Siberian Intervention: Difference between revisions

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There had been earlier minor interventions by Britain and Japan as early as 1917, and British and French encouragement to Japan, from 1915 on, that Japan move east from Vladivostok.
There had been earlier minor interventions by Britain and Japan as early as 1917, and British and French encouragement to Japan, from 1915 on, that Japan move east from Vladivostok.
Between 1917 and 1919, [[Nobuaki Makino]] was secretary of Emperor Taisho's Advisory Council on Foreign Policy, especially focused on the Siberian Intervention.
==Japanese context==
==Japanese context==
Japanese troops stayed until 1922, but the fact that Japan had operated successfully in Siberia remained an argument of the [[Strike-North Faction]]. Indeed, the overall issue was not a new one for Japan; since 1915, Britain and France had invited Japan to move troops west from Vladivostok. Japan was also concerned that Germany might want the return of the seized German leasehold at Tsingtao.
Japanese troops stayed until 1922, but the fact that Japan had operated successfully in Siberia remained an argument of the [[Strike-North Faction]]. Indeed, the overall issue was not a new one for Japan; since 1915, Britain and France had invited Japan to move troops west from Vladivostok. Japan was also concerned that Germany might want the return of the seized German leasehold at Tsingtao.


Britain, in December 1917 after the Central Soviet opened a Vladivostok, sent a warship to protect British interests. [[Arimoto Yamagata]] agreed this would justify Japan doing as Britain did, and sent a naval squadron in January 1918.  Yamagata, however, argued strongly against unilateral Japanese action, and Emperor [[Taisho]], who earlier had tried to annex Manchuria, reluctantly agreed, in April, to withdraw Japanese forces.<ref>{{citation
Britain, in December 1917 after the Central Soviet opened a Vladivostok, sent a warship to protect British interests. [[Aritomo Yamagata]] agreed this would justify Japan doing as Britain did, and sent a naval squadron in January 1918.  Yamagata, however, argued strongly against unilateral Japanese action, and Emperor [[Taisho]], who earlier had tried to annex Manchuria, reluctantly agreed, in April, to withdraw Japanese forces.<ref>{{citation
  | title= Japan's Imperial Conspiracy
  | title= Japan's Imperial Conspiracy
  | author = David Bergamini
  | author = David Bergamini

Revision as of 12:40, 30 August 2010

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The Siberian Intervention of 1918-1922 was an effort, by the World War I Western Allies plus Japan, in response to the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia's separate surrender to Germany, and the Russian Civil War. The intervening forces supported White Russian forces against the Bolshevik Red Army during the Russian Civil War, keeping resources from the Germans. Other than the Japanese, these forces left in 1920.

There had been earlier minor interventions by Britain and Japan as early as 1917, and British and French encouragement to Japan, from 1915 on, that Japan move east from Vladivostok. Between 1917 and 1919, Nobuaki Makino was secretary of Emperor Taisho's Advisory Council on Foreign Policy, especially focused on the Siberian Intervention.

Japanese context

Japanese troops stayed until 1922, but the fact that Japan had operated successfully in Siberia remained an argument of the Strike-North Faction. Indeed, the overall issue was not a new one for Japan; since 1915, Britain and France had invited Japan to move troops west from Vladivostok. Japan was also concerned that Germany might want the return of the seized German leasehold at Tsingtao.

Britain, in December 1917 after the Central Soviet opened a Vladivostok, sent a warship to protect British interests. Aritomo Yamagata agreed this would justify Japan doing as Britain did, and sent a naval squadron in January 1918. Yamagata, however, argued strongly against unilateral Japanese action, and Emperor Taisho, who earlier had tried to annex Manchuria, reluctantly agreed, in April, to withdraw Japanese forces.[1]

American decisions

References

  1. David Bergamini (1971), Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, Morrow, pp. 302-303