Eurozone crisis

In addition to the following text, this article comprises:      - a country-by-country summary of the development of the crisis;      - links to contemporary reports of the main events of the crisis;      - brief profiles of the principal actors;      - notes on the debt trap, the eurozone's departures from optimum currency area criteria, on the eurozone's policy options; ,      - tabulations of the fiscal characteristics of the PIIGS countries and their GDP growth rates; and,     - tabulations concerning the major member countries' attitudes to the crisis. It was last updated on 28 November 2011

The eurozone crisis started in 2010 when doubts about its ability to service its debt made investors reluctant to buy bonds issued by the Greek government. That reluctance spread to affect the bond issues of several other eurozone members, and by late November 2011, it was affecting the bonds of all of its members, including Germany.

Overview

The crisis started early in 2010 with the revelation that, without external assistance, the Greek government would be forced to default on its debt. The rescue measures that were initially adopted by the other eurozone governments took the form of conditional loans that enabled the Greek government to continue to roll-over its maturing debts. In the course of 2010, however, investors' fears of sovereign default by other eurozone governments increased their cost of borrowing, and further conditional loans had to be provided to the governments of Ireland and Portugal. The crisis deepened when, in the latter half of 20ll, it became evident that a default by the Greek government could no longer be avoided. On October 26 2011, after prolonged negotiations, a rescue plan was agreed, involving a 50 per cent write-off of the Greek government's debt; the recapitalisation of eurozone banks; and an increase in the effective size of the European Financial Stability Facility. There were increases in the sovereign spreads of Spain and Italy that were attributed to contagion from Greece, and eurozone leaders prevailed upon the Italian government to take determined action to reduce its debt. Bond market investors were not reassured. In mid November there were increases in the bond yields of other eurozone countries including France, and on 24 November 2011 there was a partial failure of a German government bond auction. Leaders of the eurozone differ about how its collapse is to be averted.

Background to the crisis

The eurozone

Overview

The eurozone was launched in 1991 as an economic and monetary union that was intended to increase economic efficiency while preserving financial stability. Financial vulnerability to asymmetric shocks as a result of disparities among member economies was intended to be countered in the medium term by limits on public debt and budget deficits, and in the long term, by progressive economic convergence. By the early years of the 21st century, however, it had became apparent that the fiscal limits could not be enforced, and that membership had enabled the governments of some countries - notably Greece - to borrow on more favourable terms than had previously been available. It had also become evident that membership had reduced the international competitiveness of low-productivity countries - such as Greece -, and that it had raised the competitiveness of high-productivity countries - such as Germany. For those and other reasons, it now appears that there had been divergence rather than convergence among the economies of the eurozone, and that their vulnerability to external shocks had beem increased rather diminished.

Membership

In 1991, leaders of the 15 countries that then made up the European Union, set up a monetary union with a single currency. There were strict criteria for joining (including targets for inflation, interest rates and budget deficits), and other rules that were intended to preserve its members' fiscal sustainability were added later. No provision was made for the expulsion of countries that did not comply with its rules, nor for the voluntary departure of those who no longer wished to remain, but it was intended to impose financial penalties for breaches.

Greece joined, what by then was known as the eurozone, in 2001, Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009. The current membership comprises Belgium, Germany¸ Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland. Bulgaria, Czech Republic.

The non-members of the eurozone among members of the European Union are Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

The European Central Bank

The European Central Bank is the core of the "Eurosystem" that consists also of all the national central banks of the member countries of the Union (whether or not they are members of the eurozone). Its governing body consists of the six members of its Executive Board, and the governors of the national central banks of the 17 eurozone countries. It is responsible for the execution of the Union's monetary policy. Its statutory remit requires that, "without prejudice to the objective of price stability", it is to "support the general economic policies in the Community" including a "high level of employment" and "sustainable and non-inflationary growth". The bank's governing board sets the eurozone's discount rates and has been responsible for the introduction and management of refinancing operations . Article 101 of the European Treaty expressly forbids the ECB from lending to governments and Article 103 prohibits the euro zone from becoming liable for the debts of member states.

The Bank is an independent decision-making body, being protected from political control by article 107 of the Maastricht Treaty: " ”…, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decisionmaking bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body".

The Stability and Growth Pact

The Stability and Growth Pact that was introduced as part of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, set arbitrary limits upon member countries' budget deficits and levels of public debt at 3 per cent and 60 per cent of gdp respectively. Following multiple breaches of those limits by France and Germany, the pact has since been renegotiated to introduce the flexibility announced as necessary to take account of changing economic conditions. Revisions introduced in 2005 relaxed the pact's enforcement procedures by introducing "medium-term budgetary objectives" that are differentiated across countries and can be revised when a major structural reform is implemented; and by providing for abrogation of the procedures during periods of low or negative economic growth . A clarification of the concepts and methods of calculation involved was issued by the European Union's The Economic and Financial Affairs Council in November 2009 which includes an explanation of its excessive deficit procedure. According to the Commission services 2011 Spring forecasts, the government deficit exceeded 3% of GDP in 22 of the 27 European Union countries in 2010.

The European Financial Stability Facility

In May 2010, the Council of Ministers established a Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to assist eurozone governments in difficulties "caused by exceptional circumstances beyond their control". It was empowered to raise up €440 billion by issuing bonds guaranteed by member states . It was to supplement an existing provision for loans of up to €60 billion by the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), and loans by the International Monetary Fund. Proposals to leverage the €440 billion by loans from the European Central Bank were not authorised until October 2011. The EFSF and the EFSM are to be replaced in 2013 by a permanent crisis resolution regime, to be called the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).

Pre-crisis performance

Neither a 1999-2008 growth rate comparison, nor a 2008-2011 growth rate comparison shows a significant difference between the performance of the eurozone as a whole and of the European Union as a whole, However, there is clear evidence that the Great Recession had imposed an asymmetric shock on the eurozone, causing downturns of above average severity in the economies of the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain), that are attributable to departures from currency area criteria, including large differences in member country trade balances, limited labour mobility and price flexibility.

The PIIGS

The economies of the PIIGS countries differed in several respects from those of the others. Unlike most of the others, they had developed deficits on their balance of payments current accounts (largely attributable to the effect of the euro's exchange rate upon the competitiveness of their exports). Deleveraging of corporate and household debt had amplified the effects of the recession to a greater extent - especially in those with larger-than-average financial sectors, and those that had experienced debt-financed housing booms. In common with the others, they had developed cyclical deficits under the action of their economies' automatic stabilisers and of their governments' discretionary fiscal stimuli, and increases in existing structural deficits as a result of losses of revenue-generating productive capacity. In some cases, their budget deficits had been further increased by subventions and guarantees to distressed banks.

The development of the crisis March 2010 to October 2011

Developments in individual countries are dealt with in greater detail on the addendum subpage.

Overview

The Great Recession brought about large increases in the indebtedness of the eurozone governments and by 2009, twelve member states had public debt/GDP ratios of over 60% of GDP. Concern developed in early 2010 concerning the fiscal sustainability of the economies of the "PIIGS" countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) and a eurozone fund was set up to assist members in difficilty. Bond markets were eventually reassured by the conditional loans provided to Ireland, but despite repeated loans to Greece, they demanded increasing risk premiums for lending to its government. In late 2010 there were signs of contagion of market fears by the governments of other eurozone countries, and it appeared that that the integrity of the eurozone was being put in question. Nevertheless, the eurozone leaders did not take decisive action until October 2011, when they sought to restore confidence in the governments of Greece and Ireland.

The Irish problem

Between 2009 and 2010 Ireland's budget deficit increased from 14.2 per cent to 32.4 per cent of GDP, as a result mainly of one-off measures in support of the banking sector. November 2010 the government applied for financial assistance from the EU and the IMF. By the Autumn of 2011 the government's programmes of tax increases had brought about a major improvement in fiscal sustainability, bringing down its budget deficit from 32.4 percent to an expected 10.6 percent of GDP.

The Greek crisis

In April 2010, the Greek government faced the prospect of being unable to fund its maturing debts. Its problems arose from large increases in its sovereign spreads reflecting the bond market's fears that it might default - fears that were based upon both its large budget deficits, and its limited economic prospects. In May 2010, the Greek government was granted a €110 billion rescue package, financed jointly by the eurozone governments and the IMF. Further increases in spreads showed that those rescue packages had failed to reassure the markets.

We are experiencing an episode in the history of the world which is very very special. It is the gravest financial crisis, economic crisis, since World War II, so it is something which is big. It is big in Europe, it is big in the US, big in Japan, big in the rest of the world. European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet 30th August 2011[1]

"We are now facing the greatest challenge our Union has ever seen... This is a financial, economic and social crisis, but also a crisis of confidence with respect to our leaders in general, to Europe itself, and to our ability to find solutions." José Manuel Durão Barroso President of the European Commission State of the Union Address, 28 September 2011

Contagion among the PIIGS

Signs began to appear of the contagion of the bond market fears from Greece to other PIIGS countries, particularly Portugal and Spain. Portugal received an EU/IMF rescue package in May 2011, and Greece was assigned a second package in July, neither of which restored the bond market's confidence in eurozone sovereign debt. There was a dramatic increase in measures of the market assessment of default risk, implying a 98 per cent probability of a Greek government default. Also in 2011, there was a major decline in confidence in eurozone banks, following rumours that losses on Greek bonds had left them undercapitalised. What had started as a Greek crisis was developing into a eurozone crisis because the rescue packages that could be needed for the much bigger economies of Spain or Italy were expected to be larger than the eurozone could afford. It was also acquiring the potential to trigger a second international financial crisis because the default of a European government might be expected to create a shock comparable to the failure of the Lehman Brothers bank that had triggered the crash of 2008. The falls in world stock market prices that occurred in August and September of 2011 were widely attributed to fears of a eurozone-generated financial crisis.

The Italian crisis

Bond market concern about the sustainability of Italy's public debt was reflected in a progressive rise in the yield on its 10-year government bonds during 2011, and by October it had risen to over 5 percent.

The decisions of October 2011

Overview

On the 26th of October, a meeting of eurozone leaders was held, the declared purpose of which was to restore confidence by adopting a "comprehensive set of additional measures reflecting our strong determination to do whatever is required to overcome the present difficulties". One set of measures that was adopted for that purpose, acknowledged the Greek government's inability to repay its debt in full, and provided for the restructuring of that debt, and for the financial support necessary for the government's survival. A second set was intended to provide an insurance against the contagion by other eurozone countries of the Greek government's difficulties and to assure the markets that sufficient eurozone funds would be available to cope with contagion should it occur. Thirdly, and in view of the market's awareness that a rescue of the Italian government would impose a major drain on those funds, the leaders sought to strengthen that government's defences against default. The measures that were agreed are recorded in a communiqué and in a list of "main results".

"We want Greece to remain in the Euro. At the same time, Greece must decide whether it is ready to take the commitments that come with Euro membership" José Manuel Durão Barroso President of the European Commission. Remarks following the G20 Summit Joint EU Press Conference Cannes, 4 November 2011

Restructuring the Greek debt

The rescue package for Greece included a 50 percent write-off of the Greek government's debt (as had been agreed with the Insitute of International Finance representing the world's banks), and a €130 billion conditional loan. The Greek government responded to the conditions for the loan by calling a referendum to enable the Greek people to decide whether to accept the package. At an emergency summit on 2nd November, however, Greek Prime Minister Papandreou was persuaded by French President Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel that the subject of the referendum should be whether Greece should remain within the eurozone, rather than the acceptability of the rescue package. He was also told that the €8 billion tranche of the EU/IMF loan that (needed to avoid a default in December) would be withheld until after the referendum. Acknowledging the prospect that the referendum could result in the departure of Greece from the eurozone,Jean-Claude Juncker, the Chairman of the Eurogroup of eurozone Finance Ministers announced that preparations for that outcome were in hand. The next day Prime Minister Papandreou announced his willingness to cancel the referendum, and that he had obtained agreement of opposition leaders to do so. On the 6th of November party leaders agreed to form a coalition government under a new Prime Minister. A new government was formed with Lucas Papademos as Prime Minister of Greece, and the terms of the EU rescue were agreed.

Strengthening Italy's policies

A programme of reform proposed by the Italian Government was itemised in the summit communiqué, and Prime Minister Berlusconi was called upon to submit "an ambitious timetable" for its implementation. The reforms that were promised in response in his "letter of intent" are reported to include also a reduction in the size of the civil service, a €15 billion privatisation of state assets and the promotion of private sector investment in the infrastructure. . It was approved on the 12th of November by the Italian parliament as the Financial Stability Law, and Berlusconi was replaced as Prime Minister by the eminent economist, Mario Monti.

Strengthening the firewall

The "firewall measures" that were proposed in order to limit contagion by European governments and their banks included a 4- to 5-fold increase in the size of the European Financial Stability Facility and the recapitalisation of selected eurozone banks.

The eurozone crisis

Contagion beyond the PIIGS

The bond market was not immediately reassured by the decisions of October 2011. Despite the new Italian government's acceptance of the measures had been agreed, the yields on its bonds rose to over 7 per cent, and there was evidence of contagion of the crisis by other PIIGS and non-PIIGS countries, including Austria and France, in the form of sharply rising sovereign spreads. On 23 November, contagion reached Germany. Its government failed to sell more than two-thirds of its 10-year bonds at auction, after which its bond yields rose above the yields on US treasuries and UK gilts

It appeared that bond market investors had bacome reluctant to buy the sovereign bonds of any eurozone country because of fear of a breakdown of the entire eurozone system.

Policy constraints

Overview

The principal alternatives that have been put forward to the current policy responses to the crisis have been (a) the extension of the European Central Bank's limited practice of government bond purchases to the point of giving it the obligation to serve as member governments' lender of last resort, and (b) the issue by individual member government of eurobonds that would be jointly guaranteed by member states as a whole. The reason that has been put forward for their rejection by the eurozone's decision makers has been the fear that the moral hazard that is associated with financial rescues, would lead to reckless conduct by member governments, of the sort that would increase the prospects of a recurrence of the crisis. To counter that fear, it has been proposed that member governments should be required to submit budget proposals to the European Commission for approval, but there are doubts whether national parliaments would assent to such a surrender of sovereignty.

There is evidence of dissension among member states, some of whom consider that the avoidance of, what they fear to be, the imminent collapse of the eurozone should be given priority over the longer-term problem of avoiding moral hazard.

Institutional constraints

The European Central Bank

The European Central Bank would be able to make a decisive response to the crisis were it not for the constraint of its mandate, and were it not for the restrictive interpretation that it applies to its function. Article 123 of the Treaty on European Union prohibits it from buying bonds from member governments, so that an amendment to the treaty would, in principle, be necessary to enable it to act as their "lender of last resort". Statements by its governors make it clear, however, that they consider the function of a central bank to be the avoidance of inflation, and that they would be very reluctant to use its powers for other purposes. Interpreted literally, the treaty does not forbid the purchase of government bonds on the secondary market, and there have been a number of such purchases. They have been too small to make a decisive difference, however and, even so, they have been opposed to the point of resignation by some of the Bank's governors.

The European Commission

The Commission has put forward its proposals for the introduction of eurobonds and for improved fiscal integration but, although fhe European Union's treaties authorise the Commission to take the initiative in proposing legislation, legislative decisions (except those concerning competition policy) can be taken only by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.

National attitudes

Germany

With the largest of the eurozone's economies, and the largest contributor to its rescue measures, Germany's attitudes have necessarily had a decisive influence on the eurozone's response to the crisis, and the European press is virtually unanimous in the belief that its Chancellor, Angela Merkel dictates her conditions on what should be done..

The German Government is opposed to "any participation of the European Central Bank in the strategies to resolve the euro debt and banking crisis". It is also opposed to the European Commission's eurobond proposal. Chancellor Merkel described the proposal as "extremely regrettable and inappropriate", arguing that the case for it should be put at the end of the process of European integration, "if indeed it is put at all", but newspaper reports in Germany indicate that some within her Christian Democratic Union Party and the Christian Social Union might be willing to give up their objections if it were made conditional on the introduction of an effective system of fiscal integration (in light of a judgement by the German Constitutional Court, an amendment to the German constitution may be needed for that purpose).

According to a YouGov poll held in August 2011, most Germans disapprove of their government's handling of the crisis (75%), and they want no more bailouts (59%), but want Greece expelled from the eurozone (58%). But German opinion is dividide on the question of whether Germany should leave the eurozone (44% for/48% against) . However, the results of a European Parliament "Eurobarometer" survey do not show German attitudes to the crisis as differimg greatly from those of other eurozone countries, except for their disapproval of eurobonds.

There have been signs that Angela Merkel's coalition government has been losing popular support , but federal elections are not due until 2013.

France

France's President Sarkozy is reported to favour both the eurobond proposal, and the proposal to use the the European Central Bank as lender of last resort, but to be willing to avoid public statements of disagreement with Chancellor Merkel.

Others

Qn a visit to Berlin on 28th November, the Polish Foreign Minister attacked the German Government's policy with the words " we ask that Germany admits that she is the biggest beneficiary of the current arrangements and therefore that she has the biggest obligation to make them sustainable" and called for immediate action to strengthen fiscal coordination and to make the European Central Bank the eurozone's lender of last resort.

The Dutch Finance Minister has been quoted as saying "in the long term I do not exclude Eurobonds. But we have to do necessary things first. That means strict surveillance and enforcement of budgetary discipline".

International repercussions

The eurozone's failure to deal with the crisis has reduced the market's confidence in the bond issues of other eurozone governments and its banks.