Emergence (biology)/Bibliography: Difference between revisions

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A list of key readings about Emergence (biology).

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O'Connor, Timothy, Wong, Hong Yu, "Emergent Properties", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming [March 21, 2009] URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/properties-emergent/.

R Keith Sawyer (November 2001) Emergence in sociology: Contemporary philosophy of mind and some implications for sociological theory American Journal of Sociology 107 (3) pp.551-585. A discussion of both nonreductive (collective phenomena are collaboratively created by individuals yet are not reducible to individual action) and the reductive (emergent social properties can be reduced to explanations in terms of individuals and their relationships) views.

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	*O'Connor, Timothy, Wong, Hong Yu, "Emergent Properties", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming [March 21, 2009] URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/properties-emergent/.		*O'Connor, Timothy, Wong, Hong Yu, "Emergent Properties", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming [March 21, 2009] URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/properties-emergent/.

			*R Keith Sawyer (November 2001) [http://iscte.pt/~jmal/mcc/Keith_Sawyer_Emergence_in_Sociology.pdf Emergence in sociology: Contemporary philosophy of mind and some implications for sociological theory] ''American Journal of Sociology'' '''107''' (3) pp.551-585. A discussion of both nonreductive (collective phenomena are collaboratively created by individuals yet are not reducible to individual action) and the reductive (emergent social properties can be reduced to explanations in terms of individuals and their relationships) views.