Eurozone crisis

The crisis

The basic problem

If the annual interest payable on a government's debt were to continue to rise faster than the national income, it would eventually exceed the feasible revenue from taxation. The process is normally hastened by the fact that government debt is traded in a well-informed market. Operators in that market would be aware of the approach of the point at which the government would be forced to default on its debt, and they would be increasingly reluctant to allow that government to continue to roll over its debt. The government concerned could seek to overcome that reluctance by offering them higher interest on future loans, but an increase in the interest to be paid would hasten the process and increase the reluctance of further potential investors. That is what is known as the debt trap.

The debt trap could be escaped:

- (i) by repudiation of the debt;

- (ii) (temporarily) by a negotiation with creditors to ease the terms of repayment;

- (iii) (temporarily) by getting the country's central bank to purchase the debt; or,

- (iv) by a programme of reductions in public expenditure and/or increases in rates of taxation.

Options (i) and (ii) have the drawback of making future investors reluctant to buy the government's bonds. Option (iii) can also have that effect of it causes an inflation that reduces the value of the currency in which the debt is to be repaid. Option (iv) is free from that drawback, but is effective only if it avoids creating a recession that increases the deficit (by the operation of the country's automatic stabilisers).

Fewer options are available to members of a currency union, however. Option (iii) may be excluded by the fact that monetary policy is no longer under the control of the borrowing government. That fact also prevents the use of monetary policy to counter the recessionary consequences of (iv) (without which that option may be ineffective); and the rules of the currency union prevent the exchange rate deprecation that might otherwise counter them. To make (iii) possible and (iv) easier, a further option would be (v) - to leave the currency union.

The eurozone dilemma

The eurozone members' collective dilemma is whether a debt-trap-threatened member should be:

- (a) rescued by their loans or guarantees, or

- (b) left to tackle its problem without their assistance.

Option (a) sets a precedent that reduces incentive upon individual members' to abide by the collectively-agreed rules of fiscal conduct, and thereby increases the long-term danger that the dilemma will recur (the moral hazard consideration).
Option (b) involves the more immediate danger of a default by the member concerned that might put other members in a similar situation (the contagion consideration).

The problem of the PIIGS

Since the inception of the eurozone, five of its members - Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain - have suffered downgrades of their governments' credit ratings and increases in the interest rates payable on their bond issues, reflecting investors' fears that they might default. Those fears are mainly attributable to recession-induced increases in their budget deficits or in their public debt that raised doubts about their fiscal sustsinability. Two of them - Greece and Ireland - have been given financial support, conditional upon their adoption of deficit-reduction programmes. In neither case has that been followed by an improvement in their credit ratings, suggesting that doubts remain concerning their ability to implement those programmes. Their current financial status remains a matter of concern, and it has even been suggested that the future of the Eurozone is at stake.

Background to the crisis

The eurozone

Membership

In 1991, the 15 members of the European Union, meeting in the Dutch town of Maastricht, agreed to set up a monetary union with a single currency. They agreed upon strict criteria for joining, including targets for inflation, interest rates and budget deficits, and they subsequently agreed upon rules of conduct that were intended to preserve its members' fiscal sustainability. No provision was made for the expulsion of countries that did not comply with its rules, nor for the voluntary departure of those who no longer wished to, but the intention was announced of imposing financial penalties for breaches.

Greece joined the Eurozone in 2001, Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009. The current membership comprises Belgium, Germany¸ Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom are EU Member States but are not members of the Eurozone.

The Maastricht Treaty

[1]

The Stability and Growth Pact

The Stability and Growth Pact that was introduced as part of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, set arbitrary limits upon member countries' budget deficits and levels of national debt at 3 per cent and 60 per cent of gdp respectively.

Following multiple breaches of those limits by France and Germany, the pact has since been renegotiated to introduce the flexibility necessary to take account of changing economic conditions. Revisions introduced in 2005 relaxed the pact's enforcement procedures by introducing "medium-term budgetary objectives" that are differentiated across countries and can be revised when a major structural reform is implemented; and by providing for abrogation of the procedures during periods of low or negative economic growth . A clarification of the concepts and methods of calculation involved was issued by the European Union's The Economic and Financial Affairs Council in November 2009 which includes an explanation of its excessive deficit procedure.

The Financial Stability Facility

In May 2010, the European Council adopted a regulation establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism. A volume of up to EUR 60 billion is foreseen and activation is subject to strong conditionality, in the context of a joint EU/IMF support, and will be on terms and conditions similar to the IMF. The mechanism will operate without prejudice to the existing facility providing medium term financial assistance for non-euro area Member States' balance of payments. In addition, the representatives of the governments of the euro area member states adopted a decision to commit to provide assistance through a Special Purpose Vehicle that is guaranteed on a pro rata basis by participating member states in a coordinated manner and that will expire after three years, up to EUR 440 billion, in accordance with their share in the paid-up capital of the European Central Bank and pursuant to their national constitutional requirements

Fiscal policies

The dept trap identity establishes the conditions for fiscal sustainability as follows.

To avoid an increase in public debt in the course of any year, the budget balance during that year must not be greater than the opening level of debt multiplied by the difference between the interest rate on the debt and the nominal GDP growth rate in that year (and that means a budget surplus if the interest rate is greater than the growth rate). If, for example, the interest rate were 5% and the growth rate were 2% then a debt of 50% of gdp would require a surplus of 1.5% of GDP, a debt of 100% of GDP would require a surplus of 3% of gdp, and so forth.

History of the crisis

Greece

When Greece joined the eurozone in 2001, it was less prosperous than the other members[56], but its GDP grew more rapidly over the next seven years and fell less rapidly in the course of 2009. By the end of 2009, its unemployment rate had nevertheless risen in line with the European average and it was still suffering higher levels of poverty [57], and its national debt had risen by about 25 per cent above its pre-crisis level of 100 per cent of GDP[3]. Concern about the sustainability of the goverment's fiscal policy had led the credit rating agencies to downgrade the government's debt in January 2010, [58], and several times after that; and by early 2010 the cost of insuring against default by the Greek government rose after Moody’s Investors Service said the country’s economy was facing a “slow death” from deteriorating finances[59]. The investor panic continued until, in April 2010, it was announced that members of the eurozone were prepared to offer the government a conditional of €30 billion at lower interest rates than the current market rate (then over 7 per cent) [60] [61]. In return, the Government was required to carry out a programme of fiscal contraction that was expected to drive its economy into a deep recession. The statement did not have the expected stabilising effect, but was followed by increases in risk premiums and further credit rating downgrades with Standard and Poor estimating that investors would recover only 30 to 50 per cent of their investments if the Greek government defaults. A further agreement on May 2[62] to lend the Greek government €110 billion also failed to reassure investors[63]. Public spending cut-backs have sparked widespread demonstrations. An August 2010 review [64] applauded the government's measures, but investors continued to be unwilling to buy its bonds. Fiscal tightening in 2010 is expected to amount to 7.5 per cent of GDP.

Ireland

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A downturn in the output of the formerly booming Irish construction industry that started in 2007, intensified and developed into a full-blown economic recession in the course of 2008 and construction and property companies began to default on loans from the banks. News of their defaults made foreign banks and investors, that had been the banks' principal source of short-term finance, reluctant to risk further commitments, and a banking crisis developed. Consumer confidence fell and there was a very sharp increase in unemployment[42][43]. In an attempt to restore confidence, the Irish government undertook to guarantee loans to the banks. GDP growth rates averaging about 6 percent over the period 1995-2007 were followed by year-on-year falls of 8 percent in the 4th quarter of 2008 and 9 per cent in the first quarter of 2009, and the inflation rate fell to -3 per cent in September 2009. The government introduced fiscal stimulus measures amounting to 4.4 per cent of GDP spread over the three years 2008-10 which, combined with the effects of its automatic stabilisers is expected to raise the national debt to over 80 per cent of GDP from its 2007 level of 28 per cent[3]. Foreign investors became wary of the possibility a sovereign default, and the government's ability to finance the deficit was threatened by a general loss of confidence. In March 2009 the Standard and Poor credit rating agency downgraded its rating for Ireland from AAA to AA+[44], and April, the government decided that the only way to restore confidence was to take steps to reduce its deficit - and took the extraordinary step of increasing taxation in the midst of a recession [45]. Additional steps taken included direct purchase of stock in some banks and the establishment of the "National Asset Management Agency" - essentially a government-owned bank that will buy toxic debt from six financial institutions - both steps aimed at improving their balance sheets and freeing up capital.[46][47].

The report of an IMF consultation published in July 2010 concluded that the governments "aggressive measures" had helped gain policy credibility and stabilize the economy but that further long-haul efforts with active risk management would be need to preserve policy credibility[48]. On August 24, 2010 the Standard and Poor's credit rating agency downgraded Ireland's debt for the 3rd time to AA- (following 3 downgrades by the Fitch agency and 2 by Moody's).

Ireland's economy suffered a second downturn in the second quarter of 2010 and the Government's financial position continued to deteriorate. In September 2010, its CDS spread reached a record 5 per cent. On the 22nd of November 2010 the government applied for financial assistance from the EU and the IMF[49].

Spain

The recession in Spain was shallower but more protracted than the European average, and the recovery, which started in the first quarter of 2010, has been described as "weak and fragile"[65]. Spain's unemployment rate was among the highest in Europe, reaching 19 per cent in March 2010. A major contributory factor was the bursting of a vigorous housing bubble, as a result of which the construction sector crashed, and the banking sector suffered a downturn despite the fact that it had avoided the acquisition of toxic debt. Another major factor was deleveraging of a deeply indebted household sector. The Government responded with a major fiscal stimulus that, together with the effects of the country's automatic stabilisers resulted in the largest budget deficit in the European Union - although its public debt as a percentage of GDP was among the smallest. In 2010, the bond market developed a debt aversion against Spain following the Greek crisis, the Standard and Poor credit rating agency downgraded its credit rating from AA+ to AA on 28 April 2010[66], and the sovereign spread over Germany's 10-year bonds rose to 164 basis points in early May 2010.

The unemployment rate reached 20 per cent in Q2 2010[67]

Portugal

The Portugese economy has long depended upon agricultural exports, tourism, and income from its nationals working abroad - all three of which were hit by the recession. It went into downturn earlier than the European average and emerged no sooner. The Government responded with a fiscal stimulus equivalent to about 1¼ per cent of GDP. According to its statistics institute, the Portugese economy grew by 0.3 per cent in the second quarter of 2009 after contracting in the previous three quarters, leaving at 3.7 per cent lower than a year previously. The ensuing growth rate has been low and the unemployment rate has remained above 10 per cent. Portugal's public debt reached 77 per cent of GDP in 2009 and was expected to expand further in 2010. [68]. Deficit-reducing measures were put in hand and were met with strong trade union resistance. Unease following downgrades of Greek government bonds caused increasing debt aversion towards Portugal, and Standard and Poor downgraded its credit rating from A+ to A- (4 grades below the top) on 27th April 2010[69].