Financial regulation: Difference between revisions

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imported>Nick Gardner
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imported>Nick Gardner
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===Problems and remedies===
===Problems and remedies===
====Leverage====
====Leverage====
The Turner Review recommended raising banks' reserve ratio requirements to levels substantially above those required under ''Basel 2'' and introducing a  discretionary counter-cyclical element that would raise the required ratio during economic booms <ref name=turner>[http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf ''The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis'', Financial Services Authority, March 2009]</ref>. The Warwick Commission on international financial reform was also in favour of counter-cyclical regulation but suggested that it should be rules-based to help central banks to resist political opposition to "taking away the punchbowl when the part gets going". Its purpose would be to persuade banks to put away money during a boom-at a time when they would be motivated to run down their reserves<ref name=warwick>[http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/report/swc_report.pdf ''The Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform: In Praise of Unlevel Playing Fields'', (The report of the second Warwick Commission) University of Warwick, November 2009]</ref>..
The Turner Review recommended raising banks' reserve ratio requirements to levels substantially above those required under ''Basel 2'' and introducing a  discretionary counter-cyclical element that would raise the required ratio during economic booms <ref name=turner>[http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf ''The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis'', Financial Services Authority, March 2009]</ref>. The Warwick Commission on international financial reform was also in favour of counter-cyclical regulation but suggested that it should be rules-based to help central banks to resist political opposition to "taking away the punchbowl when the part gets going". Its purpose would be to persuade banks to put away money during a boom-at a time when they would be motivated to run down their reserves<ref name=warwick>[http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/report/swc_report.pdf ''The Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform: In Praise of Unlevel Playing Fields'', (The report of the second Warwick Commission) University of Warwick, November 2009]</ref>.  
 
 


====Risk management====
====Risk management====


====Asset-price bubbles====
====Asset-price bubbles====
Frederic Mishkin has noted that [[asset price bubbles]] that involve fluctuations in the supply of credit are far more damaging than those that do not <ref>[http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/98e7c192-cd5f-11de-8162-00144feabdc0.html Frederic Mishkin: ''Not all Bubbles Present a Risk to the Economy'', Financial Times, 9th November 2009]</ref>. The "dot.com" bubble, for example did little damage because it was not credit-financed.  A Bank of England discussion paper has examined the regulatory regime of ''dynamic provisioning'' introduced by the Spanish authorities in 2000 - a rule-based scheme that requires banks to build up  provisions  against performing loans in an upturn, which can then be drawn down in a recession. It notes that the scheme did not appear to have smoothed the supply of credit, but may have made banks more resilient,


====Too-big-to-fail====
====Too-big-to-fail====
Line 32: Line 35:
====Mark-to-market accounting====
====Mark-to-market accounting====


==Costs and benefits of regulation==
==Rules versus discretion==
 
==International aspects==
 
==Costs and benefits ==


==Regulatory structure==
==Regulatory structure==
The Warwick Commission argued that "macro and micro-prudential regulation require
The Warwick Commission argued that "macro and micro-prudential regulation require different skills and institutional tructures, and suggested that where possible, micro-prudential regulation should be carried out by a specialised agency (and that) macro-prudential regulation should be carried out ....in conjunction with the monetary authorities, as they are already heavily
different skills and institutional structures, and suggested that where possible, micro-prudential regulation
should be carried out by a specialised agency (and that) macro-prudential regulation should be carried
out ....in conjunction with the monetary authorities, as they are already heavily
involved in monitoring the macro economy"
involved in monitoring the macro economy"



Revision as of 02:42, 4 December 2009

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Background: pre-crash financial regulation

Governments have long been aware of the danger that a loss of confidence following the failure of one bank could lead to the failure of others, and to limit that danger they traditionally required all banks to maintain minimum reserve ratios. Following the crash of 1929 they also imposed restrictions upon the activities of the commercial banks. In the United States, for example, the Glass-Steagall Act prohibiting their participation in the activities of investment banks. In the 1980s, however, there was a general move toward "deregulation", those restrictions were dropped and reserve requirements were relaxed. There followed a period of financial innovation and substantial change in the nature of banking[1]. The perception of a resulting increase in danger of systemic failure led, in 1988, to the publication of a set of regulatory recommendations that related a bank's required reserve ratio to the riskiness of its loans [2] and, in 2004, to revised recommendations [3] requiring banks to take more detailed account of the riskiness of their loans. Those recommendations were widely adopted, but their inadequacy was revealed by the crash of 2008 when the global banking system suffered its "most severe instability since the outbreak of World War I" [4]. and threatened the collapse of its entire financial system. That narrowly-averted catastrophe prompted the urgent consideration of measures to remedy the deficiencies of the regulatory system. Recognition of the international character of the problem led to the inauguration of a series of G20 summits, initially to formulate measures to combat the recession of 2008 and subsequently to consider measures to reduce the danger of a future collapse of the international financial system.

Post-crash proposals

Micro- and macroprudential regulation

A paper by the United States Department of the Treasury makes the point that "a narrow micro-prudential concern for the solvency of individual firms, while necessary, is by itself insufficient to guard against financial instability. In fact, actions taken to preserve one or a few individual banking firms may destabilize the rest of the financial system."

Problems and remedies

Leverage

The Turner Review recommended raising banks' reserve ratio requirements to levels substantially above those required under Basel 2 and introducing a discretionary counter-cyclical element that would raise the required ratio during economic booms [5]. The Warwick Commission on international financial reform was also in favour of counter-cyclical regulation but suggested that it should be rules-based to help central banks to resist political opposition to "taking away the punchbowl when the part gets going". Its purpose would be to persuade banks to put away money during a boom-at a time when they would be motivated to run down their reserves[6].


Risk management

Asset-price bubbles

Frederic Mishkin has noted that asset price bubbles that involve fluctuations in the supply of credit are far more damaging than those that do not [7]. The "dot.com" bubble, for example did little damage because it was not credit-financed. A Bank of England discussion paper has examined the regulatory regime of dynamic provisioning introduced by the Spanish authorities in 2000 - a rule-based scheme that requires banks to build up provisions against performing loans in an upturn, which can then be drawn down in a recession. It notes that the scheme did not appear to have smoothed the supply of credit, but may have made banks more resilient,

Too-big-to-fail

The UK's Financial Standards Authority identified three aspects of the too-big-to-fall problem as:

  • the moral hazard created if uninsured creditors of large banks believe that a systemically important bank will always be rescued, removing the incentive to impose discipline and prompting them to reduce their interest rates;
  • the costs of rescue operation and the unfairness of the "socialisation of losses"; and
  • the possibility that rescue might cost more than the host country could afford[8].

The US Treasury, in a paper published in September 2009, suggested that "systemically important firms" should be subject to higher capital requirements than other firms [9], and a G20 finance summit made the same suggestion[10].

Bonus incentives

Credit ratings

Mark-to-market accounting

Rules versus discretion

International aspects

Costs and benefits

Regulatory structure

The Warwick Commission argued that "macro and micro-prudential regulation require different skills and institutional tructures, and suggested that where possible, micro-prudential regulation should be carried out by a specialised agency (and that) macro-prudential regulation should be carried out ....in conjunction with the monetary authorities, as they are already heavily involved in monitoring the macro economy"

Policy decisions

References