David Armstrong: Difference between revisions

From Citizendium
Jump to navigation Jump to search
imported>Tom Morris
(New page: {{subpages}} '''David Malet Armstrong''' (b. 8 July 1926, Melbourne) is an Australian philosopher focused on epistemology, ontology and [[philosophy o...)
 
imported>Tom Morris
No edit summary
 
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{subpages}}
{{subpages}}


'''David Malet Armstrong''' (b. 8 July 1926, Melbourne) is an [[Australia|Australian]] [[philosophy|philosopher]] focused on [[epistemology]], [[ontology]] and [[philosophy of mind]]. He is best known for his ''Materialist Theory of Mind'', part of his [[materialism|materialist]]-[[physicalism|physicalist]] project. Regarding properties, he defends a realist conception of [[universals]] as the best way of understanding the interaction of particulars with laws of nature (in ''Universals: An Opinionated Introduction'' and the two-volume ''Universals and Scientific Realism''). In epistemology, Armstrong is best known for his advocacy of an [[externalism|externalist]] theory of justification that requires a causal link between beliefs and the states of affairs that cause them (see ''Belief, Truth and Knowledge''). Armstrong's philosophy hinges on a strongly affirmative view of science.
'''David Malet Armstrong''' (b. 8 July 1926, Melbourne) is an [[Australia|Australian]] [[philosophy|philosopher]] focused on [[epistemology]], [[ontology]] and [[philosophy of mind]]. He is best known for his ''Materialist Theory of Mind'', part of his [[materialism|materialist]]-[[physicalism|physicalist]] project. Regarding properties, he defends an immanent realist conception of [[universals]] as the best way of understanding the interaction of particulars with laws of nature (in ''Universals: An Opinionated Introduction'' and the two-volume ''Universals and Scientific Realism''). This fits into a more general project of defending the [[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Wittgenstein]]-inspired notion of the world as a totality of states of affairs (in ''A World of States of Affairs''). In epistemology, Armstrong is best known for his advocacy of an [[externalism|externalist]] theory of justification that requires a causal link between beliefs and the states of affairs that cause them (see ''Belief, Truth and Knowledge''). Armstrong's philosophy hinges on a strongly affirmative view of science.


Armstrong was a student of Professor [[John Anderson]] at the University of Sydney and has stated that he is not tremendously interested in questions in the philosophy of language<ref>[http://www.ditext.com/armstrong/kramer.html Interview with David Armstrong] from ''Matters of the Mind: Poems, Essays and Interviews in Honour of Leonie Kramer''.</ref>. Although interested in questions of ethics and political philosophy, Armstrong has not written about this area in any depth. He has stated that he is a supporter of liberal democracy, but with a conservative edge, and has been inspired by the work of [[Michael Oakeshott]].
Armstrong was a student of Professor [[John Anderson]] at the [[University of Sydney]] and has stated that he is not tremendously interested in questions in the [[philosophy of language]]<ref>Armstrong declares his unofficial motto as being "Put semantics last", see [http://www.ditext.com/armstrong/kramer.html Interview with David Armstrong] from ''Matters of the Mind: Poems, Essays and Interviews in Honour of Leonie Kramer''.</ref>. Although interested in questions of ethics and political philosophy, Armstrong has not written about this area in any depth. He has stated that he is a supporter of liberal democracy, but with a conservative edge, and has been inspired by the work of [[Michael Oakeshott]].
 
== Epistemology ==
Armstrong's epistemology is reliabilist - that is, Armstrong identifies knowledge as true belief with a reliable, law-like (nomic) relationship between knower and world.


==References==
==References==
<references/>
<references/>

Latest revision as of 10:02, 8 February 2010

This article is a stub and thus not approved.
Main Article
Discussion
Related Articles  [?]
Bibliography  [?]
External Links  [?]
Citable Version  [?]
 
This editable Main Article is under development and subject to a disclaimer.

David Malet Armstrong (b. 8 July 1926, Melbourne) is an Australian philosopher focused on epistemology, ontology and philosophy of mind. He is best known for his Materialist Theory of Mind, part of his materialist-physicalist project. Regarding properties, he defends an immanent realist conception of universals as the best way of understanding the interaction of particulars with laws of nature (in Universals: An Opinionated Introduction and the two-volume Universals and Scientific Realism). This fits into a more general project of defending the Wittgenstein-inspired notion of the world as a totality of states of affairs (in A World of States of Affairs). In epistemology, Armstrong is best known for his advocacy of an externalist theory of justification that requires a causal link between beliefs and the states of affairs that cause them (see Belief, Truth and Knowledge). Armstrong's philosophy hinges on a strongly affirmative view of science.

Armstrong was a student of Professor John Anderson at the University of Sydney and has stated that he is not tremendously interested in questions in the philosophy of language[1]. Although interested in questions of ethics and political philosophy, Armstrong has not written about this area in any depth. He has stated that he is a supporter of liberal democracy, but with a conservative edge, and has been inspired by the work of Michael Oakeshott.

Epistemology

Armstrong's epistemology is reliabilist - that is, Armstrong identifies knowledge as true belief with a reliable, law-like (nomic) relationship between knower and world.

References

  1. Armstrong declares his unofficial motto as being "Put semantics last", see Interview with David Armstrong from Matters of the Mind: Poems, Essays and Interviews in Honour of Leonie Kramer.