Talk:Materialism: Difference between revisions
imported>Tom Morris (→Materialism as ontology: response) |
imported>Anthony.Sebastian (→Materialism as ontology: further response to Tom Morris) |
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::Sure, materialism and physicalism count as ontologies and worldviews, but in different senses. I'd say mostly that materialism or physicalism usually form the ontological component of a naturalistic worldview, but there are plenty of people who reject the label naturalism and prefer to describe their worldview in terms of physicalism or materialism. (And there are plenty of people who reject the idea of there being worldviews.) I'll email you a link to my thesis shortly. [[User:Tom Morris|Tom Morris]] 10:58, 9 March 2011 (UTC) | ::Sure, materialism and physicalism count as ontologies and worldviews, but in different senses. I'd say mostly that materialism or physicalism usually form the ontological component of a naturalistic worldview, but there are plenty of people who reject the label naturalism and prefer to describe their worldview in terms of physicalism or materialism. (And there are plenty of people who reject the idea of there being worldviews.) I'll email you a link to my thesis shortly. [[User:Tom Morris|Tom Morris]] 10:58, 9 March 2011 (UTC) | ||
:::Tom, ignoring my penchant for informationally cumulative sentences linked by free modifiers, how would the following sit with you as the lede: | |||
:::In ancient Greece, some 2500 years before 20th-century science discovered the subatomic world; the quantum world with its characteristic indeterminancy and uncertainty; chaos; emergence; and the full flowering of the world of fields, '''materialism'''<ref>According to Rudolf Eucken (1910), the term ''materialism'' was first used by Robert Boyle, in his ''The excellence and grounds of the mechanical philosophy'', published in 1674. [http://bit.ly/f0pHXx Rudolf Eucken (1904) ''Grundbegriffe der gegenwart''. Veit. p.172]</ref>—often called ''scientific materialism''—served as a system of concepts, an [[ontology]],<ref>Ontology: "The ontology of a theory is the catalogue of things and types of things the theory deems to exist ([http://www.amazon.com/Consciousness-Explained-Daniel-C-Dennett/dp/0316180653/ref=tmm_hrd_title_0?ie=UTF8&qid=1299550822&sr=1-1 Dennett DC. (1991) ''Consciousness Explained''. Little, Brown and Company])." [NB: 'theory' here referring to a 'sytem of concepts'].</ref> accounting for a particular vision of reality, the vision of reality unrelated to supernatural causes and forces, the ontology based on primary attribution of matter as the fundamental, underlying constituent of nature—matter conceptualized, in one version of the ontology, as material particles of many varying shapes, each particle indivisible, in motion in a void, the particles interacting as dictated by necessities external to the particles themselves, the interactions determining the shape, size, weight, and motion of all objects in the natural world ([http://books.google.com/books?id=rDEvQZhpltEC&dq=anastopoulos&source=gbs_navlinks_s Anastopoulos 2008]). | |||
== Notes== | |||
<references /> | |||
== References== |
Revision as of 11:57, 9 March 2011
Missing verb?
"Materialism denies supernaturalism, in that it denies that independent spiritual or divine powers ever account for events, and [MISSING VERB HERE?] that natural forces always explain events..."
As it currently stands, this says that "materialism denies ... that natural forces always explain events." Perhaps the missing verb is "argues" or "holds"? Bruce M. Tindall 04:26, 19 January 2011 (UTC)
- Thanks, Bruce. I'll fix. This is definitely a work in progress, learning as I go. Anthony.Sebastian 21:35, 19 January 2011 (UTC)
disambiguation?
Should this article be disambiguated? When I saw the title in recent changes, my first thought was "preoccupation with material things" as in the adjective "materialistic". I'd be willing to write at least a brief introduction to materialism in this other sense, but I don't think the adjective is an appropriate title. Any ideas on how to distinguish? Materialism (philosophy) and Consumer materialism, maybe? Or would it be sufficient to leave this article alone and place a brief disambiguation at the top suggesting Consumerism for people who find themselves in the wrong place?--Joe Quick 17:21, 20 January 2011 (UTC)
- For that matter, "consumerism" may need disambiguation, too, because it is also used to mean "the promotion of the consumer's interests" (Merriam-Webster), or to describe the movement that has resulted in the requirement of disclosure of more information on product labels and in advertisements, for instance. Bruce M. Tindall 18:46, 20 January 2011 (UTC)
- That's true. Maybe I'll just invent some new words and then tell myself that everyone else is crazy when they don't understand. --Joe Quick 20:24, 20 January 2011 (UTC)
- Actually, the problem is even larger, which didn't come to mind until I had already started the article. There are specific topics under christian materialism; cultural materialism; dialectical materialism; economic materialism, etc. I think "materialism" by itself usually refers to what this article is about, viz., scientific AND philosophical materialism. Not sure how to handle the 'disambiguation'. In related articles subpage? Anthony.Sebastian 03:27, 21 January 2011 (UTC)
Past tense?
You really need more evidence than this that materialism is dead. An assertion by one phiolosopher is just her personal philosophy; it tells you nothing of what other philosophers believe. And assertions by scientists are even more useless. Peter Jackson 16:59, 21 January 2011 (UTC)
- I agree with you, Peter, except for you comment that "assertions scientists are even more useless".
- In regard to the latter, I offer the opening of The Grand Design", 2010, by preeminent scientists, Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow:
WE EACH EXIST FOR BUT A SHORT TIME, and in that time explore but a small part of the whole universe. But humans are a curious species. We wonder, we seek answers. Living in this vast world that is by turns kind and cruel, and gazing at the immense heavens above, people have always asked a multitude of questions: How can we understand the world in which we find ourselves? How does the universe behave? What is the nature of reality? Where did all this come from? Did the universe need a creator? Most of us do not spend most of our time worrying about these questions, but almost all of us worry about them some of the time.
Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge. The purpose ofthis book is to give the answers that are suggested by recent discoveries and theoretical advances. They lead us to a new picture of the universe and our place in it that is very different from the traditional one, and different even from the picture we might have painted just a decade or two ago. Still, the first sketches of the new concept can be traced back almost a century.
According to the traditional conception of the universe, objects move on well-defined paths and have definite histories. We can specify their precise position at each moment in time. Although that account is successful enough for everyday purposes, it was found in the 1920s that this "classical" picture could not account for the seemingly bizarre behavior observed on the atomic and subatomic scales of existence. Instead it was necessary to adopt a different framework, called quantum physics. Quantum theories have turned out to be remarkably accurate at predicting events on those scales, while also reproducing the predictions of the old classical theories when applied to the macroscopic world of daily life. But quantum and classical physics are based on very different conceptions of physical reality.
- They continue this theme, which ultimately again proclaims dead the deterministic mechanistic scientific materialism of the matter-based clockwork universe. I find it difficult to ignore the assertions of Stephen Hawking.
- In regard to your first point, I do plan to bring in the views of other philosophers, even going back to the 19th century.
- Thanks for your interest and comments. I appreciate them. Anthony.Sebastian 19:34, 21 January 2011 (UTC)
- I meant useless as evidence of what philosophers think. Peter Jackson 11:49, 22 January 2011 (UTC)
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1998, volume 6, page 172 has a heading "Recent materialism". Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed, 2006, volume 6, page 13, has heading "Contemporary materialism". Unless someone can prove that it's suddenly vanished in the last few years the past tense and other non-neutral sapects must be changed. Peter Jackson 11:24, 24 January 2011 (UTC)
Double quotes vs. single quotes
Hayford, I prefer to use double quotes when the embraced word/phrase repeats that of a reference source. I prefer to use single quotes when I want to call attention to a word as a word.
The distinction relates to whether words are used or mentioned, a formal distinction in linguistics.
Example: Let us avoid using 'rad' for 'radical'. Alternatively: Let us avoid using the word, rad, for the word, radical.
Example: They thought the film was "rad".
If CZ's AE rules preclude that practice, I feel sorry for the dear Lord of Rules, who would render words mentioned into words quoted by someone other than the writer.
Anthony.Sebastian 18:07, 31 January 2011 (UTC)
- Your system is idiosyncratic and your own, Anthony, I fear. We really do have to follow CZ standards, which are, I have to say, that if you use Brit. English, then you use 'single quotes' and if you use American English you use "double quotes" -- that's just the way it is. :( Hayford Peirce 18:47, 31 January 2011 (UTC)
- Rules, rules, rules. How can I get around them? Anthony.Sebastian 05:01, 1 February 2011 (UTC)
- Actually, if you look in Copyediting by Judith Butcher (Cambridge University Press), you'll find that such a system is common in philosophical/linguistic contexts. Peter Jackson 12:24, 1 February 2011 (UTC)
- Thanks, Peter, I'll try find a copy. Anthony.Sebastian 18:11, 1 February 2011 (UTC)
- Well, whatever the merits of the argument, if we have rules at all then, in my opinion at least, they have to apply to all of the people all of the time, not just some of them. Consult the fiction writer John Barth, who used to write short stories in which there would be fifteen narrators, one within the other, telling the story as told by someone else. So that a typical line of dialog would be " ' " ' " ' " ' " ' " 'What?" ' " ' " ' " ' " ' " '" -- it all made sense, sorta, but the rules had to be followed.... Hayford Peirce 18:18, 1 February 2011 (UTC)
- Rules can be stretched if nobody finds the stretch egregious. Anthony.Sebastian 20:02, 1 February 2011 (UTC)
- Haha, I like that one, Anthony! I'm going to steal it. D. Matt Innis 03:57, 2 February 2011 (UTC
95 words (as per my WordPerfect counter)
That's a pretty long lede sentence! Hayford Peirce 03:51, 9 February 2011 (UTC)
- Thank you, Hayford, I find it pretty too. ;)
- Seriously, long, flowing, coherent, anticipatory phrasing sequences, information-cumulative, non-run-on, constructed, interesting enough to motivate reader to re-read, study its messages. —Anthony.Sebastian 22:50, 9 February 2011 (UTC)
- I'm a man who has written many a long sentence in his time, and actually sold a few of them, but every study has always shown that reading comprehension improves as the length of sentences decreases. I'm not saying that a 95-word sentence can't be maintained, but I would say off the top of my head that two sentences of 47 words each would probably do a better job of getting the reader to bother going on to the *next* sentence. Maybe anyone interested in reading an entire article about Materialism is the sort of person for whom 95 words is too *short* a sentence. But for the average reader.... Hayford Peirce 23:04, 9 February 2011 (UTC)
- I will send you a work of the guru on building cumulatives. Short, medium, long, longer—not the point in my view. Rather the readability, the informativeness, the anticipation of the readers' non-conscious need what to know next.
- Every sentence can't be a cumulative flow of information—too exhausting. Anthony.Sebastian 02:04, 10 February 2011 (UTC)
Materialism as ontology
Just a comment on Anthony Sebastian's recent edit. I'd say 'worldview' and 'ontology' are quite different things. A worldview is roughly a coherent set of answers to a set of philosophical questions including possibly moral questions. So, for instance, people talk of the "Christian worldview" or the "Humanist worldview". Ontology is only part of that. Part of my Master's research work was working out the relationship between naturalism as a worldview and naturalism as an ontology, and if one can coherently talk about there being a naturalistic ontology. What makes the distinction between ontology and worldview concrete for me is epistemic demands: so, you can have some quite complex ontology that is purely theoretical, but what makes it part of a worldview is one needs to have some idea of what the conditions of knowledge are. There can be a strained relationship here. So, for the naturalistic worldview, the epistemic constraints bound the ontological ones. Because unlike a religious worldview, we do not have any reason to think that we can know, say, the mind of God, we may then have reason to reject ontological constructs that rely on there being a mind of God or a knowable divine will.
Ontology is the raw categories of being, the meat. Worldviews are the soup we mix the meat up into with some morality, some epistemology, some view on the ontological status of minds and so on. One view on ontology can be compatible with many worldviews and one worldview can tolerate some differences in ontology (look at the difference between the hardcore reductive naturalists like the Churchlands and liberal naturalists like Michael Martin [the American one]). Tom Morris 16:22, 8 March 2011 (UTC)
- Got it, Tom. Unfortunately, the philosophy literature on materialism/physicalism does not always make the distinction you describe.
- Could materialism/physicalism count as both an ontology (a catalogue of the things and types of things deemed to exist) and a worldview (a view of the world as built on natural phenomena in contrast to supernatural phenomena)? I wanted to convey materialism as a worldview with a particular ontological basis.
- I will definitely explore this issue. Can you send me your masters thesis? Anthony.Sebastian 03:44, 9 March 2011 (UTC)
- Sure, materialism and physicalism count as ontologies and worldviews, but in different senses. I'd say mostly that materialism or physicalism usually form the ontological component of a naturalistic worldview, but there are plenty of people who reject the label naturalism and prefer to describe their worldview in terms of physicalism or materialism. (And there are plenty of people who reject the idea of there being worldviews.) I'll email you a link to my thesis shortly. Tom Morris 10:58, 9 March 2011 (UTC)
- Tom, ignoring my penchant for informationally cumulative sentences linked by free modifiers, how would the following sit with you as the lede:
- In ancient Greece, some 2500 years before 20th-century science discovered the subatomic world; the quantum world with its characteristic indeterminancy and uncertainty; chaos; emergence; and the full flowering of the world of fields, materialism[1]—often called scientific materialism—served as a system of concepts, an ontology,[2] accounting for a particular vision of reality, the vision of reality unrelated to supernatural causes and forces, the ontology based on primary attribution of matter as the fundamental, underlying constituent of nature—matter conceptualized, in one version of the ontology, as material particles of many varying shapes, each particle indivisible, in motion in a void, the particles interacting as dictated by necessities external to the particles themselves, the interactions determining the shape, size, weight, and motion of all objects in the natural world (Anastopoulos 2008).
Notes
- ↑ According to Rudolf Eucken (1910), the term materialism was first used by Robert Boyle, in his The excellence and grounds of the mechanical philosophy, published in 1674. Rudolf Eucken (1904) Grundbegriffe der gegenwart. Veit. p.172
- ↑ Ontology: "The ontology of a theory is the catalogue of things and types of things the theory deems to exist (Dennett DC. (1991) Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown and Company)." [NB: 'theory' here referring to a 'sytem of concepts'].
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