Weinberger-Powell Doctrine: Difference between revisions
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U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in response to the lessons of the Vietnam War, developed a set of strategic axioms, which were rephrased as a set of questions, by his protege, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and later U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. | |||
It is widely believed that these were the guiding principles of the | It is widely believed that these were the guiding principles of the Gulf War, while the Iraq War broke several of the rules. | ||
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Latest revision as of 12:18, 19 March 2024
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U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in response to the lessons of the Vietnam War, developed a set of strategic axioms, which were rephrased as a set of questions, by his protege, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and later U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. It is widely believed that these were the guiding principles of the Gulf War, while the Iraq War broke several of the rules.
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