First Punic War

The First Punic War was an armed conflict between the Roman Republic and the City-State of Carthage which lasted from 264 BC until 241 BC. It was the first of the three Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage and was characterized by the large number of naval engagements and by the focus of the two nations on fighting for control of Sicily.

Origins

The origins of the First Punic War date back to 289 BC when the tyrant of Syracuse, Agathocles, died. At his death a mercenary band of Mamertines (Oscans who saw themselves as favored by the god of war Mamers,) who he had employed to help seize the city, were expelled from Syracuse by its citizenry. In the next few years the Mamertines found a welcoming home in the city of Messana, a Greek colony on the north east end of Sicily, sometime between 288 and 283. Soon after being taken in by the citizens of Messana the Mamertines seized control of the city, killing many of its leaders in the dead of night and sending the rest into exile and then dividing the property, and wives, of the dead and exiled amongst themselves.

Sometime after this, following their example, the Roman garrison in Rhegium (which is directly across the straits from Messana), comprising of citizens sine suffragio (citizens without voting rights) from Capua, under the command of a Decius Vibellius, and with the aid of the Mamertines copied the Mamertines and seized the city. The Mamertines and the rogue garrison entered into an alliance as they spoke the same language, came from nearby regions of Italy, and were in very similar situations in their respective cities.

At the same time Syracuse fell to the rule of a new Tyrant, Hicetas, who engaged in a war with the city of Acragas and its ally Carthage. With the two major powers on the island distracted the Mamertines extended their influence over most of north eastern Sicily. Soon after this Hicetas died and the Carthaginians laid siege Syracuse and were poised to, finally, put the entire island of Sicily under their direct control. Desperately seeking help, the citizens of Syracuse sent a messenger to Pyrrhus of Epirus who, seeking both to be seen as defender of Greek culture and as Agathocles' son-in-law, was more than willing to aide them. Fearing retribution from a victorious Syracuse the Mamertines in Messana entered into an Alliance with the Carthaginians and resisted Pyrrhus until he abandoned his Sicilian expedition in 275 BC.

Also in 275 a young army officer, Hiero, lead an army coup in Syracuse and had himself appointed as general, a position which gave him executive control over the city. In 270 BC the Romans finally retook Rhegium from the rebellious garrison, and marched the surviving members of the group back to Rome where they were beheaded in the forum. Hiero then stabilized relations with the Carthaginians, and marched against the Mamertines to re-establish Syracusan hegemony over the region. His first campaign, suffered a setback on the River Cyamosorus wherein he lost most of his merecenary contingent (Polybius says that this defeat was intentional, with Hiero trying to remove unruly and untrustworthy troops) and Hiero return to Syracuse where he raised a large Citizen army. However in his second campaign, which took place around 265 BC, he was able to force the Mamertines back into the region surrounding Messana and dealt a disastrous defeat to their army on the River Longus.

Seeing this "Hannibal son of Gisgo", who commanded the Carthaginian naval detachment based in Lipara and acting to prevent Syracusan dominance over the entire eastern half of Sicily, sailed to Hiero and convinced him to delay his march on Messana. He then went to Messana and convinced the Mamertines to take in a small Carthaginian garrison so as to effectively become a protectorate of Carthage. The Mamertines agreed and when Hiero was faced with this, and with the fact that the end of the campaigning season was at hand, he was forced to return to Syracuse.

The Mamertines, now trying to secure their long term security as Carthage was notoriously slow to act in defense of an ally, then sent a delegation to Rome seeking to place Messana under their protection (deferunt se in fidem), which the Romans, most likely fearing that if Hiero was no longer occupied with Sicily he might rally to the cause of the Greek cities of Magna Graecia and invade Italy as Pyrrhus had done in 280 BC, after serious deliberation granted.

Earlier Carthago-Roman Treaties

Too Come

Opening Stages of the War

The Mamertines then, with the ink on the treaty still damp, returned to Messana and through unspecified means expelled the Carthaginian force (which was apparently merely a token force and not sufficient to force the Mamertines to bend to Carthaginian will), an error which the Carthaginians then crucified the garrison commander for. In response to this Hiero and Carthage came to a diplomatic agreement to put aside their differences and besiege Messana together, and most likely burn it. Considering that the Carthaginian commander was given only the provincial garrisons to use as troops indicates that the Carthaginians, at least, did not envisage a long war, and probably hoped to use their strong navy to keep the Romans (who had no real central navy) from reinforcing Messana in time. Syracuse and Carthage then advanced on Messana, with the Carthaginians using Cape Pelorias as a naval base to blockade the port at Messana. In response the Romans sent a Consular Army under Appius Claudius Caudex to relieve the siege. And though he faced trouble getting his force across the straights into Messana, one story has the Carthaginians capturing a Roman trireme trying to carrying across an advance force into Messana and returning it to the main Roman force unharmed in the hopes of avoiding a war, by the summer of 263 there was a Roman force in Messana.

References

• Caven, Brian (1980). The Punic Wars. Barnes & Noble Books. ISBN 0-88029-892-8. 
• Polybius (1987). The Rise of the Roman Empire. Penguinn Books Ltd, London. ISBN 0-14-044362-2. 
• Lazenby, J. F. (1996). The First Punic War. Stanford University Press, Stanford. ISBN 0-8047-2674-4. 
• Goldsworthy, Adrian (2000). The Punic Wars. Cassell & Co, London. ISBN 0-304-35284-5.