Vietnamese Communist grand strategy

Template:TOC-right Vietnamese Communist grand strategy certainly is related to that of Mao Zedong, but diverged considerably from his classical three-phase model. In addition, they came up with a phased model of their enemy's behavior, and then tested their theories against it. Since they now control Vietnam, that does suggest that they eventually came up with a viable model.

Countering that argument, however, is the reality that they apparently expected a fairly quick resolution when they invaded Cambodia in 1978, and found themselves enmeshed in 13 years of war. When the press started referring to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the "Soviets' Vietnam", cynics have called the invasion of Cambodia "Vietnam's Vietnam".

Background: the Maoist model

Mao Zedong developed a model of "protracted war" that has been the model for the phases many revolutionary movements:

1. Organization of the covert guerilla force, with individual and small attacks, often using the tactic of terrorism
2. Operations by medium-sized military forces in raids and ambushes, without any attempt to hold ground. These forces could be part-time and melt into the population, or operate from geographic sanctuaries
3. Conventional military confrontation with the intent of capturing and holding ground

In a purely military context, Vo Nguyen Giap called these "defensive, equilibrium, and offensive". North Vietnamese grand strategy, however, evolved another path, especially in changing the third stage from conventional military victory to a victory in a political, diplomatic, or psychological context. While the final victory ending the 1954 war was at the diplomatic table in Geneva, a good deal of conventional warfare led to the table, especially the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu.

Between 1959 and 1965, if not 1972, the Vietnamese politburo changed methods. They went back to something close to Mao's third stage in 1972-1975. Against Cambodia, however, they themselves came closer to their model of western behavior. Against China, yet another model might apply, far closer to a Western model of limited war.

Against the French, the Maoist model certainly applied in its first two stages, although while Dien Bien Phu and other major military actions were clearly conventional, they were not trying to defeat France on its own territory, which would have been the ultimate Phase 3 victory. Their idea of Phase 3 was conventional warfare in a limited area, possibly with a complete defeat of French forces in Indochina, but, as events established, could be ended at the negotiating table in Geneva.

After Geneva, the Maoist model did not seem to fit, for several reasons:

1. China and the Soviet Union, allies and suppliers, did not want a resumption of fighting
2. In 1954, there was to be a referendum on unification in two years, and Hanoi believed it would win
3. Even elections did not occur, the Party believed that the government of Ngo Dinh Diem was so inherently unstable that there would be a popular #General Uprising in the South, which, at most, would need support from paramilitary forces.

General Uprising

This was uniquely Vietnamese contribution to revolutionary theory, and, while it never took place, was the planned endpoint of all other actions. In Western terms, it assumed the populace of the South was the center of gravity; upset it and all else would fall.

Contrast: the model of western behavior

• Special war
• Local war
• ?

First evolution: General Offensive-General Uprising

Nguyen Chi Thanh, writing in the the Party theoretical journal Hoc Tap, called for the need to have simultaneous revolutions in production, technology and ideology. In that context, he called for avoiding excessive dependence on external aid, and increasing self-sufficiency, which may have indicated a desire to be independent of Chinese and Soviet pressure.

In December 1963, the Politburo apparently decided that it was possible to strike for victory in 1965. Theoretician Truong Chinh stated the conflict as less the classic, protracted war of Maoist doctrine, and the destabilization of doctrine under Khruschev, than a decision that it was possible to accelerate. "on the one hand we must thoroughly understand the guideline for a protracted struggle, but on the other hand we must seize the opportunities to win victories in a not too long a period of time...There is no contradiction in the concept of a protracted war and the concept of taking opportunities to gain victories in a short time." This may reemphasize Thanh's comments above against external dependency.

Protracted war theory, however, does not urge rapid conclusion. Palmer suggests that there might be at least two reasons beyond a simple speedup:

• The Politburo wanted to prevent Southern Communist dominance in an eventual victory, so by introducing Northern troops, they could take away that opportunity
• They thought they would be defeated if they did not take decisive action

They may also have believed the long-trumpeted U.S. maxim of never getting involved in a land war in Asia, and that the U.S. was too concerned with Chinese intervention to use airpower outside South Vietnam.