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From Citizendium, the Citizens' Compendium

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional security organization.

State	Date joined (*founder)
Indonesia	8 August 1967*
Malaysia	8 August 1967*
Phillipines	8 August 1967*
Singapore	8 August 1967*
Thailand	8 August 1967*
Brunei Darussalam	8 January 1984
Vietnam	28 July 1995
Laos	23 July 1997
Myanmar	23 July 1997
Cambodia	23 July 1997

Contents 1 Economic 2 Mutual Defense 2.1 Governing treaties and agreements among ASEAN/ASC members 2.2 Additional alliances 2.3 External security relationships 2.3.1 Counterterrorism 3 References

Economic

As of 2006, the ASEAN member states had a combined population of about 560 million, a total area of 4.5 million square kilometers, a combined gross domestic product of almost US$1,100 billion, and a total trade of about US$1,400 billion.^[1]

Mutual Defense

ASEAN, with some pride, observes that while there have been tension, there have been no armed conflicts, since its founding, among its members. Building on this experience, ASEAN is forming the ASEAN Security Community (ASC).

The members of the Community pledge to rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives. It has the following components: political development; shaping and sharing of norms; conflict prevention; conflict resolution; post-conflict peace building; and implementing mechanisms.

Governing treaties and agreements among ASEAN/ASC members

The ASC is based on a number of agreements^[1]:

Agreement	Place	Date
ASEAN Declaration	Bangkok	8 August 1967
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration	Kuala Lumpur	27 November 1971
ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea	Manila	22 July 1992
Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone	Bangkok	15 December 1997
ASEAN Vision 2020	Kuala Lumpur	15 December 1997
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II	Bali	7 October 2003

Additional alliances

In 1994, ASEAN created a larger ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), charged with evolution, in three steps, to "the promotion of confidence building, development of preventive diplomacy and elaboration of approaches to conflicts."

Besides the ASEAN members, the ARF members are:

• Australia
• Canada
• China
• European Union
• India
• Japan
• Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea)
• Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea)
• Mongolia
• New Zealand
• Pakistan
• Papua New Guinea
• Russian Federation
• United States

The ARF discusses major regional security issues in the region, including the relationship amongst the major powers, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, transnational crime, South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula, among others. ^[2]

Given the geographical realities, such as Singapore's small size, there are mutual basing agreements; some of the Singapore military is in Malaysia and the Phillipines. This is particularly important given the ASEAN concern over piracy.

There are annual ASEAN intelligence summits. With respect to intelligence cooperation, John Margeson poses the challenge, "Do arrangements such as ECHELON exist outside the relationships between "great" powers? Literature shows that broad relationships exist among regional powers for various reasons. In the case of ASEAN, states brought together to fight communist insurgency find that they can maximize security by cooperating in covert operations and intelligence sharing."^[3]. See external security relationships for a discussion of alliances beyond the ASEAN members.

Technology has accelerated ASEAN intelligence cooperation. For example, Malaysia and Singapore jointly monitor the South China Sea electronically, presumably with SIGINT, maritime patrol by ships and aircraft, and possibly IMINT from commercial satellites.

External security relationships

There are both political and technical sensitivities in forming additional alliances, which can be useful but challenging.

One regional alliance has obvious common interest and even overlapping membership, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) of Australia, Great Britain, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia, which includes three members of the UKUSA alliance with strong national SIGINT organizations.

Counterterrorism

Spurred by terrorism concerns, the ASEAN states, in May 2002, agreed on an Action Plan that provided for enhanced cooperation in intelligence sharing and coordination of anti-terror laws^[4].

In August 2002, ASEAN and the United States issued a “Joint Declaration . . . to Combat International Terrorism," which was followed by an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting on terrorism, to be jointly sponsored by Malaysia in the US. The US proposed that a regional counterterrorism training center be established in Malaysia. Accompanying the Anti-Terrorism Center is an intelligence-sharing agreement among Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Thailand, a first meeting of which was held in Manila in January 2003. An obvious question, without a simple answer, is how much SIGINT capabilities these countries have.

Concerns of national identity, and in some cases domestic Islamic constituencies, find cooperation with the U.S. to be a delicate matter for the Phillipines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Of the ASEAN members, Singapore seems most comfortable in exchanging intelligence information with the US, especially receiving SIGINT in return for HUMINT.

Singapore has established sharing between the United States Pacific Command Joint Intelligence Center and Singapore’s Joint Counterterrorism Center, and Singapore also is leading in accepting US goals for maritime security, with a Strategic Goods Control law in January 2003. That law made Singapore the first major port to meet US homeland security rules for cargo. Singapore wants more US X-ray equipment, and possibly MASINT sensors.

US relations to an ASEAN or other group may be more domestically acceptable, in countries suspicious of the US, than bilateral arrangements. There are obvious reasons for regional nations wanting US intelligence support, including SIGINT. Nevertheless, the eagerness of the US to help against Islamic groups strikes at local sensitivities.

References