Operation Rolling Thunder
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Template:TOC-right Operation ROLLING THUNDER was an air campaign of the Vietnam War, principally proposed by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his staff, over the strong objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but enthusiastically supported by President Lyndon Johnson. Its basic premise was twofold: retaliatory strikes against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) for attacks in the South, coupled with a gradual escalation that would "signal" determination to the DRV leadership.
McNamara was insistent that the enemy would comply with his concepts of cost-effectiveness, of which Ho and Giap were unaware.
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They were, however, quite familiar with attritional strategies.[1] While they were not politically Maoist, they were also well versed in Mao's concepts of protracted war (see insurgency).[2]
In July 1965, McNamara wrote to Johnson, that the air campaign in progress had not "produced tangible evidence of willingness on the part of Hanoi to come to the conference table in a reasonable mood. The DRV/VC seem to believe that SVN is on the run and near collapse; they show no signs of settling for less than complete takeover.""[3]
Targeting
The targets were primarily transportation lines, bridges, railway yards, storage dumps, and oil tanks; civilian areas were to be avoided. In line with a "signaling" model proposed by Harvard economist Thomas Schelling, LBJ refused to allow the most valuable installations, those around Hanoi and Haiphong, to be attacked. The idea was that damage future was more harrowing than damage present. In practice, the slow escalation gave Hanoi time to camouflage and decentralize its installations, and thus minimize the damage.The raids were closely controlled by the White House, which saw them as "signals" in a negotiating process with Hanoi. There is no indication, however, that Hanoi even perceived that signals were sent.
Raids were calibrated so that each month they became more punitive, at least in the American value system. This theory, centered in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was that sooner or later Hanoi's pain threshold would be crossed and they would agree to negotiate a plan that would allow SVN to survive.
A classic error, which generations of professional intelligence analysts have been taught to avoid, is mirror-imaging. The Johnson Administration treated the North Vietnamese as mirror images of themselves, rather than people with a radically different mindset.
At the same time, the JCS view that North Vietnam could be crippled with a short, intense campaign also had aspects of mirror imaging, if a mirror could be added so that the images were of industrial powers such as Germany or the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam. The DRV did not have huge logistical facilities, and, while they used trucks, a substantial amount of the material moved down the Ho Chi Minh Trail was moved by human power. An innovation of the North Vietnamese was a cargo bicycle, not that was ridden, but handled much as a pack animal: it was laden with supplies, and pushed along by human guides.
Over time, North Vietnam did develop, for the time, an impressive air defense system. Air defense installations, especially airfields and control centers, were prohibited targets until very late in the war. With conscious irony, the initial Gulf War air attack proposal, initially focused on command and control and the KARI air defense system, was codenamed INSTANT THUNDER.
Analysis
McNamara was insistent that a rational enemy would not accept the massive casualties that indeed were inflicted on the Communists. The enemy, however, was willing to accept those casualties. [4]
Historians (on all sides) are unanimous that Rolling Thunder was a total failure.[5] North Vietnam was a very poor agricultural country with few likely targets in the first place. Unlike Germany and Japan in World War Two, it did not manufacture its own munitions, but imported them from China and Russia. LBJ vetoed plans to mine Haiphong harbor and cut the railroad lines at the Chinese border.
References
- ↑ Vo Nguyen Giap (2001), People's War People's Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries, University Press of the Pacific
- ↑ Mao Tse-tung (1967), On Protracted War, Foreign Languages Press
- ↑ McNamara, Robert S. (20 July 1965), Notes for Memorandum from McNamara to Lyndon Johnson, "Recommendations of Additional Deployments to Vietnam,"
- ↑ Adams, Sam (1994), War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir, Steerforth Press
- ↑ Col. Dennis Drew, Rolling Thunder 1965: Anatomy of a Failure (1986); Merle L., Pribbenow, II, "Rolling Thunder and Linebacker Campaigns: the North Vietnamese View." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 2001 10(3-4): 197-210. Issn: 1058-3947