Meta-ontology: Difference between revisions
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Quine critiqued Carnap's views in several major works. Possibly the most direct critiques are ''On Carnap's views on ontology''<ref name=Quine2/> and ''Two dogmas of empiricism''.<ref name=Quine3/> He first dismissed the 'internal-external distinction' as just a matter of how general a terminology one chose to use. So for example, one could choose a language that employed the term ''furniture'', in which case one could talk about ''tables'' and ''chairs'' and ''beds'', or one could choose to use a narrower language in which ''furniture'' was not a concept, but only ''chairs''. In that case one was restricted to speak of types of chair: ''arm chairs'', ''lawn chairs'' and so forth; the choice of language being just a matter of convenience. Quine called this a matter of ''categories'' (the breadth of a language) and ''subclasses'' (the division of a category into its constituents) and considered the 'internal-external distinction' to be trivial. | Quine critiqued Carnap's views in several major works. Possibly the most direct critiques are ''On Carnap's views on ontology''<ref name=Quine2/> and ''Two dogmas of empiricism''.<ref name=Quine3/> He first dismissed the 'internal-external distinction' as just a matter of how general a terminology one chose to use. So for example, one could choose a language that employed the term ''furniture'', in which case one could talk about ''tables'' and ''chairs'' and ''beds'', or one could choose to use a narrower language in which ''furniture'' was not a concept, but only ''chairs''. In that case one was restricted to speak of types of chair: ''arm chairs'', ''lawn chairs'' and so forth; the choice of language being just a matter of convenience. Quine called this a matter of ''categories'' (the breadth of a language) and ''subclasses'' (the division of a category into its constituents) and considered the 'internal-external distinction' to be trivial. | ||
This aspect of Quine's critique is not widely accepted today, as is discussed later. | This aspect of Quine's critique is not widely accepted today, as is discussed later.<ref name=Yablo/><ref name=AllspectorKelly/><ref name=Bird/> | ||
By dropping the 'internal-external' distinction, Quine reduced the Carnap's ontology to simply the 'analytic-synthetic distinction' and he proceeded to argue that this distinction was untenable, that any attempt to define 'analyticity' inevitably was either completely circular and meaningless or dragged in some empirical aspect that made the supposedly analytic actually synthetic. The problem is that any explanation of a analytic statement that is more than just a restatement in terms of defined synonyms, that is, any explanation that is not circular, is a statement about ''usage'', and usage inevitably draws in empirical matters. Quine's approach to this issue also has been questioned, as discussed later, but it is a much more subtle matter than it appears.<ref name=Ryan/> | By dropping the 'internal-external' distinction, Quine reduced the Carnap's ontology to simply the 'analytic-synthetic distinction' and he proceeded to argue that this distinction was untenable, that any attempt to define 'analyticity' inevitably was either completely circular and meaningless or dragged in some empirical aspect that made the supposedly analytic actually synthetic. The problem is that any explanation of a analytic statement that is more than just a restatement in terms of defined synonyms, that is, any explanation that is not circular, is a statement about ''usage'', and usage inevitably draws in empirical matters. Quine's approach to this issue also has been questioned, as discussed later, but it is a much more subtle matter than it appears.<ref name=Ryan/> | ||
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==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist|refs= | {{reflist|refs= | ||
<ref name=AllspectorKelly> | |||
{{cite journal |author=M Allspector-Kelly |url=http://homepages.wmich.edu/~malspect/On%20Quine%20on%20Carnap%20on%20Ontology.pdf |title=On Quine on Carnap on Ontology |journal=Philosophical Studies |volume=102 |pages=93-122 |year=2001 |quote= Quine’s and Carnap’s views are much closer than Quine ever suspected.}} | |||
</ref> | |||
<ref name=Bird> | |||
{{cite journal |author=Graham H. Bird |title=Carnap and Quine: Internal and external questions. |journal=Erkenntnis |volume=42 |issue=1 |year=1995 |pages=41-64 |url=http://www.springerlink.com/index/mln6q38t24242500.pdf}} Reprinted in: {{cite book |editor=Thomas Bonk, ed |chapter=Carnap's internal and external questions |author=Graham H. Bird |url=http://books.google.ca/books?id=zWi5yL243xAC&pg=PA107&lpg=PA107#v=onepage&q&f=false |page=107 |title=Language, Truth and Knowledge: Contributions to the Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap |isbn=1402012063 |year=2003 |publisher=Springer}} "I want to argue that Quine's criticisms leave Carnap's central points quite untouched." | |||
</ref> | |||
<ref name=Carnap1> | <ref name=Carnap1> | ||
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<ref name=Ryan> | <ref name=Ryan> | ||
{{cite book |title=American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia |chapter=Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic |author=Frank X Ryan |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=KmUTkreTEQsC&pg=PA36 |pages=36-39 |editor=John Lachs, Robert B. Talisse, eds |isbn=020349279X |publisher=Psychology Press |year=2004}} | {{cite book |title=American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia |chapter=Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic |author=Frank X Ryan |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=KmUTkreTEQsC&pg=PA36 |pages=36-39 |editor=John Lachs, Robert B. Talisse, eds |isbn=020349279X |publisher=Psychology Press |year=2004}} | ||
</ref> | |||
<ref name=Yablo> | |||
{{cite journal |journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |title=Does ontology rest upon a mistake? |author=Stephen Yablo |url=http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/factual/papers/YabloMistake.pdf |volume=72 |pages=229-261 |quote=The usual charge against Carnap’s internal/external distinction is one of ‘guilt by association with analytic/synthetic’. But it can be freed of this association... |year=1998}} | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 09:15, 5 July 2013
Meta-ontology is the metatheory of ontology, which is to say it comprises discussion of what ontolgy is about and its methods. According to Hofweber:
| ‘ | "it also isn't so clear what an ontological question really is, and thus what it is that ontology is supposed to accomplish. To figure this out is the task of meta-ontology, which strictly speaking is not part of ontology construed narrowly, but the study of what ontology is. However, like most philosophical disciplines, ontology more broadly construed contains its own meta-study, and thus meta-ontology is part of ontology, more broadly construed. Nonetheless it is helpful to separate it out as a special part of ontology. Many of the philosophically most fundamental questions about ontology really are meta-ontological questions."[1] | ’ |
- ——Thomas Hofweber; Logic and ontology
The term 'meta-ontology' is rather new and became more used following a paper titled 'Meta-ontology' by Peter van Inwagen.[2] He phrased the subject of 'meta-ontolgy' as follows:
| ‘ | Quine has called the question ‘What is there?’ "the ontological question." But if we call this question by that name, what name shall we use for the question, ‘What are we asking when we ask “What is there?” ’? Established usage, or misusage, suggests the name ‘the meta-ontological question’, and this is the name I shall use."[2] | ’ |
- ——Peter van Inwagen; Meta-ontology
The question by Quine that Inwagen is referring to was posed in an essay On what there is.[3]
Background
The questions Inwagen referred to as 'meta-ontology' concerned a debate between Carnap and Quine about the structure of an ontology. So a logical starting point is the position of Carnap, followed by the critique by Quine, and then some more mdern takes on the issues.
Carnap
Carnap came from the school of logical positivism which was an outgrowth of some impatience of scientists with philosophy. Carnap's view was that an ontology consists of two parts: an 'internal' part, consisting of a logical combination of terms, definitions and formal relationships, and the observational data that the logical part intended to explain, and an 'external' part that consisted of pragmatic or practical consideration about which framework to use. He called the internal part a 'linguistic framework', and felt that it was not interesting to philosophers because any analysis of this part amounted simply to questions about usage of terms. On the other hand, Carnap felt that the 'external' part was not interesting to philosophers either, because it turned upon merely practical matters, such as how accurate a description was useful, whether a particulate linguistic framework was pertinent to a particular practical problem and so forth.
His views were expressed in two major works: Meaning and necessity in which he presented the idea of the analytic-synthetic distinction, and Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology in which he presented the internal-external distinction.[4][5] The internal-external distinction has been described. The analytic-synthetic distinction was a separation between terms that were defined, analytic terms whose meaning was specified by the logical part of a linguistic framework, and synthetic terms whose meaning involved some empirical observation. An example of the analytic type that is very often presented is All bachelors are unmarried. An example of the synthetic type requiring some evidential input is John is a bachelor.
Quine
Quine critiqued Carnap's views in several major works. Possibly the most direct critiques are On Carnap's views on ontology[6] and Two dogmas of empiricism.[7] He first dismissed the 'internal-external distinction' as just a matter of how general a terminology one chose to use. So for example, one could choose a language that employed the term furniture, in which case one could talk about tables and chairs and beds, or one could choose to use a narrower language in which furniture was not a concept, but only chairs. In that case one was restricted to speak of types of chair: arm chairs, lawn chairs and so forth; the choice of language being just a matter of convenience. Quine called this a matter of categories (the breadth of a language) and subclasses (the division of a category into its constituents) and considered the 'internal-external distinction' to be trivial.
This aspect of Quine's critique is not widely accepted today, as is discussed later.[8][9][10]
By dropping the 'internal-external' distinction, Quine reduced the Carnap's ontology to simply the 'analytic-synthetic distinction' and he proceeded to argue that this distinction was untenable, that any attempt to define 'analyticity' inevitably was either completely circular and meaningless or dragged in some empirical aspect that made the supposedly analytic actually synthetic. The problem is that any explanation of a analytic statement that is more than just a restatement in terms of defined synonyms, that is, any explanation that is not circular, is a statement about usage, and usage inevitably draws in empirical matters. Quine's approach to this issue also has been questioned, as discussed later, but it is a much more subtle matter than it appears.[11]
References
- ↑ Thomas Hofweber (Aug 30, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed:Logic and ontology. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition).
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Peter van Inwagen (1998). "Meta-ontology". Erkenntnis 48: 233–250. reprinted in Peter van Inwagen (2001). “Chapter 1: Meta-ontology”, Ontology, Identity and Modality, paperback. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521795486. On-line version found here.
- ↑ Willard van Orman Quine (September, 1948). "On what there is". Review of metaphysics 2: p. 21 ff. Reprinted in Willard van Orman Quine (1980). “Chapter 1: On what there is”, From a logical point of view, 2nd. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0674323513. On-line version is found here.
- ↑ Rudolf Carnap (1946). Meaning and Necessity. Chicago University Press.
- ↑ Rudolf Carnap (1950). "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology". Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4: 40-50.
- ↑ Willard van Orman Quine (October, 1951). "On Carnap's views on ontology". Philosophical Studies II: 65 ff. Reprinted in W v O Quine (1976). “Chapter 19: On Carnap's views on ontology”, The ways of paradox: and other essays, 2nd. Harvard University Press, 203 ff. ISBN 0674948378.
- ↑ Willard Van Orman Quine (1980). “Chapter 2: Two dogmas of empiricism”, From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-philosophical Essays, 2nd. Harvard University Press, 20 'ff. ISBN 0674323513. See this on-line version.
- ↑ Stephen Yablo (1998). "Does ontology rest upon a mistake?". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72: 229-261. “The usual charge against Carnap’s internal/external distinction is one of ‘guilt by association with analytic/synthetic’. But it can be freed of this association...”
- ↑ M Allspector-Kelly (2001). "On Quine on Carnap on Ontology". Philosophical Studies 102: 93-122. “Quine’s and Carnap’s views are much closer than Quine ever suspected.”
- ↑ Graham H. Bird (1995). "Carnap and Quine: Internal and external questions.". Erkenntnis 42 (1): 41-64. Reprinted in: Graham H. Bird (2003). “Carnap's internal and external questions”, Thomas Bonk, ed: Language, Truth and Knowledge: Contributions to the Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Springer. ISBN 1402012063. "I want to argue that Quine's criticisms leave Carnap's central points quite untouched."
- ↑ Frank X Ryan (2004). “Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic”, John Lachs, Robert B. Talisse, eds: American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia. Psychology Press, 36-39. ISBN 020349279X.