Korean War of 1592-1598: Difference between revisions

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[[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]], the Japanese warlord then in command second to the Emperor, had for long been aspiring to leave his name in history as a great conqueror of Asia. Even before unifying all of Japan in 1590, Hideyoshi began sending ambassadorial missions in 1587 to Korea to reveal his intention to have Korea join with Japan on war against China. Hideyoshi had been under the false impression that Korea was a Japanese territory as a part of the [[Tsushima Island]]; in fact, Korea was a vassal state of China and the China's closest ally. When Korea rejected Hideyoshi's "decree" in 1592, Hideyoshi launched the invasion late in April and commanded his forces ''in absentia''.  
[[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]], the Japanese warlord then in command second to the Emperor, had for long been aspiring to leave his name in history as a great conqueror of Asia. Even before unifying all of Japan in 1590, Hideyoshi began sending ambassadorial missions in 1587 to Korea to reveal his intention to have Korea join with Japan on war against China. Hideyoshi had been under the false impression that Korea was a Japanese territory as a part of the [[Tsushima Island]]; in fact, Korea was a vassal state of China and the China's closest ally. When Korea rejected Hideyoshi's "decree" in 1592, Hideyoshi launched the invasion late in April and commanded his forces ''in absentia''.  


The Japanese troops first attacked the southeastern part of Korea and then made a northwestward advance to the capital. The Japanese forces captured the Korean capital city of Hanseong within 3 weeks and occupied most of the peninsula by end of the year. China responded by sending 3,000 troops to the city of Pyeongyang in July, but the Chinese were horribly outnumbered and defeated by the Japanese troops. In order to continue the invasion into China, Hideyoshi sent the rest of his invasion forces in Japan. However all of Hideyoshi's auxiliary troops were lost in the naval battle at Hansando against the Korean admiral Yi Sun-sin, and the Japanese were put on the defensive. Admiral Yi's  [[Battle of Noryang|naval battle]] at the straits of [[Noryang]].
The Japanese troops first attacked the southeastern part of Korea and then made a northwestward advance to the capital. The Japanese forces captured the Korean capital city of Hanseong within 3 weeks and occupied most of the peninsula by end of the year. China responded by sending 3,000 troops to the city of Pyeongyang in late August, but the Chinese were horribly outnumbered and defeated by the Japanese troops. However, within a few days of the Chinese defeat, the Korean admiral Yi Sun-sin annihilated the Japanese fleet carrying the reserve troops that would continue the invasion into China. On January 1, 1593, the Chinese crossed the Admiral Yi's  [[Battle of Noryang|naval battle]] at the straits of [[Noryang]].


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Revision as of 11:24, 22 November 2007

The Japanese invasions of Korea (1592-1598) comprised a major war between Japan and the alliance of Ming of China and Joseon of Korea. Japan invaded Korea on May 23, with the larger objective to conquer the entirety of Asia by using Korea as a bridge to China. The battles that involved 300,000 combatants and claimed more than 2 million lives took place almost entirely on the Korean peninsula and its nearby waters. The war consisted of two main invasions from Japan – the first in 1592 and 1593, and the second from 1597 to 1598.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the Japanese warlord then in command second to the Emperor, had for long been aspiring to leave his name in history as a great conqueror of Asia. Even before unifying all of Japan in 1590, Hideyoshi began sending ambassadorial missions in 1587 to Korea to reveal his intention to have Korea join with Japan on war against China. Hideyoshi had been under the false impression that Korea was a Japanese territory as a part of the Tsushima Island; in fact, Korea was a vassal state of China and the China's closest ally. When Korea rejected Hideyoshi's "decree" in 1592, Hideyoshi launched the invasion late in April and commanded his forces in absentia.

The Japanese troops first attacked the southeastern part of Korea and then made a northwestward advance to the capital. The Japanese forces captured the Korean capital city of Hanseong within 3 weeks and occupied most of the peninsula by end of the year. China responded by sending 3,000 troops to the city of Pyeongyang in late August, but the Chinese were horribly outnumbered and defeated by the Japanese troops. However, within a few days of the Chinese defeat, the Korean admiral Yi Sun-sin annihilated the Japanese fleet carrying the reserve troops that would continue the invasion into China. On January 1, 1593, the Chinese crossed the Admiral Yi's naval battle at the straits of Noryang.

Although

The war is known by several English titles, including the Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, in context of Hideyoshi’s biography; the Seven Year War, in reference to the war’s duration; and the Imjin War, in reference to the first year of the war in Korean (See Sexagenery Cycle).[1]

Background

East Asia and the Chinese Tributary System

In the late 16th century, the Ming Dynasty of China dominated the East Asian geopolitics. China established hegemony over the smaller neighboring countries in form of the tributary system. In practice, the tributary states maintained complete autonomy, and they sent ambassadors periodically to the imperial court in China to pay homage and to exchange gifts with the Chinese government officials. Many of the tributary states received the exclusive privilege from China to participate in the lucrative international trade within the tributary system. China justified the tributary system with the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, that the Chinese Emperor rules to the benefit of mankind by decree from Heaven.[2] Several Asian countries, including Korea,[3][4] voluntarily joined the tributary system in pursuit of the legal tally trade and the legitimacy in their rule by the Mandate of Heaven.

While Japan never officially submitted to the tributary system, China granted Japan the right to engage in a limited tributary trade, which China considered as a form of tribute from Japan.[5] The two treaties, in 1404 and 1434, that admitted Japan into the tributary trade required Japan to police its waters to protect the trade routes from the wako pirates. However, as the Japanese lords failed to effectively control its piracy, China expelled Japan from the tributary system in 1547.[6] The trade issue would emerge again, during the wartime negotiations between Japan and China, as a cautious excuse from the Japanese for their first invasion of Korea.

China considered Korea as a key asset to its tributary system. China needed the alliance with Korea in order to outflank the hostile Jurchen tribes in Manchuria and to protect the sea from the Japanese pirates. Furthermore, the Chinese and the Koreans considered themselves as the pinnacles of civilization, similarly to today's cross-national cultural identities (such as "the West") based on scientific and technological achievements. The very strict Confucian ideologies that imbued the two countries contributed to this elitism by rejecting the foreign customs and learnings as immoral and barbaric.

China would come to Korea's aid during the war, mainly because of Korea's geopolitical and social importance to China. Additionally, China aimed to protect the legitimacy of its tributary system by fulfilling its promise to provide security to its tributary states. The Chinese scholar officials greatly feared that the China's loss of legitimacy would spur a domino effect of opposition collapsing the entire tributary system.

  1. Today in Korean History, Yonhap News Agency of Korea, 2006-11-28. Retrieved on 2007-03-24. (in English)
  2. T'ien ming: The Mandate of Heaven. Richard Hooker (1996, updated 1999). World Civilizations. Washington State University.
  3. Rockstein, Edward D., Ph.D. pp. 7
  4. Rockstein, Edward D., Ph.D. pp. 10-11
  5. Cheow pp. 6
  6. Villiers pp. 71