Revolution in military affairs: Difference between revisions
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz (New page: '''Revolution in military affairs (RMA)''' has been, most recently, associated with high-technology changes to modern forces, but one of its theorists, retired Colonel [[Doug Macgregor...) |
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'''Revolution in military affairs (RMA)''' has been, most recently, associated with high-technology changes to modern forces, but one of its theorists, retired [[Colonel]] [[Doug Macgregor]], points to a variety of historical events, when a military force "successfully exploit[ed]" technology, organization, training and leadership to attain qualitatively superior fighting power, as well as dramatic positional advantages in time and space which the opponent’s countermeasures cannot defeat. In a briefing derived from his book, ''Breaking the Phalanx'',<ref>{{citation | '''Revolution in military affairs (RMA)''' has been, most recently, associated with high-technology changes to modern forces, but one of its theorists, retired [[Colonel]] [[Doug Macgregor]], points to a variety of historical events, when a military force "successfully exploit[ed]" technology, organization, training and leadership to attain qualitatively superior fighting power, as well as dramatic positional advantages in time and space which the opponent’s countermeasures cannot defeat. In a briefing derived from his book, ''Breaking the Phalanx'',<ref>{{citation | ||
| Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century | | Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century | ||
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*American Carrier-based Warfare in the Pacific during WW II; | *American Carrier-based Warfare in the Pacific during WW II; | ||
*Soviet/Russian Operational Art in the last years of WW II. | *Soviet/Russian Operational Art in the last years of WW II. | ||
Other examples, where a technology and its application changed warfare when it first appeared, include the first effective ironclad warships at the [[Battle of Hampton Roads]] and the introduction of a radically new [[battleship]] type with ''[[HMS Dreadnought (1905)]]''. | |||
One of the steps in recent RMA was the development of [[precision-guided munition]]s, introduced in the [[Vietnam War]], but first used in large, decisive quantities in the [[Gulf War]]. Another aspect is [[John Boyd]]'s concept of the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop, in which the side that uses information faster and better wins. Boyd's specific work was in fighter combat; the U.S. Navy's "Top Gun" training approach used these ideas. | One of the steps in recent RMA was the development of [[precision-guided munition]]s, introduced in the [[Vietnam War]], but first used in large, decisive quantities in the [[Gulf War]]. Another aspect is [[John Boyd]]'s concept of the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop, in which the side that uses information faster and better wins. Boyd's specific work was in fighter combat; the U.S. Navy's "Top Gun" training approach used these ideas. | ||
Derived in part from MacGregor's work is the [[restructuring of the United States Army]], which changed the WWII-based structure from one based on [[division]]s to smaller and more flexible [[brigade]]s, making extensive use of computers and communications. This fits into a broader framework of "maneuver warfare". | Derived in part from MacGregor's work is the [[restructuring of the United States Army]], which changed the WWII-based structure from one based on [[division]]s to smaller and more flexible [[brigade]]s, making extensive use of computers and communications. This fits into a broader framework of "maneuver warfare".<ref name=Leonhard>{{citation | ||
| title = The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle | |||
| author = Robert R. Leonhard | |||
| publisher = Presidio | year = 1991 | isbn=0891415327 | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist}} | {{reflist}} | ||
Revision as of 17:12, 25 May 2009
Revolution in military affairs (RMA) has been, most recently, associated with high-technology changes to modern forces, but one of its theorists, retired Colonel Doug Macgregor, points to a variety of historical events, when a military force "successfully exploit[ed]" technology, organization, training and leadership to attain qualitatively superior fighting power, as well as dramatic positional advantages in time and space which the opponent’s countermeasures cannot defeat. In a briefing derived from his book, Breaking the Phalanx,[1] he gives examples including:[2]
- Napoleon’s Conduct of Warfare in the early 1800s;
- German Conquest of France in 1940;
- American Carrier-based Warfare in the Pacific during WW II;
- Soviet/Russian Operational Art in the last years of WW II.
Other examples, where a technology and its application changed warfare when it first appeared, include the first effective ironclad warships at the Battle of Hampton Roads and the introduction of a radically new battleship type with HMS Dreadnought (1905).
One of the steps in recent RMA was the development of precision-guided munitions, introduced in the Vietnam War, but first used in large, decisive quantities in the Gulf War. Another aspect is John Boyd's concept of the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop, in which the side that uses information faster and better wins. Boyd's specific work was in fighter combat; the U.S. Navy's "Top Gun" training approach used these ideas.
Derived in part from MacGregor's work is the restructuring of the United States Army, which changed the WWII-based structure from one based on divisions to smaller and more flexible brigades, making extensive use of computers and communications. This fits into a broader framework of "maneuver warfare".<ref name=Leonhard>{{citation
| title = The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle | author = Robert R. Leonhard | publisher = Presidio | year = 1991 | isbn=0891415327