraction already spread by cruise missiles (Air Force and Navy, most with explosive warheads), drone decoys, and anti-radiation missiles. The combined approach worked well.

Iraqi response to Coalition offensive counter-air

Iraq had very little success in air-to-air combat against Coalition aircraft. While the degraded KARI system compared to the Coalition E-3 Sentry and EC-130 Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) C3I system certainly played a role in managing the air battle, Iraqi pilots seemed poorly trained in air combat. Iraqi pilots seemed not to react at all, or take defensive actions too late, when they were illuminated by Coalition fighter radar. After the Iraqi ground shelters proved quite vulnerable, Saddam apparently ordered his first-line aircraft to Iran, and was surprised when Iran would not return them.

The Gulf War Air Power Survey also commented on the poor training of Iraqi air-to-air pilots, confirming Cordesman's observations that their best pilots went into ground attack.

Exotic weapons

A warhead does not always need explosives to be devastating. Iraqi air defense and C3I generally depended more on commercial electrical power than countries that not only have complete generators, but backup generators for their military systems. The Navy had developed the KIT-18 carbon filament spool payload for BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Vaguely reminiscent of spiders spinning webs, the cruise missiles flew across power lines, spooling out the thin filament, which still could cause massive circuits on the power lines. This had the advantage of knocking out power, but not destroying the hard-to-replace generators and other large components needed to restore civilian service.

Expanding leadership targets, and the al Firdos bunker

In February, F-117's were regularly hitting top leadership targets, including the political as well as C3I for air defense. Alan Arkin, hardly an apologist for the U.S. military, reported that the Amiriyah shelter, known as the Al Firdos C3 bunker to U.S. war planners, was added to the target list in early February. Signals intelligence traced to it, and daytime photography of limousines and trucks outside it, led Air Force targeters to consider it "a newly activated Iraqi command shelter," perhaps to take over from other destroyed shelters.

Bombed on February 13, the Iraqis showed hundreds of civilians, "possibly the families of elite government and intelligence personnel, were using the shelter as a refuge to escape nighttime bombing. About 400 Iraqi civilians, mostly women and children, died in the attack. Another 200 were injured severely. U.S. intelligence never detected the civilian presence and still believes the shelter was used (at least during the day) by Iraq's intelligence agencies as a back-up communications post."

"Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell conferred and the air war planning office in Riyadh was ordered to get approval for any subsequent downtown targets selected for attack." Arkin reports that on a later visit to Baghdad, he encountered a very similar shelter under another government building, also not clearly associated with military operations but probably with the elite.

Again, there are no simple answers. Arkin's column appropriately is titled with Clausewitz's phrase, "the fog of war."

Other targeting pressures

As the Air Force continued to search for leadership "center of gravity" targets, the Army was urging that bombing move to Iraqi military forces, especially the Republican Guard. CENTCOM intelligence reappraised AFCENT bomb damage assessment, and concluded the Tawakalna Division, the southernmost and most vulnerable of RG divisions, had not been nearly as damaged as the Air Force had estimated. Much conflict between the Army and Air Force was reported as going on during the war, but not afterwards.

SCUD surprises

Iraq was known to have both imported versions of the Soviet SS-1 SCUD ballistic missile, as well as domestic clones and derivatives. The derivatives gave up already small payload for increased range, and usually with reduced accuracy. U.S. intelligence knew about most of the fixed SCUD bases, but badly underestimated the number of mobile launchers and the skill of their crews.

The concern was not so much that the SCUD was a truly dangerous weapon. It was at the level of sophistication of a World War II V-2 missile, considered to operate with adequate accuracy if it could hit something as small as a metropolitan area. Had it had a nuclear warhead, the power of the warhead could have compensated for the inaccuracy -- but the Iraqis did not have any. There was also concern that they mught have chemical or biological warheads, but, again, while they had a WMD development program, they had not worked out the details of weaponizing. As one example, while a ton of nerve agent in a warhead is frightening, the reality is that it cannot simply be burst with an explosive charge and expected to have a tactical effect. If for no other reason, nerve agents are inflammable and a burster charge may simply cause them to burn harmlessly.

The real danger

Given that the SCUD family were merely psychological weapons that still could cause casualties, when Iraq started shooting SCUDs at Israel, there was intense Israeli political reaction. At first, the Israelis demanded the right to go after the launchers, but there was very real concern that the overt participation of Israel could split off the Arab members of the Coalition.

Countermeasures

Detection

U.S. Defense Support Program (DSP) early warning satellites, which detected sudden heat bursts such as that generated by a missile launch, did detect the SCUD launches, and sent the information to the strategic warning center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. The information was then radioed, on a high-priority basis, to the theater of operations.

What remains somewhat unclear is whether the DSP satellites only gave a general warning, or if they located the launch points with enough precision so that special operations troops and attack aircraft had a chance to get to the launch site and destroy the launcher, before the Iraqis moved it.

Ground and air operations

During the 1991 Gulf War, British SAS and United States Army Special Forces units were sent on SR to find mobile Iraqi SCUD launchers, originally to direct air strikes onto them. When air support was delayed, however, the patrols might attack key SCUD system elements with their organic weapons and explosives.

During this conflict, the US senior commanders, Colin Powell and H Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., were opposed to using ground troops to search for Iraqi mobile Scud launchers. This was a part of Schwarzkopf's greater disdain for special operations. Under Israeli pressure to send its own SOF teams into western Iraq, and the realization that British SAS were already hunting Scuds, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney proposed using US SR teams as well as SAS

On February 7, US SR teams joined British teams in the hunt for mobile Scud launchers . Open sources contain relatively little operational information about U.S. SOF activities in western Iraq. Some basic elements have emerged, however. Operating at night, Air Force MH-53 Pave Low and Army MH-47E helicopters would ferry SOF ground teams and their specially equipped four-wheel-drive vehicles from bases in Saudi Arabia to Iraq. The SOF personnel would patrol during the night and hide during the day. When targets were discovered, United States Air Force Combat Control teams accompanying the ground forces would communicate over secure radios to E-3 Sentry airborne command posts.

Ballistic missile defense

In principle, the available version of the United States Army MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile had a capability against short-range ballistic missiles. Patriots were deployed in Saudi Arabia, but, as an emergency measure to mollify the Israelis, several batteries were sent to Israel.

There were reports, at the time, that the Patriots were stopping every SCUD, and later reports they had no effect at all. The answer is somewhere in between. Part of the problem was the SCUDs, and especially the SCUD derivatives, tended to break up in flight. The missile would home on the larger pieces of fuel tank, rather than the actual warhead.

In the most serious incident, where a single SCUD hit a U.S. barracks in Dharain, killing 28 and wounding over 100 soldiers, it was later found that a software bug had caused the Patriot system to decide that particular SCUD was not a threat, and it was not engaged. The software fix was known, but simply was not installed on the launchers and radars protecting Dharain.

Planning the ground offensive into Kuwait and Iraq

Sometime in late October, although kept quiet not to affect the November Congressional elections, Powell's request, including two corps and doubling Navy and Marine air, was approved. With the two Army corps, new operational concepts became practical. Even with limited forces, the goal was to thread through gaps, perhaps gaps blown by firepower and engineers, in the Iraqi defenses, or perhaps limited bypass with heliborne or amphibious forces.

The "Jedi Knights", however, planned an operation in which a corps would make one of the longest flanking maneuvers in military history, hitting into the Iraqi rear lines of the Kuwait Theater of Operations from the far west, essentially empty desert. GPS was one of the enabling technologies here, to allow closely synchronized maneuver without roads.

It was intended that the Iraqis see the threat of the frontal attack they expected, to be delivered by the Arab forces and the Marine forces on land. The Iraqis were also very aware that a U.S. Marine expeditionary brigade was at sea, and could land on the Kuwaiti coast, or Iraqi coastal areas such as the Faw Peninsula.

Khafji: an attempted counteroffensive

Khafji is a coastal city inside Saudi Arabia, which was deserted on January 29, 1991. Iraq launched its only organized ground offensive into Saudi Arabia, apparently to capture Khafji. At the time, and even today, the Iraqi intentions are not completely clear. Drawing on patterns from the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq had a pattern of sending an armored probe against Iran, inviting a pursuit, and then leading the enemy into strong defensive areas, covered by preregistered Iraqi artillery.

Given the ineffectiveness of Iraqi air, Saddam may have decided that since his regular army III Corps was still intact, a limited ground attack, drawing Coalition forces into his defensive belt, might be just the thing to cause the casualties he believed would break the opponents' will.

It took several days to assemble the attack force, which was under constant surveillance, especially by the E-8 Joint STARS. United States Marine Corps forces had been in the Khafji area, with some large and important logistics bases outside the city. When the Iraqi forces began moving toward Khafji, a number of Marine forces fell back to a prepared defensive line, although two small observation teams, led by corporals, stayed in Khafji.

Reconnaissance in force on the main front

Before the main attacks, on February 19, the 2nd Brigade ("Blackjack") of the 1st Cavalry Division made a reconnaissance in force down the Wadi al-Batin, both to draw Iraqi attention, screen the VII Corps headquarters, and pound the Iraqi formations with "shoot and scoot" salvoes from their M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). On February 20, however, they ran into prepared Iraqi positions, and directed A-10 aircraft against over 100 Iraqi artillery pieces.

Another probe, not a feint but a reconnaissance prior to breaching, was made by Marine task forces.

Iraqi Defensive Doctrine

The Iraqis did have complex defensive fortifications, although their desertions did not leave enough forces to man the lines. Their defensive doctrine reflected what worked against the Iranians:

• Corps to defend an area 90 to 160 km wide and 50 to 80 km, divided into
• divisional sectors 45 to 85 km wide and 20 km deep, split into
• brigade zones 8 to 12 km wide and 7 to 5 km deep, with
• battalion zones 3 to 4 km wide and 2 to 3 km deep.

"An Iraqi infantry division was expected to control a security zone along the front about 8 km deep. Most of the division's combat force was concentrated in an operational zone about 10 km deep. The divisional logistic and administrative area was concentrated in a more secure zone 2 km deep to the rear of the operational zone."

Each brigade and divisional strongpoint was arranged as a set of triangles, each apex manned by one of the three basic battalions of a brigade, brigades of a division, etc. They mined, trenched (sometimes with oil to set on fire), and wired the centers of the triangles, and wanted to lure the attackers into central kill zones.

Their unusual triangular formations, not used by other armies, were optimized for the use of earthmoving engineer equipment in the desert. That equipment constructed sand berms to channel attackers. Certain areas, however, were not actively defended, and the decision not to do so had internal logic. They had not expected a serious engagement in the Wadi al Batin, for a variety of reasons.

The Wadi, less than 100 feet deep, is "a clearly visible terrain feature with reasonable trafficability, it offered a good attack route both to the Iraqis and to the Coalition forces. The Iraqis not only located infantry units on the sides of the wadi as flanking forces but also placed two armored and one mechanized Republican Guard divisions and two armored Army divisions just north of the point where the wadi opened up into flat desert. They were expected to be able to stop any attack up the Wadi al-Batin and would also serve as a theater reserve if the attack came elsewhere...However, the Iraqis did not anticipate a major attack in this area or further west. The terrain just west of the wadi they considered unsuitable for tanks, since there were lots of boulders and sabkhas of quicksand. Moreover, there were no roads in this area, and the Iraqis firmly believed that units trying to operate away from roads in the desert would simply get lost." Ironically, the desert natives depended on roads while the Coalition depended on GPS.

Marine probing of defensive lines

Another probe began with Task Force Grizzly, built around the 4th Marine Regiment of the 1st Marine Division on February 22. Grizzly, and Taro, an second task for to the west, was a reconnaissance in force, covered by Marine 155mm howitzers, who were to probe for holes in the first set of barriers. <Gordon & Trainor, p. 346</ref> These Marine movements, however, since they were not a diversion as in the Wadi al Batin, created a potential problem with last-minute attempts by Mikhail Gorbachev to find a diplomatic solution. Grizzly slowed its efforts, but did capture seventy Iraqi prisoners who showed them lanes through the antitank mines. They did not know the structure of the antipersonnel minefield.

Psychological operations

Coalition aircraft did not only destroy Iraqi troops, but participated in psychological warfare where B-52s deliberately bombed close, but not to hit, Iraqi field forces. Schwarzkopf was immensely impressed by B-52's in Vietnam, and requested the coordinated use of bombs with leaflets before and after the raid, as with the Iraqi 7th Division in mid-February:

• Before the raid

(front of leaflet)This is your first and last warning! The 7th Infantry Division will be bombed tomorrow! Flee this location now!

(back of leaflet) The 7th Infantry Division will be bombed tomorrow. The bombing will be heavy. If you want to save yourself, leave your location and do not allow anyone to stop you. Save yourself and head toward the Saudi border, where you will be welcomed as a brother.

• After the raid

After the bombing, a second B52 leaflet was dropped which said, "We have already informed you of our promise to bomb the 7th Infantry Division. We kept our promise and bombed them yesterday. BEWARE. We will repeat this bombing tomorrow. Now the choice is yours. Either stay and face death, or accept the invitation of the Joint Forces to protect your lives."

Movement into Iraq and Kuwait

Major ground forces began to move on 23 February. Fixed wing aircraft had long been patrolling, attacking targets of opportunity, and bombing assigned targets, flying 900 sorties on the even of the attack. Now, however, the beat of rotors joined the roar of jet engines as the 101 Airborne Division (Air Assault) began flying its scout helicopters into Western Iraq. Three Americans were killed. 48 hours before the main attack, Coalition air concentrated on attacking the Iraqi forces discovered by the Blackjacks.

It was deemed politically essential that Arab forces actually liberate Kuwait City. Since the U.S. Marines had better engineer equipment and obstacle breaching techniques, they led the movement into Kuwait. As they moved through the first line of border defenses, two Saudi armored brigades and a pan-Arab brigade, the same Arab units that retook Khafji, entered Kuwait.

Helicopter-borne 1st Division Marines moved through the second break in the Iraqi defensive. Shortly after, they carried out their first medical evacuation mission. Originally, the 1st and 2nd Divisions were to attack in sequence, but, to give more of an opportunity to the pan-Arab corps, the Marines attacked in parallel. The 2nd Division attacked, successfully, at a point that appeared so well fortified that the Marines decided the Iraqis would not actively defend.

TF Grizzly opened lanes, with creative solutions such as one combat engineer using the antitank mines as stepping stones. Since he knew his weight would not set them off, he correctly guessed that this would let him avoid the antitank mines. This practice, however, did not get into Marine manuals of the future.

On the left hook, the 101st's helicopters were joined in exploration by the westernmost regular unit, the 6th French Light Armored Division. With a brigade from the 82nd Airborned Division, they moved to take control of the key Al Salman air base in Iraq, a Scud facility and major Iraqi base. 101st Airborne helicopters were waiting for the weather to clear and let a full brigade move fifty miles into Iraq, setting up the first artillery base and helicopter Forward Area Refueling Point (FARP). Air assaults are bounds from FARP to FARP.

Meanwhile, the main armored force of the VII Corps, pan-Arab Corps, and, in the XVIII Airborne Corps area, the 24th Infantry Division were ready to move heavy forces into their target areas. In its preparation for the assault, MG McCaffery had taken the senior commanders of the 24th through an exhausting 36 hour command post exercise, which left them knowing their plans perfectly. Still, it was tiring; battalion commander Bill Chamberlain, a descendant of Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, victor of the Little Round Top engagement at the Battle of Gettysburg, and given the honor of taking the Confederate surrender at Appomattox, told McCaffery: "Sir, I just want to sat I would rather be shot in combat than go through another Map-Ex." A fellow battalion commander agreed, "I, too, would rather see Bill shot than go through another Map-Ex."

Exploitation

A few hours after the first penetration, CENTCOM learned the Iraqis had destroyed the desalination plant in Kuwait City, its only source of fresh water. This meant both that the Iraqis had to be evacuating and could be struck in a disordered retreat, and that there was urgency to get services working again for the Kuwaiti population.

It was also becoming obvious that the Iraqi forces in Kuwait, partially due to high rates of desertion, were considerably smaller than expected. .B-52 attacks, even aimed away from troops, terrified them and increased panic flight.

With the Iraqi evacuation and the successful movement of light forces in the west, the main attack started early, approximately 3PM local time. As it entered, the 101st's attack helicopters were already destroying Iraqi trucks on highways in the rear area. Before long, VII Corps and the 24th Division had penetrated at least fifteen miles. The Marines had a longer fight at the second barrier line, but captured a corps headquarters and were taking so many Iraqi prisoners that they could only disarm them, point south, and tell them where to walk to POW camps.

Battle of Burqan

Iraqi III Corps commander Salah Aboud Mahmoud, who was considered one of the more competent Iraqi generals to the U.S., and defied Saddam to save some of his troops at Khafji, was given command of Iraqi forces in souther Kuwait, and intended to do things the Marines did not expect. Specifically, he exploited the smoke produced by the Burqan oil field, which the Iraqis had set afire. The Marines, indeed, had a command post near the oil field, thinking it would protect them.

Captured documents gave a warning that the Iraqis might counterattack from the oil field, which complemented scout reports of an unusual amount of troop activity in and out of the field. Signals intelligence was also detecting Iraqi strength in the oil field, and MG Mike Myatt, commanding 1st Marine Division, redeployed quickly to meet an attack, expected in the early morning, from the oil field. Increasing the tension were what turned out to be false reports of chemical mines in the area. Myatt positioned TOW missiles s, with thermal sights that could see through the smoke, on his closest points to the field, and then called in artillery strikes. After the artillery lifted, the Iraqis came out of the smoke in force, heading for Myatt's command post. Attack and counterattack continued through the morning. Eventually, what proved to be the largest Iraqi planned counteroffensive of the war failed. Mahmoud, incidentally, retained the respect of both sides, and was one of the two officers Saddam sent to the cease-fire meeting.

Marine/Arab movement and Liberation of Kuwait City

On the 24th, the Marines jumped off at 0400, accompanied by an Army tank brigade. Kuwait City was closer than the VII Corps objectives, perhaps 35-50 miles although the defensive positions were stronger. The 1st Marines breached their objectives quickly and captured 3,000 Iraqis. 2nd Marine Division attacked at 0530, with the Army brigade, encountering opposition at a berm that was quickly cleared, but the minefields took longer to clear. The first opposition came from a berm line and two mine belts. Marine M60A1 tanks with bulldozer blades quickly breached the berm, but the mine belts required more time; they were breached by 0615. Boomer's force established systematic phase lines to coordinate with the Arab forces. As they neared Kuwait City, these became well-marked highways. At the first phase line, they captured an entire Iraqi battalion, then fought for Al Jaber airfield and captured another 3,000. By the end of the day, over 10,000 unexpected prisoners, 20 miles inside Kuwait, became a significant logistical problem.

Schwarzkopf, never a fan of special operations troops, commended COL Jesse Johnson, the commander of overt United States Army Special Forces troops: SOCCENT, or Special Operations Command component of CENTCOM, who had been successfully keeping communications open with the Arab forces. Johnson also prepared, only if necessary, rescue missions in which the U.S., British, and French would retake their embassies.

JSOC operations

A Joint Special Operations Command (MG Wayne Downing, commanding) group continued to operate in secret. Delta Force operators are known to have been SCUD-hunting.

SCUD hunting

When Delta is deployed, a U.S. Army Ranger unit usually goes with them, to provide quick-reaction support to Delta, and to do appropriate direct action raiding. When the Rangers were not needed for the SCUD hunt, since if the missiles were found by Delta or British SAS, air attacks were usually called in, or sometimes sniper fire on explosive rocket components.

Ranger Run I

Looking for a mission, Downing told the company-sized Ranger unit that it could look for fixed targets to raid, which would help the Scud hunt. They found a communications relay station, about four miles from the Jordanian border, and attacked on the night of February 26. Besides pure disruption of communications, destroying the station might force Iraqis to stop using intercept-resistant fiber optic cables running through the relay station, and go to radio that could be more easily detected and located. It was possible that they might also capture Iraqi communications personnel with knowledge of operational procedures.

The raid had inconclusive results, and might have been more significant if mounted when the war were not coming to a close. They did destroy the communications facility and captured some documents, and no more SCUDs flew, but the cause and effect are not obvious.

Pursuit of the Republican Guard

Part of Schwarzkopf's concept of operations was not simply to oust the Iraqi Republican Guard units from Kuwait, along with lesser units, but to destroy the RG, the core of Saddam's offensive capability. While all CENTCOM elements had the RG as a priority target, the VII "Jayhawk" Corps (LTG Fred Franks, commanding) had the assignment of killing it on the ground.

Army officers still argue if Franks was too conservative or Schwarzkopf was too aggressive. Schwarzkopf constantly demanded Franks move faster, but Franks moved deliberately. To give a perspective, possibly through the filter of Army personalities and politics, Franks was promoted to a prestigious four-star post after the Gulf War, as did Luck and Yeosock. Schwarzkopf's deputy for operations, Yeosock, retired in the three-star rank.

The corps had been reinforced with a mechanized infantry brigade from the 3rd Infantry Division (attached to the 1st Armored Division), four field artillery brigades (42d, 75th, 142nd, and 210th), and the 11th Aviation Brigade. At over 142,000 soldiers, it was larger than the 116,000 of the XVIII Airborne Corps. As a "heavy" mechanized and armored unit, it needed a vast amount of supplies.

Originally, VII Corps was to delay its attack until February 25, so the Iraqis would assume the main attack was the XVIII Corps coming from the west. To LTG John Yeosock, commanding Third United States Army, the headquarters commanding both corps, the Army had a different task than the Marines. While the Marines "planned a sprint to the gates of Kuwait City" supporting the Arab forces, the Marines also had a geographic and humanitarian objective. The Army, however, saw a "marathon", in which it had farther to go, and was "convinced it was about to lock horns with the premier fighting force in the third world." Franks had planned a deliberate attack against the RG, and when Schwarzkopf stepped up the schedule, as the Iraqis collapsed before the Marines, it was more of a problem for Franks than for Luck. Luck's XVIII Corps was attacking into a less dense concentration of Iraqis, and in the manner of a reconnaissance in force rather than a deliberate attack.

Franks planned to fight the RG much as he would have fought a Soviet union, positioning in two parallel armored attacks, then concentrate his three divisions and swing into the RG. He had expected 2 days to fight the preliminary positioning and 6 days to destroy the RG.

VII Corps breaching operations

VII Corps did begin the accelerated action, attacking in parallel with the First Cavalry Division feint up the Wadi al Batin; the 1st Cav remained in CENTCOM reserve, not under Franks' control. On VII Corps' right, along the Wadi al Balin, the 1st Cavalry Division would make a strong, but limited, attack directly to its front.

The coordinated plan had 1st Cav attracting the enemy, while Franks cut through the static defenses on his right, and then sent two more divisions on an "end around to the left". The "end around was the main attack." Starting at 0538, 1st Infantry Division (MG Thomas Rhame, commanding), charged into Iraqi trenches, delivering an intense artillery preparation at 1440 hours, and then sent in the combat engineers. If Iraqis would not surrender, the 1st Division tank plows and earthmover buried them alive, without American casualties. . This cut lanes through the minefields, in preparation for the British 1st Armored Division (MG Rupert Smith, commanding).

There has been criticism of the burial of troops in trenches, but this was not widely considered a violation of the customary laws of war. Nothing would have been said had those same troops been buried by artillery fire, and they were offering resistance. The question is whether they could have been captured, also considering the need for speed in opening the breaches. Estimates of the number of Iraqi dead vary widely, from one count of 44 to one journalist's comment "there could have been thousands". Connetta estimates the number was somewhere in the range of 250 to 600. According to Gordon and Trainor, "only several dozen bodies" were found by Iraqis.

On the far left, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (COL Paul Holder, commanding), a brigade-sized formation, led the 1st (MG Ron Griffin, commanding) and 3rd Armored (MG "Butch" Funk, commanding) Divisions.

Al Busayyah

A1 Busayyah, a town approximately 80 miles inside Iraq, and a major Iraqi logistics base, was the immediate objective of VII Corps. Franks halted about 20 miles inside the border, concerned that the two armored divisions had gotten too separated fro the 1st Infantry Division. For the day, VII Corps rounded up about 1,300 of the enemy.

Franks chose to wait for daylight to pass the British through the breaches, as they had not trained with night vision equipment. Franks was already concerned about the "fog of war", in that there had already been a "friendly fire" incident between the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions. U.S. troops were trained for night operations, and it was assumed by many that the British capability should have been known through NATO exercises. Perhaps Franks' worst decision, however, was not to tell the volatile Schwarzkopf that he had deliberately paused; Schwarzkopf, on looking at the maps at 0800 the next morning and finding VII Corps had not moved, "he exploded...Schwarzkopf demanded to know why the VII Corps forces were not deep in Iraq. Schwarzkopf had been angry before but now his frustration was boiling over."

Yeosock calmed Schwarzkopf, who was also angry with the lack of progress by the Egyptians. It is fair to say that Franks and Schwarzkopf, both thoroughy competent generals, had basically incompatible styles.

At approximately 0635 hours, an E-8 Joint STARS radar aircraft spotted an Iraqi brigade moving toward the town. It was a very modest force to stop multiple divisions led by an armored cavalry regiment. Without any source of intelligence, the Iraqi brigade commander, from one of their better formations, the 52nd Armored Division, set up a blocking position against what he believed was a light force. He may have thought he was meeting the light French division on the extreme west of the XVIII Corps area, and had no idea that he was blocking a heavy corps. Nevertheless, A-10 antitank aircraft found them first, and then 2nd Armored Cavalry finished the job. Prisoner interviews showed that the Iraqis were stunned that Coalition forces were not bound to roads .

Griffith and the 1st Armored Division, however, moved deliberately. Rather than attack the base with aircraft and surround it with a small force, Griffith received Franks' permission to bombard Al Bussayyah overnight, and then take it in the morning, with the full division. Only a small force actually defended it, and this again angered Schwarzkopf, who ordered Fransk again to destroy the RG. At 0522 hours on the 25th, 2nd Armored Cavalry again was probing to find the RG, scouting its position for the divisions following him. A last-minute check showed that the change of the 2nd Cav's movement had not been conveyed to the British, and a fratricide incident was narrowly averted. .

When Schwarzkopf and Yeosock talked at noon on the 24th, Schwarzkopf said Franks' progress would be acceptable if he could accelerate. Schwarzkopf was extremely pleased with the XVIII Corps and the Marines, and faced the political problem that the Marines were positioning so they could reach Kuwait City before the Egyptians. Schwarzkopf pleaded with Khalid, his counterpart, to save him from letting the Marines into Kuwait City.

Within the hour, Schwarzkopf learned that an American rear area force had taken the bloodiest Scud hit of the war. He also heard radio broadcasts that the Iraqis were ordering their troops out of Kuwait Finding VII Corps not moving fast enough to satisfy him, he adjusted the corps boundaries so the 24th Infantry Division, in XVIII Corps, could pressure the RG from the West. He also gave Franks control of the 1st Cav.

All day and night on the 26th, Franks hit the RG.

Battle of 73 Easting

On the afternoon of the 26th, Holder's cavalry encountered fire on a line marked 69 Easting on a map. The plan had been for them to stop at 70 Easting, but H.R. McMaster, the captain leading Eagle Troop. Eagle, in the lead, encountered an Iraqi 18th RG Brigade from the Tawakalna Division at about 1600 the cavalrymen found T-72 tanks in prepared positions at 73 Easting. Eagle and Iron Troops took no casualties, but Ghost troop had lost one man. The regiment used its thermal imaging equipment to deadly advantage, killing every tank that appeared in its sights. Three cavalry troops had destroyed a brigade, in principle more than three times its size.

The Tawakalna Division may have been assigned as the sacrificial rear guard to allow two other RG divisions, the Medina and Hammurabi Armored divisions to withdraw toward Basra.

This action was quite asymmetrical in the size of the forces involved, but not a huge battle in the broader context of the war. Nevertheless, it has become widely studied and discussed, for a number of reasons. It was the first land battle in which the American fighting vehicles had recorders on their sensors and weapons controllers, which produced computer-readable files that could feed "what-if" simulations and virtual reality training based on actual combat. It was also featured in Tom Clancy's nonfiction book, Armored Cavalry. McMaster has risen in the army with the unusual combination of his combat record here and elsewhere, as well as a reputation as a theorist and historian; he has just been selected as a brigadier general after, among other things, commanding the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in the peace operations resulting from the Iraq War.

Kuwait-Basra highway

There is a highway that extends from Kuwait City, to Safwan on the Kuwait-Iraq border, and then on to the major port of Iraq, Basra. The highway was both a supply line to the Iraqi troops in Kuwait, and an exit back to Iraq. When Iraqi troops began to evacuate Kuwait, Coalition aircraft blocked movement on the road by wrecking both ends, and then repearedly attacked stranded vehicles.

Bush was being pressured by Saudi Arabia and Iraq to end the killing, partially because neither Arab country wanted a complete collapse of Iraq, with the potential of a radical Shi'ite state breaking off and declaring its independence. An assistant to Schwarzkopf said the rules were:

• No harm would come to any Iraqi who left his vehicle and offered to surrender
• Those fleeing in tanks, trucks, or any other vehicle with military applications would be considered legitimate targets.

According to the BBC, while Iraq had said it was withdrawing, it still refused to accept the UN resolutions. Allied forces bombed them from the air, killing thousands of troops in their vehicles in what became known as the "Highway of Death".

Were the fleeing Iraqis hit hard? Yes. Was it an overt war crime? No. Was it disproportionate use of force on a broken force, but with the potential that force might again be effective? There is no simple answer. Gordon & Trainor suggest that the Iraqis on the highway might have been talked out of their vehicles.

This example, as well as the bombing of the al Firdos bunker, have consequences that go beyond this war alone. By and large, the American public saw Desert Storm as relatively bloodless, and there was no public reaction as there was to television news coverage of both U.S. and Vietnamese casualties during the Vietnam War. Here, the media, with minimal censorship, provided real-time battlefield reports independent of military control. Gruesome photos of the so-called "highway of death" undermined support for continuing the war, and those were pictures of the destruction of a brutal enemy force. What should we expect when the bodies are those of our friends and relatives?

There are no simple answers, even if the killings of Iraqis on the highway were totally licit from a Just War standpoint. The incident, however, deserves careful reflection.

When live media reports combined with information from other high-tech sources begin to communicate the horrific shrieks and terrifying sights of death and mutilation as it happens to a loved one in combat, the political pressure to terminate hostilities at almost any price may become inexorable.

Cease-fire and dispositions

While destroying the Republican Guard had been an objective, political considerations picked an arbitrary time for a cease fire, after 100 hours of ground combat.

Deciding when to stop

Schwarzkopf, according to Gordon and Trainor, recognized that it might be necessary to subordinate the destruction of the RG to other objectives. Among considerations in Washingon were "protecting the United States military against the charge of brutalization and holding down American and Iraqi casualties." Schwarzkopf said he was sometimes unsure, when talking to Powell, if the position was Powell's own, that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or that of the National Command Authority (i.e., Bush and Cheney).

At 1545 hours on 27 February, Schwarzkopf and Powell spoke, and Powell liked Schwarzkopf;s proposal.

So here's what I propose. I want the Air Force to keep bombing those convoks backed up at the Euphrates where the bridges are blown. I want to continue the ground attack tomorrow,drive to the sea, and totally destroy everything in our path. That's the way I wrote the plan for Desert Storn, and in one more day we'll be done. Do you realize if we stop tomorrow night, the ground campaign will have lasted five days? How does that sound to you: the Five-Day War? — Schwarzkopf, p. 469

Powell called back a few hours later, and said there was tension in Washington about the killing, and even Britain and France were asking how long it would continue.

The president is thinking about going on the air tonight at nine o'clock and announcing we're cutting it off. Would you have any problem with that?

Schwarzkopf said that his "gut reaction" was that doing so would save American lives. While not every Iraqi resource had been destroyed, they were ineffective as a military force. Powell caled back to explain that there would be three hours of fighting after Bush's announcement, so it would be a "hundred hour war".

Supply had become an issue, as well as soldier fatigue in around-the-clock fighting. If the ground war had lasted longer, General Schwarzkopf would have had to halt the advance to fill forward operating bases. On the morning of 27 February, as VII Corps prepared to complete the destruction of the Republican Guard Forces Command, 1st and 3d Armored Division tanks were almost out of fuel.

Status of forces when the guns went silent

When the cease-fire ordered by President Bush went into effect, CENTCOM had very nearly destroyed the Iraqi ground forces. The Iraqis lost 3,847 of their 4,280 tanks, over half of their 2,880 armored personnel carriers, and nearly all of their 3,100 artillery pieces. Only five to seven of their forty-three combat divisions remained capable of offensive operations. In the days after the cease-fire the busiest soldiers were those engaged in the monumental task of counting and caring for an estimated 60,000 prisoners.

The combat units came close to overrunning their supply lines. Tanks and tracked vehicles moved faster in the desert than supply trucks on roads. Helicopter movements needed exquisite planning of leapfrogging with Forward Ammunition and Refueling Points, generally spaced no more than 98 miles apart, that being the practical range of a CH-47 Chinook helicopter carrying a fuel bladder as a sling load. . There are several helicopter configurations that optimize their ability to transport fuel into FARPs, but there will be a delicate balance of the number and type of helicopters committed to fuel transport, as opposed to those available for combat operations. While a FARP technically covers both fueling and rearming, the closer the FARP to the enemy, the more likely it is to be restricted to fueling.

Arranging the Cease-Fire

Schwarzkopf and Powell had discussed memorable means ways to conduct the cease-fire talk, such as using the deck of the battleship USS Missouri, which was in the theater, and having the Iraqis sign on the same deck where the World War II Japanese surrender had taken place. This simply turned out to be impractical, between getting the battleship to a convenient place, and then flying all relevant delegates to it.

The next choice was Jalibah air base, which had the symbolism of being 95 miles inside Iraq, making it obvious the Iraqis had been defeated. It was initially approved, but, on the evening of February 28, CENTCOM learned that Jalibah was littered with unexploded ordnance and was simply too dangerous a place to hold talks.

Next, Safwan, two miles inside Iraq, was suggested. It was quickly discovered, however, that no Coalition troops happened to be there, but Iraqi troops were. Schwarzkopf thought VII Corps was physically occupying Safwan. The annoyed Schwarzkopf directed Yeosock to make a show of force at Safwan and "encourage" the Iraqis to vacate. They did.

It was now necessary to work out the details of the signing. The Iraqis proposed to send two three-star generals not known to Schwarzkopf, Sultan Hashim Ahmad, deputy chief of defense staff, and Salah Abud Mahmud, commander of the now defunct III Corps that had fought at Khafji and in Kuwait. <Schwarzkopf, pp. 472-483>

The Agreements

According to a Bush administration official, "Norm went in uninstructed...the generals made qn effort not to be guided. It was treated as something that was a military decision, not to be micromanaged."

Schwarzkopf directed the Iraqis that the first condition was accounting for POWs, followed by the return of remains, giving the locations of minefields and WMD bunkers, etc. The Iraqis agreed, although the issue remained open if Iraq had detained any Kuwaiti civilians.

According to Schwarzkopf, the Iraqis were generally agreeable, but had one request: "You know the situation of our roads and bridges and communications. We would like to fly helicopters to carry officials of our government into areas where roads and bridges are out. This has nothing to do with the front line. This is inside Iraq." Schwarzkopf, who said the Iraqis had accepted the other U.S. points, thought this was reasonable and replied, "As long as it is not over the part we are in, that is absolutely no problem. So we will let the helicopters fly. That is a very important point, and I want to make it sure that it's recorded, that military helicopters can fly over Iraq."

Iraqi LTG Ahmad then said something Schwarzkopf, in retrospect, thinks he should have questionedL "So you mean even helicopters that are armed can fly in Iraq skies, but not the fighters? Bechase the helicopters are the same, they transer somebody —"

Schwarzkopf agreed, but wrote,

In the following weeks, we discovered what the son of a b**** had in mind: using helicopter gunships to suppress rebellions in Basra and other cities. By that time it was up to the White House to decide how much the United States wanted to intervene in the internal politics of Iraq...grounding the helicopter gunships [would have little effect]] compared to the Iraqi divisions that never entered the Kuwaiti war zone.

Lessons learned

After isolating and evaluating various aspects of Army operations and systems, questions remained about the overall course of the war and its outcome. Was the Army really as good as the overwhelming victory and one-sided statistics of the war suggested? Was Iraq's military really that weak? Complete answers awaited more careful analysis of the combatants, but in the immediate aftermath of the ground campaign two conclusions seemed justified.

Correlation of forces

First, Iraq's military was not prepared for a war of rapid movement over great distances. The Iraqis, in their most recent combat experience against Iran, had developed skills at slow-paced, defense-oriented warfare. Those skills proved inadequate to stop an army with high-speed armor capabilities.

Second, Central Command used its air arm to devastating advantage. With air supremacy established more than a month before the ground war began, the success of General Schwarzkopf's well-conceived and dreadfully misnamed "Hail Mary" play-the huge corps-size envelopment to the west-was assured. The relentless day and night pounding of aerial bombardment made easier the task of coalition units not in the envelopment, for when they attacked straight ahead into Iraqi positions, they found enemy units less than 50-percent effective. The combination of a powerful air offensive, followed by a fast moving armor-reinforced ground campaign, proved extremely effective in the desert environs of Southwest Asia.

Operational problems and threats

Speed and synchronization

First, Army units moved so fast that they found their enemy consistently out of position and oriented in the wrong direction. In 100 hours of combat XVIII Airborne Corps moved its lead elements 190 miles north into Iraq and then 70 miles east. Even the armor-heavy Vll Corps drove 100 miles into Iraq and then 55 miles east. Iraqi units showed themselves unable to reposition even short distances before Army units were upon them.

Communications

The impressive overall performance notwithstanding, problems requiring postwar attention did occur. Several types of equipment drew criticism from commanders. American field radios proved unreliable, and commanders who had the opportunity to try British-made Iraqi radios pronounced them superior. Fortunately, the initiative of key commissioned and enlisted personnel at the battalion and company levels bridged communications gaps at crucial times.

Mobile equipment

A number of pieces of mobile equipment were felt to be underpowered. While the key M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles had adequate speed, the M109 Paladin 155mm howitzer delivered effective fire, but could not keep up with the M1 and M2. The M9 armored combat earthmover (i.e., bulldozer) did its pure engineer role well, but again could not keep pace in tactical movement.

Supply

Despite its brevity, the 100-hour Persian Gulf war lasted long enough to provoke an update of the age-old postwar lament, criticism of the supply effort. This time, the speed of the advance exposed a shortcoming: helicopters, tanks, and Bradleys outdistanced supply trucks. Lifting fuel tanks and ammunition pallets by helicopter provided a quick fix, but choppers carrying fuel gulped it almost as fast as they delivered it.

Fratricide

The successful allied counterattack on the city of R'as al Khafji in the first week of February was marred when American support fire killed several CENTCOM troops. General Schwarzkopf ordered accelerated research on antifratricide methods. A joint research team, coordinated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, immediately went to work on the problem of making American vehicles and positions visible only to American armored vehicles and aircraft.

Throughout the war, fratricide was a problem. The immensely complex Air Tasking Orders deconflicted aircraft, at the cost of rapid response to targets of opportunity. Things were especially difficult at the borders between units in different chains of command. In some cases, the decision was made not to have ground or air fire into some border areas, possibly missing some Iraqis but avoiding hitting friendly troops.

The problem was not completely solved, and better communications for situational awareness and identifying one's own forces is a major ongoing requirement in military electronics.

It may well be that in the fog of war, friendly fire casualties are inevitable, but this solemn observation does not absolve the armed forces from doing everything in their power to eliminate the problem

Theater ballistic missiles

While they did little actual destruction, the SCUD was an enormous psychological weapon, especially against civilian populations, and great resources were diverted against them. The particular version of the MIM-104 Patriot‎ air defense missile, although first thought to be intercepting the incoming missiles, turned out to be engaging, much of the time, the missile body rather than the warhead. The one missile that hit a barracks in Dharain was not engaged due to a Patriot software bug, the patch for which had not yet been applied. Current Patriot systems are several generations more advanced.

Weapons of mass destruction

While Saddam never used his WMD, chemical weapons were definitely found in supply dumps, and questions remain about health effects of destroying them in place. Early in the air war, many missions were directed against WMD facilities that may actually have no operational capability, but no commander was willing to take that risk.

Technology

Realistic training

A constant refrain was the value of the field training for heavy forces at the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California. More than one soldier said the Iraqis were not as tough as the Aggressor Force at the NTC, and very much agreed with the premises "you fight like you train, you train like you fight", and "sweat in training saves blood in battle".

NTC put U.S. battalion and brigade forces against a force that constantly fought on the same terrain, using Soviet tactical doctrine but with American maintenance such that the weapons always worked. The NTC was extensively instrumented, so soldiers were able to see, in after-action reviews, what they had done wrong and what they needed to fix. A culture had emerged where it was not harmful to an officer's career if he lost a practice engagement, but clearly understood the mistakes and what to do the next time. Of course, the minority of officers that managed victory under deliberately adverse conditions did tend to get noticed as far above the ordinary.

General

A striking coalition advantage was the ability to fight at night, as if it was day, using vision-enhancing technology. Neither family used the infrared light floodlights of the first generation, which revealed the position of the viewer. The next generation, or the "Starlight Scope", intensified even faint moon and starlight, but still had disadvantages compared to the systems available in 1991. The major systems were:

• AN/PVS-4 sight for personal weapons such as rifles and machine guns, which could also be detached and used as a viewing aid.
• AN/PVS-7 night vision goggle was a head-mounted monocular unit for ground vehicle operation, map reading, navigation, maintenance, and first aid.
• AN/AVS-6 aviation night vision imaging system was a binocular system that allowed helicopter pilots to conduct nocturnal missions as close to the ground as possible.

The other family moved away from visible light amplification and the "near infrared", and used thermal imaging: the difference between the heat of an object and its background. These penetrated not only night, but rain, dust storms, and even sand dunes, with range up to 2 miles. Coupled with invisible laser rangefinders, soldiers could detect, then precisely locate, enemy targets that first became aware they were not hidden when the world exploded around them.

Coupled with Global Navigation System that let soldiers know their precise position independently of roads, and also using the GPS precision time for synchronization, these technologies surpassed local knowledge of the Iraqis.

Being able to fight 24 hours a day, however, had medical and stress complications for soldiers, since the human body needs periodic rest. This is not completely solved, although soldiers have learned to sleep in bouncing, moving tanks and other vehicles.

Air

Above all, precision-guided munitions worked. They did not work perfectly, and the airmen still cannot win all on their own. Effective tactical adaptations were made rapidly, such as "tank plinking", where F-111 aircraft armed with laser-guided bombs might well fly out with eight bombs each, and get confirmed kills of eight tanks with relatively inexpensive weapons.

The AH-64 Apache helicopter, which some believed would be maintenance intensive and might not work well in the desert, worked. While the A-10 was widely agreed to be the ugliest aircraft ever flown by the United States Air Force, it was effective when used against the proper targets and with the proper doctrine: it was a tank-killer and close air support aircraft, not a high-performance fighter-bomber that could go into the teeth of strong air defense.

While it did not necessarily do huge amounts of damage, sometimes deliberately in keeping with a broader psychological plan, the venerable B-52 remained one of the most feared weapons.

The Air Force did demonstrate "Global Reach", flying 36-hour cruise missile delivery missions from the United States, but it was recognized this should be a quick-response contingency; flying aircraft out of closer locations made much more sense.

Stealth and cruise missiles worked.

Ground

The Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HUMVEE), and the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) all exceeded expectations in reliability.

There were five main variants of the HEMTT, one of which is a 2500 gallon fuel tanker, and the greatest problem is that there were not enough. To some extent, it was possible to supplement them in the rear areas by using commercial trucks, but logisticians continue to estimate the real need.

One of the major concerns is how well they could cope with the extremely fine desert dust, but with careful maintenance of air filters, they worked.

It should be noted that these were being used in rapid conventional combat, and have not been exposed to extensive mines and Improvised Explosive Devices as encountered in today's Iraqi urban environment.