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'''Jacques Derrida''' ([[July 15]] [[1930]]–[[October 8]] [[2004]]) was an [[Algeria]]n-born [[France|French]] [[philosopher]], regarded as the founder and leader of the [[Deconstruction]]ist movement.
'''Jacques Derrida''' ([[July 15]] [[1930]]–[[October 8]] [[2004]]) was an [[Algeria]]n-born [[France|French]] [[philosopher]].


Borrowing from [[Friedrich Nietzsche]]'s process of genealogy, deconstruction seeks to read a text against itself. This is done through the revealing of the signs every sign is pointing to, in infinite reference. Deconstruction stipulates that a subject of interest (such as a text) can be better understood through this manner. Through a word Derrida is hesitant to use, deconstruction allows the ''reconstruction'' of new meanings or better understandings.  
He provided, along with such thinkers as [[Paul de Man]], [[Michel Foucault]], and [[Jacques Lacan]], the intellectual impetus for what Anglo-American thinkers and critics later called "[[Deconstruction]]." Derrida's seminal works include ''Speech and Phenomena'' (''La Voix et le phenomene'', 1967), ''Writing and Difference'' (''L'Ecriture et la difference'', 1967), ''Of Grammatology'' (''De la Grammatologie'', 1967), and ''Dissemination'' (''La dissemination'', 1972), as well as essays in the Parisian journal ''[[Tel quel]]''.


Essentially, Deconstruction tries to show that subjects of interest — texts, traditions, societies, beliefs, etc — do not have definable meanings. There is the understanding that all signs and symbols are required to be more than they appear to be in order to have meaning. That signs and symbols depend on something Derrida calls ''Differánce''.
Despite extended engagement with philosophical forebears such as [[Husserl]] (in ''Speech and Phenomena''), [[Hegel]] (in ''Writing and Difference''), [[Rousseau]] (in ''Of Grammatology''), and [[Plato]] (in ''Dissemination''), Derrida does not attempt a comprehensive philosophical critique of these philosophers; by considering the philosophical "blind spots" these thinkers open by granting authority to certain ways of construing truth, such as preferring speech over writing or logical concept over metaphor, Derrida expounds his own philosophical position regarding the status of truth and knowledge in Western philosophy.


''Differánce'' relies on the space, the difference, between every sign. This space exists in the referral between signs. For example, a “dog” is different than a “canine” even though they refer to the same type of animal. The difference between “dog” and “canine” gives each its unique qualities. Interestingly, these unique qualities exist only because there is not a unique sign and symbol for any one subject of interest. One way to describe ''Differánce'': The difference of difference is ''Differánce''. To put it more simply (a hard task with Derrida), it is only by the distinction of symbols from one another that gives rise to their individual capacity. However, these symbols can not stand on their own - they require other symbols and signs to give them their ''Differánce''. Another example: The difference between words, text itself (typeface), is the white space between these very words. The "white space" gives each word its distinction from the one beside it. Without white space between words there is in fact only black bars with no unique characteristic because their is nothing to distinguish one from another. An "a" is an "a" because it is not a "b","c","d","e", and so forth.
For Derrida, all concepts are inextricably bound up with metaphor. Any concept that understands an aspect of some thing about or in the world is thus necessarily logically invalid, ungrounded--and in that sense "false"--since it relies to some extent on an "as if" way, a metaphorical way, of understanding that thing. In other words, the very nature of logical concepts dooms them to mark out (unwittingly, so to speak) some aspect of the object they supposedly understand which escapes subsumption to that concept, escapes its understanding.
 
Because Derrida is saying that all truth bears falsity along with it, some have declared Derrida absurdist for supposedly claiming that truth is falsehood, but this view is ill considered. The thrust of Derrida's thought points up the contingency and constructedness of truth, not that there is no such thing as truth. Satisfied to demonstrate the contingency of truth under any and all conditions, Derrida is silent on the nature of truth's contingency. A more considered critique of Derrida's view might see his thought as a form of transcendental skepticism, not dissimilar to Kant's. In any case, via rigorous philosophical demonstration, Derrida explicates the limitations of the logical conceptual thinking one routinely employs to live the requirements and ordinary situations of everyday life.




[[Category:CZ Live|Derrida, Jacques]]
[[Category:CZ Live|Derrida, Jacques]]
[[Category:Philosophy Workgroup|Derrida, Jacques]]
[[Category:Philosophy Workgroup|Derrida, Jacques]]

Revision as of 21:50, 10 March 2007

Jacques Derrida (July 15 1930–October 8 2004) was an Algerian-born French philosopher.

He provided, along with such thinkers as Paul de Man, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Lacan, the intellectual impetus for what Anglo-American thinkers and critics later called "Deconstruction." Derrida's seminal works include Speech and Phenomena (La Voix et le phenomene, 1967), Writing and Difference (L'Ecriture et la difference, 1967), Of Grammatology (De la Grammatologie, 1967), and Dissemination (La dissemination, 1972), as well as essays in the Parisian journal Tel quel.

Despite extended engagement with philosophical forebears such as Husserl (in Speech and Phenomena), Hegel (in Writing and Difference), Rousseau (in Of Grammatology), and Plato (in Dissemination), Derrida does not attempt a comprehensive philosophical critique of these philosophers; by considering the philosophical "blind spots" these thinkers open by granting authority to certain ways of construing truth, such as preferring speech over writing or logical concept over metaphor, Derrida expounds his own philosophical position regarding the status of truth and knowledge in Western philosophy.

For Derrida, all concepts are inextricably bound up with metaphor. Any concept that understands an aspect of some thing about or in the world is thus necessarily logically invalid, ungrounded--and in that sense "false"--since it relies to some extent on an "as if" way, a metaphorical way, of understanding that thing. In other words, the very nature of logical concepts dooms them to mark out (unwittingly, so to speak) some aspect of the object they supposedly understand which escapes subsumption to that concept, escapes its understanding.

Because Derrida is saying that all truth bears falsity along with it, some have declared Derrida absurdist for supposedly claiming that truth is falsehood, but this view is ill considered. The thrust of Derrida's thought points up the contingency and constructedness of truth, not that there is no such thing as truth. Satisfied to demonstrate the contingency of truth under any and all conditions, Derrida is silent on the nature of truth's contingency. A more considered critique of Derrida's view might see his thought as a form of transcendental skepticism, not dissimilar to Kant's. In any case, via rigorous philosophical demonstration, Derrida explicates the limitations of the logical conceptual thinking one routinely employs to live the requirements and ordinary situations of everyday life.

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