Gulf War (Iraq, 1991)

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Formally beginning with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and ending with the cease-fire on 6 April 1991, the Iraq War was preceded by the Iran-Iraq War, with tensions following that conflict's end in 1988, and followed by new tensions culminating with the U.S.-led Gulf War in 2003. The Gulf War involved the occupation of Kuwait and Kuwaiti resistance, the defense of Saudi Arabia by a growing coalition led by the United States, an intensive air campaign reducing Iraq's military, and a ground campaign that ejected the Iraqis and led to a cease-fire. Following the cease-fire was a period of interactions with a truculent Iraq, ensuring the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction and enforcing "no fly zones" in the North and South of Iraq. Eventually, Iraq was invaded in the 2003 Iraq War, with the disarming of the regular Iraqi military, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government, and an open-ended occupation and attempts at nation-building.

The war was notable for the extremely high level of technology used by the Coalition, with lopsided victories in every tactical engagement. Coalition combat casualties were minimal, the number from fratricide and non-battle accidents comparable to those inflicted by the Iraqis. The war was also notable for not creating a clear peace, although the politics of the region prevented a replacement of the Hussein government.


Background

Leading up to the Iraqi invasion was a period of brinksmanship and diplomatic miscommunication starting not long after the end of the Iran-Iraq War.

Hussein-Glaspie meetings

On July 25, 1990, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, met with Saddam Hussein. There are different accounts of whether Saddam was warned not to open hostilities, or if things could have been construed as the U.S. remaining neutral. Iraq had issued a transcript that suggested that the U.S. gave no strong warning. The New York Times reported that U.S. State Department issues, on receiving Glaspie's account, were unclear how strong a warning had been given, but that Administration sources said they did not want to make an issue of it at the time, because that might interfere with coalition-building. [1]

In the hearing, Representative Lee H. Hamilton, (Democrat, Indiana) the Ambassador if she had ever told Saddam that the U.S. would fight if Iraq invaded, and she said she did not explicitly do so. In response to Hamilton's question about his being deterred, she said: " I told him we would defend our vital interests. He complained to me for one hour about fleet movements and American neo-imperialism and militarism. He knew perfectly well what we were talking about, and it would have been absolutely wrong for me, without consulting with the President, to inform anybody of a change in our policy. Our policy was that we would defend our vital interests. It's up to the President to decide how we would do it. Saddam Hussein, who is a man who lives by the sword, believed that we were going to do it by the sword."

Specific indications of imminent invasion

U.S. intelligence moved to a specific attack warning on August 1. [2]

The Iraqi Government and Military

Iraq's civilian, security, and military apparatus was under the strongly centralized control of Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle, many of whom came from clansmen from Tikrit, Iraq. As such, Hussein was the center of gravity of the entire Iraqi structure.

KARI: Iraqi air defense

French Thomson-CSF had built what appeared to be an extensive integrated air defense system (IADS) for Iraq, called KARI[3]. The Iraqis, however, used it with a more Soviet doctrine that discouraged local decisionmaking.

The overall defense had three levels:

  1. National/strategic, operated by the Iraqi Air Force
  2. Key point defense, operated by the Republican Guard
  3. Mobile, operated by the Iraqi Army

Strategic

Early warning radars, at this level, included the SPOON REST, SQUAT EYE and FLAT FACE radar.

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

Defense of Saudi Arabia

Warden presented the original for the 1991 Gulf War air campaign to GEN (ret.) Chuck Horner, then commanding air forces (CENTAF) for United States Central Command. According to a book by Horner (coauthored by Tom Clancy), a lieutenant general at the time, found he did not work well with Warden, and three stars beats one eagle.[4] Sound thinking was involved, one member of the Checkmate. David Deptula, teamed stayed in Saudi Arabia, and now is himself a lieutenant general, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, United States Air Force.

The problems first seemed a matter of personalities. GEN H Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., commanding United States Central Command during the Gulf War, spoke well of Warden's original air war concepts.[5] Schwarzkopf did express concern that Warden saw the air component winning the war, and did not provide enough support to land forces.

Attempts to prevent all-out hostilities

Following the invasion, there were a number of diplomatic initiatives to find a peaceful solution, and hopes that the formation of what became a 34-nation coalition might give second thoughts to Saddam Hussein. [6]

The United Nations, in an unprecedented way, had played a crucial role throughout the eight-month international crisis, which began on 2 August 1990 when Iraq invaded, occupied and annexed its neighbour--the tiny, oil-rich State of Kuwait--calling it an "integral part" of Iraq.

After the Iraqi invasion but before Coalition combat operations began, the UN Security Council, with majority votes, adopted 15 resolutions related to the crisis, among other things: condemning the initial invasion; calling for Iraqi troop withdrawal and protection of prisoners of war, diplomas and civilians; imposing strong, mandatory, comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq until it complied with its demands; arranging for aid to innocent victims of the conflict and countries economically affected by the embargo; and setting a deadline before authorizing the use of "all necessary means" to restore international peace and security in the area.

The deadline passed. And a seven-week war took place--waged by a coalition of troops representing 34 nationalities--to oust Iraq from Kuwait.

Operations against Iraq

Planning

Initial strikes

Most of the initial air activity was aimed at suppression of enemy air defense, disrupting the leadership and its communications, and WMD targets. The first shots to hit Iraq came from U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, led to an early warning radar station on the Saudi border by U.S. Air Force MH-53 PAVE LOW special operations helicopters.

With some limited exceptions on the outskirts, only stealth F-117 aircraft flew into the Baghdad area, along with cruise missiles fired from ships and submarines in international waters, as well as from B-52 bombers flying 36-hour round trip missions from their U.S. bases. Non-stealthy aircraft, however, ranged all over Iraq, simply avoiding the strongest air defenses in Baghdad.

Khafji: an attempted counteroffensive

Liberation of Kuwait

Cease-fire and dispositions

References

  1. Friedman, Thomas L. (22 March 1991), "After the War; U.S. Explains View on Envoy to Iraq", New York Times
  2. Trainor, Michael R. (1995), The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, Little, Brown
  3. The French word "Irak" spelled backwards
  4. Clancy, Tom & Chuck Horner (1999), Every Man a Tiger: The Gulf War Air Campaign, Putnam Adult
  5. Schwarzkopf, H Norman, Jr. (1992), It Doesn't Take a Hero, Bantam
  6. "War in Persian Gulf area ends; Iraq accepts UN cease-fire, demand for reparations, but calls Council resolution 'unjust.'", UN Chronicle, June, 1991