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==Pre-crash  financial regulation==
==Pre-crash  financial regulation==
Governments have long been aware of the danger that a loss of confidence following the failure of one bank could lead to the failure of others, and to limit that danger by the imposition of minimum ''reserve ratios''. Following the [[crash of 1929]]  they also imposed restrictions upon the activities of the ''commercial banks''. In the United States, for example, the Glass-Steagall Act  prohibiting their participation in the activities of ''investment banks''. In the 1980s, however, there was a general move toward "deregulation",  those restrictions were dropped, and reserve requirements were relaxed,  and there followed a period of financial innovation and  substantial change in the nature of banking.
Governments have long been aware of the danger that a loss of confidence following the failure of one bank could lead to the failure of others, and to limit that danger they traditionally required all banks to maintain minimum ''reserve ratios''. Following the [[crash of 1929]]  they also imposed restrictions upon the activities of the ''commercial banks''. In the United States, for example, the Glass-Steagall Act  prohibiting their participation in the activities of ''investment banks''. In the 1980s, however, there was a general move toward "deregulation",  those restrictions were dropped, reserve requirements were relaxed,  and there followed a period of financial innovation and  substantial change in the nature of banking<ref>[http://www.bis.org/publ/econ43.pdf?noframes=1 Claudio Borio and Renato Filosa: ''The Changing Borders of Banking'', BIS Economic Paper No 43, Bank for International Settlements December 1994]</ref>.  The perception of a resulting increase in danger of  systemic failure led, in 1988, to the  publication of a set of regulatory recommendations that related a bank's required reserve ratio to the riskiness of its loans <ref>[http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf?noframes=1, ''The Basel Capital Accord'' (Basel I) Basel Committee for Banking Supervision 1988]</ref> and, in 2004, to revised recommendations <ref>[http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm Revised International Capital Framework, (Basel II) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006]</ref> requiring banks to take more detailed account of the riskiness of their loans. The
 
 
===International recommendations===
In 1974  the governors of the central banks of the Group of Ten leading industrial countries had set up [[The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision]] <ref>[http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision]</ref> to coordinate precautionary banking regulations <ref> See paragraph 5 of the article on [[Financial economics]]</ref>, and in 1988, concern about the increased danger of  systemic failure led that committee to publish a set of regulatory recommendations that related a bank's required reserve ratio to the riskiness of its loans <ref>[http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf?noframes=1, ''The Basel Capital Accord'' (Basel I) Basel Committee for Banking Supervision 1988]</ref>. In 1999 further  concern about the danger of instability led to the creation of the [[Financial Stability Forum]] <ref>[http://www.fsforum.org/index.htm The Financial Stability Forum]</ref>  to promote information exchange and international co-operation in financial supervision and surveillance. In 2004, the Basel Committee published revised recommendations known as Basel II <ref>[http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm Revised International Capital Framework, (Basel II) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006]</ref> intended to require banks to take more detailed account of the riskiness of their loans.
Responsibility for assessing risk was placed upon the banks and the credit agencies.


During the eighteen-month period between the middle of 2007 and the end of 2008 the "''[[crash of 2008]]''" resulted in  the failure or enforced rescue of fifteen major banks, three of the world's largest mortgage-lenders and one of the world's largest insurance companies <ref> For a list of the affected companies see the timelines subpage of the article on the crash of 2008  [http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Crash_of_2008/Timelines]</ref>, a disaster that has been attributed to risk-management errors on the part of the banks and the principal credit-rating agencies <ref> For an account  of some  possible sources of  risk-management errors, see the tutorials subpage of the article on the crash of 2008 [http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Crash_of_2008/Tutorials]</ref> and to inaction on the part of the regulatory authorities. The investments whose riskiness had been wrongly assessed were derivatives based upon mortgages in the United States housing market <ref> See the article on the [[subprime mortgage crisis]]</ref>. In 2007, an international banking panic was triggered by the revelation of serious problems at a major United States bank stemming from its holdings of such derivatives, and in 2008 an international "credit crunch" was generally attributed to a loss of mutual confidence among banks that was prompted by the unexpected failure of the United States authorities to save the Lehman Brothers bank from bankruptcy.
During the eighteen-month period between the middle of 2007 and the end of 2008 the "''[[crash of 2008]]''" resulted in  the failure or enforced rescue of fifteen major banks, three of the world's largest mortgage-lenders and one of the world's largest insurance companies <ref> For a list of the affected companies see the timelines subpage of the article on the crash of 2008  [http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Crash_of_2008/Timelines]</ref>, a disaster that has been attributed to risk-management errors on the part of the banks and the principal credit-rating agencies <ref> For an account  of some  possible sources of  risk-management errors, see the tutorials subpage of the article on the crash of 2008 [http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Crash_of_2008/Tutorials]</ref> and to inaction on the part of the regulatory authorities. The investments whose riskiness had been wrongly assessed were derivatives based upon mortgages in the United States housing market <ref> See the article on the [[subprime mortgage crisis]]</ref>. In 2007, an international banking panic was triggered by the revelation of serious problems at a major United States bank stemming from its holdings of such derivatives, and in 2008 an international "credit crunch" was generally attributed to a loss of mutual confidence among banks that was prompted by the unexpected failure of the United States authorities to save the Lehman Brothers bank from bankruptcy.

Revision as of 05:30, 3 December 2009

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Pre-crash financial regulation

Governments have long been aware of the danger that a loss of confidence following the failure of one bank could lead to the failure of others, and to limit that danger they traditionally required all banks to maintain minimum reserve ratios. Following the crash of 1929 they also imposed restrictions upon the activities of the commercial banks. In the United States, for example, the Glass-Steagall Act prohibiting their participation in the activities of investment banks. In the 1980s, however, there was a general move toward "deregulation", those restrictions were dropped, reserve requirements were relaxed, and there followed a period of financial innovation and substantial change in the nature of banking[1]. The perception of a resulting increase in danger of systemic failure led, in 1988, to the publication of a set of regulatory recommendations that related a bank's required reserve ratio to the riskiness of its loans [2] and, in 2004, to revised recommendations [3] requiring banks to take more detailed account of the riskiness of their loans. The

During the eighteen-month period between the middle of 2007 and the end of 2008 the "crash of 2008" resulted in the failure or enforced rescue of fifteen major banks, three of the world's largest mortgage-lenders and one of the world's largest insurance companies [4], a disaster that has been attributed to risk-management errors on the part of the banks and the principal credit-rating agencies [5] and to inaction on the part of the regulatory authorities. The investments whose riskiness had been wrongly assessed were derivatives based upon mortgages in the United States housing market [6]. In 2007, an international banking panic was triggered by the revelation of serious problems at a major United States bank stemming from its holdings of such derivatives, and in 2008 an international "credit crunch" was generally attributed to a loss of mutual confidence among banks that was prompted by the unexpected failure of the United States authorities to save the Lehman Brothers bank from bankruptcy. According to the Bank of England "The global banking system experienced its most severe instability since the outbreak of World War I" [7].

(The article on bank failures and rescues lists the major bank failures and banking crises from the end of the first world war and the crash of 2008)

Post-crash proposals

[8].

[9].

[10].

[11]

The authorities' reactions

[12]; and in a 2005 lecture, Jean-Claude Trichet, the President of the European Central Bank, argued that not all bubbles threaten financial stability, and that if policy-makers attempted to eliminate all risk from the financial system, they either fail or they would "hamper the appropriate functioning of a market economy"[13]. [14], and by Federal Reserve Board Governor Frederic Mishkin [15]

Policy decisions

References

  1. Claudio Borio and Renato Filosa: The Changing Borders of Banking, BIS Economic Paper No 43, Bank for International Settlements December 1994
  2. The Basel Capital Accord (Basel I) Basel Committee for Banking Supervision 1988
  3. Revised International Capital Framework, (Basel II) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006
  4. For a list of the affected companies see the timelines subpage of the article on the crash of 2008 [1]
  5. For an account of some possible sources of risk-management errors, see the tutorials subpage of the article on the crash of 2008 [2]
  6. See the article on the subprime mortgage crisis
  7. Overview of the November Inflation Report, Bank of England 2008
  8. Asset Prices and the Business Cycle, World Economic Outlook, Chapter 3, International Monetary Fund, May 2000
  9. Lessons for Monetary Problems from Asset Price Fluctuations, (World Economic Outlook October 2009 Chapter 3) International Monetary Fund 2009
  10. The Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform: In Praise of Unlevel Playing Fields, (The report of the second Warwick Commission) University of Warwick, November 2009
  11. The Role of Macroprudential Policy, a discussion paper, Bank of England, November 2009
  12. Ben Bernanke: Asset-Price "Bubbles" and Monetary Policy (Speech to the New York Chapter of the National Association for Business Economics, New York, New York, October 15 2002) Federal Reserve Board 2002
  13. Jean-Claude Trichet: Asset price bubbles and monetary policy,(Mas lecture, 8 June 2005) European Central Bank, 2005
  14. Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada: Some Considerations on Using Monetary Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity, (Speech to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, 19 November 2009)Bank for International Settlements, 2009
  15. Frederic Mishkin: How Should We Respond to Asset Price Bubbles, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, October 2008