World War Two in the Pacific: Difference between revisions

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[[Image:USS West Virginia Pearl Harbor.jpg|thumb|250px|Survivors from the ''USS West Virginia'' being rescued. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor forced the United States into the war.]]
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The '''Pacific War''' was the part of [[World War II]] — and preceding conflicts — that took place in the [[Pacific Ocean]], its islands, and in [[East Asia]], between 1937, and 1945.  The most decisive actions took place after the [[Empire of Japan]] attacked various countries, known as the Allies, in December, 1941, including an attack on United States forces at [[Pearl Harbor]].
[[Image:Ww2-pacific.jpg|thumb|left|Scope of the Second World War in the Pacific]]
'''World War Two in the Pacific''', called the '''Pacific War''' in Japan, was the part of [[World War II]] that took place in the Pacific Ocean, its islands, and in East and South Asia between 1937 and 1945.  There is no absolutely accepted starting date, but it is mos commonly accepted as e Japanese invasion of China ([[Second Sino-Japanese War]])) in 1937, but the most decisive actions took place after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the colonies of the U.S., the U.K., and the Netherlands in December 1941.


The war, however, did not magically appear out of context, any more than World War Two in Europe clearly began on 1 September 1939.  Czechoslovakia and the Sudetenland were clearly precursors, and arguments can be made for proxies such as the [[Spanish Civil War]]. The rise of German National Socialism and Italian [[Fascism]] were necessary. The European conflict certainly was influenced by World War I and the [[Versailles Peace Treaty]], and not only World War I, but the [[Russo-Japanese War]] and [[First Sino-Japanese War]], as well as the [[Japanese militarism|Japanese militarism before World War Two]], all played a role.
===Participants===
===Participants===
The major Allied participants were the United States and China. The British Commonwealth, including Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and India, and the Netherlands played significant roles. Mexico, DeGaulle's Free French Forces and many other countries also took part, especially forces from other British colonies. The Soviet Union fought two short, undeclared border conflicts with Japan in 1938 and 1939, then remained neutral until August 1945, when it joined the Allies and invaded [[Manchukuo]] and Korea.  
The major Allied participants were the United States, Britain and is Commonwealth, including Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and India, and the Netherlands played significant roles.  [[CBI|China played a major role]]. Mexico, DeGaulle's Free French Forces, Canada and other countries also took part, especially forces from other British colonies. The Soviet Union fought two short, undeclared border conflicts with Japan in 1938 and 1939, then remained neutral until August 1945, when it joined the Allies and invaded [[Manchukuo]] and Korea.  


The Axis states which assisted Japan included the Japanese puppet states of [[Manchukuo]] and the [[Wang Jingwei Government]] (which controlled most of the population of China). [[Thailand]] joined the Axis powers under duress. Japan enlisted many soldiers from its colonies of Korea and Formosa (now called [[Taiwan]]). Some German submarines operated in the Indian Ocean.
The Axis states which assisted Japan included the Japanese puppet states of [[Manchukuo]] and the Wang Jingwei Government]] in China. [[Thailand]] joined the Axis powers under duress. Japan enlisted many soldiers from its colonies of Korea and Formosa (now called [[Taiwan]]). Some German submarines operated in the Indian Ocean.
==Background==
{{main|Japanese militarism}}
Japan had a complex national desire to become a great power, which would require more resources. The initial approach, dating back to the nineteenth century, was exploitation of China,which, while not yet in outright civil war, had a national government under [[Chiang Kai-shek]] challenged by regional warlords and revolutionaries. These included [[Chang Tso-lin]] in Manchuria, and the growing Chinese Communist movement.


== Conflict between China and Japan ==
Japan's position at the 1922 [[Washington Naval Conference]] was recognized although not to the extent that Japan nationalists would have liked (they saw any situation not at parity with Great Britain and the U.S. as an insult).  
===Background===
The roots of the war began in the late 19th century with China in political chaos and Japan rapidly modernising. Over the course of the late 19th century and early 20th century, Japan intervened and finally annexed [[Korea]] and expanded its political and economic influence into China, particularly [[Manchuria]]. This expansion of power was aided by the fact that by the 1910s, China had fragmented into warlordism with only a weak and ineffective central government.


However, the situation of a weak China unable to resist Japanese demands appeared to be changing toward the end of the 1920s. In 1927, Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]] and the [[National Revolutionary Army]] of the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT) led the [[Northern Expedition]]. Chiang was able to defeat the warlords in southern and central China, and was in the process of securing the nominal allegiance of the warlords in northern China. Fearing that [[Zhang Xueliang]], the warlord controlling Manchuria, was about to declare his allegiance to Chiang, the Japanese staged the [[Mukden Incident]] in [[1931]] and set up the puppet state of [[Manchukuo]]. The nominal Emperor of this puppet state was better known as [[Henry Pu Yi]] of the defunct [[Qing Dynasty]].
Operating without knowledge of the high command but possibly with knowledge of th Palace, officers of the [[Kwangtung Army]] staged the September 1931 [[Manchurian Incident]] by which it claimed the right to exact military retribution against China and established the puppet state of [[Manchukuo]].  Subsequent incidents led the Japanese army to invade parts of Northern China.  Japan also occupied for a time Shanghai, and following a protest by the [[League of Nations]], Japan withdrew from the League.


Japan's imperialist goals in China were to enhance Japanese prstige as the dominant power in Asia and to have puppet governments in China that would not act against Japanese interests.  Japanese actions in Manchuria were roundly criticised and led to Japan's withdrawal from the [[League of Nations]]. During the 1930s, China and Japan reached a stalemate with Chiang focusing his efforts at eliminating the [[Communist Party of China|Communists]], whom he considered to be a more fundamental danger than the Japanese. The influence of [[Chinese nationalism]] on opinion both in the political elite and the general population rendered this strategy increasingly untenable.
===Exploitation of China===
By the summer of 1937 Japan had seized Chinese territory to the outskirts of Beijing and began the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]].  Japan had established regional dominance over [[Manchuria]] and parts of [[Mongolia]], but still saw a need to expand to gain resources. Within government circles in the 1930s, alternative strategies included greater exploitation of China, [[Strike-North Faction|Strike-North]] into the Soviet Union and Siberia, and [[Strike-South Faction|Strike-South]] into [[Southeast Asia]] and Pacific islands.


During the period of 1930–1934, the nationalist KMT and the [[Chinese Communist Party]] entered into direct conflict.  The Japanese capitalised on the infighting between Chinese factions to make greater inroads, forcing a landing at Shanghai in 1932.
The [[Nine-Power Treaty]] was somewhat as a compromise; signatory nations agreed to abide by the [[Open Door Policy]] while the territorial integrity of China was to be respected. 
===China, French Indochina, and Strike South===
Following the German defeat of France in 1940, Japan saw opportunity to further squeeze China.  It prevailed on the Vichy French government to allow Japan to occupy and use airbases in Northern [[French Indochina]] from which it could bomb China and interdict the flow of western aid to China through French Indochina.  The U.S., in response, authorized a loan to China and passed the [[Export Control Act]] which authorized the president to restrict the export of strategic materials to nations he deemed threatened national security.  Roosevelt used the act to embargo aviation fuel, scrap steel, and other materials to Japan.


Meanwhile, in Japan, a policy of assassination by secret societies and the effects of the [[Great Depression]] had caused the civilian government to lose [[civilian control of the military|control of the military]]. In addition, the military high command had limited control over the [[Army|field armies]] who acted in their own interest, often in contradiction to the overall national interest. [[Pan-Asianism]] was also used as a justification for expansion. This is perhaps best summarized by the "Amo Doctrine" of 1934, issued by Eiji Amo, head of information department of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Known as the "[[Monroe Doctrine]] of Asia," it announced Japan's intention for European countries to adopt a "hands off" policy in China, thereby negating the [[Open Door Policy]]. It stated that Japan was to be the sole leader in security in East Asia, including the task of defeating communism. Economic reason was also a very important factor leading to the invasion of China. During the [[Great Depression]], Japanese exports to American and European markets were severely curtailed, and Japan turned to completely dominating China politically and ecnomically to provide a stable market. In the period leading up to full-scale war in 1937, Japan's use of force in localised conflicts to threaten China unless the latter reduced its [[protective tariff]] and suppressed anti-Japanese activities and [[boycotts]] were evidence to this.
Once the Japanese had settled on the [[Strike-South Faction|Strike-South strategy]], they soon realized that they needed at least partial control of [[French Indochina]], both to cut off supplies moving north into China, and to provide air bases in range of targets further south and west. This led to complex relationships with [[Indochina and the Second World War|Indochina]], reflecting both the creation of [[Vichy France]], and the stronger German control of France through the [[Tripartite Pact]].


=== The Second Sino-Japanese War ===
In September 1940, Japan entered the [[Tripartite Pact]] with Germany and Italy pledging to aid each other if attacked by another power. Vastly confusing this situation was, however, the April 1941  [[Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact]] pledging nonaggression between Germany and the Soviet Union.  The inherent conflict between the two pacts, if the [[Strike-North Faction]] had not already been killed by poor Japanese performance against Soviet troops, made Strike-South the only expansionist strategy left.
In 1936, Chiang was [[kidnap]]ped by [[Zhang Xueliang]] (an event known as the [[Xian Incident]]). As a condition of his release, Chiang agreed to form a united front with the communists and fight the Japanese. Soon after, the [[Marco Polo Bridge Incident]] took place on [[July 7]], [[1937]], which succeeded in provoking a war between the [[Republic of China]] and the [[Empire of Japan]], the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]]. Though the Nationalist and Communist Chinese would cooperate in military campaigns against Japan and sought to create a united national front, [[Mao Zedong]] refused to directly submit to the Kuomintang, and the aim of the Communists remained social revolution. In 1939, the Chinese Communist Red Army consisted of 500,000 troops independent of the KMT.<ref name=GEORGI-DIMITROV>{{cite web
|title=Georgi Dimitrov and the United National Front in China 1936-1944 (See: ''No. 22 New Soviet Aid for Chinese'')
|url=http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv5n2/dimitrov.htm
|accessdate=2007-03-05 }}</ref>


In [[1939]] Japanese forces tried to push into the [[Russian Far East|Soviet Far East]] from Manchuria. They were soundly defeated in the [[Battle of Halhin Gol]] by a mixed Soviet and Mongolian force led by [[Georgy Zhukov]]. This stopped Japanese expansion to the North, and Japan and the Soviet Union kept an uneasy peace until 1945.
Even in Strike-South, Japan preferred to limit its confrontations with the Western colonial powers. At first, it believed it might hold the conflict to Great Britain.


In addition, throughout the 1930s Japan succeeded in alienating public opinion in the West, particularly the United States and Britain. During the early 1930s, public opinion in the United States had been neutral.  However, news reports of the [[Panay incident]] caused American public opinion to swing against Japan.
===US-Japanese tensions===
Negotiations between the United States and Japan proved unproductive.  [[U.S. Secretary of State]] Cordell Hull maintained an inflexible position that the first step in any resumption of trade between the U.S. and Japan would be a complete withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indochina, a step that the militant nationalists controlling Japan were unwilling to take.  Their other alternative was to seize the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies, an alternative for which they began war plans.  In order to secure their lines of supply between Indonesia and Japan, they would need control of the British base at Singapore and the U.S. colony of the Philippines.  Invasion of the Philippines, the Japanese correctly figured, would lead to war with the U.S., and given the strength of the U.S. navy in the Pacific as well as the productive capacity of the United States, the best hope for a Japanese victory in this war would be a decisive victory from which the U.S. would have little other alternatives than to negotiate a peace.  To decisively defeat the U.S. fleet, would require a massive blow at a time when the U.S. Navy was least prepared and least expecting a Japanese attack: at the very beginning of the war.


By [[1941]], Japan was in a stalemate in China. Although Japan had occupied much of north and central China, the [[Kuomintang]] had retreated to the interior setting up a provisional capital at [[Chongqing|Chungking]] while the [[Communist Party of China|Chinese communists]] remained in control of base areas in [[Shaanxi]]. In addition, Japanese control of north and central China was somewhat tenuous, in that Japan was usually able to control railroads and the major cities ("points and lines"), but did not have a major military or administrative presence in the vast Chinese countryside. The Japanese found that its aggression against the retreating and regrouping Chinese army was stalled by the mountainous terrain in southwestern China while the Communists organized widespread [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla]] and saboteur activities in eastern and central China behind the Japanese front line.
== The Pacific at war==
In an effort to discourage Japan's war efforts in China, the United States, Britain, and the Dutch government in exile (still in control of the oil-rich [[Dutch East Indies]]) stopped selling oil and steel to Japan.  This was the "ABCD encirclement" (American-British-Chinese-Dutch) designed to deny Japan of the raw materials needed to continue its war in China. Japan saw this as an act of aggression, as without these resources Japan's military machine would grind to a halt. On December 8, 1941, Japanese forces attacked the British colony of [[Hong Kong]], Shanghai, and the [[Philippines]], which was then a United States possession.  Japan also used [[Vichy French]] bases in [[French Indochina]] to invade Thailand, then used the gained Thai territory to launch an assault against Malaya, a British colony, headed toward the great British naval base at Singapore.
===Japanese strategy===
Japan had a grand strategy based both on establishing its regional dominance, and also to obtain economic resources it did not believe it could obtain by peaceful means. Within the military-dominated government, there had been a "Strike-South" and a "Strike-North" faction, respectively, seeing the needed resources in Southeast Asia or in Siberia. In either case, it had been conducting large-scale operations in Manchuria and China since 1931.


Japan sponsored several [[puppet government]]s, one of which was headed by [[Wang Jingwei]]. However, its policies of brutality toward the Chinese population, of not yielding any real power to the governments, and of support to several competing governments failed to make any of them a popular alternative to Chiang's government. Japan was also unwilling to negotiate directly with Chiang, nor was it willing to attempt to create splits in united front against it, by offering concessions that would make it a more attractive alternative than Chiang's government to the former [[warlord]]s in Chiang's government. Although Japan was deeply mired in a [[quagmire]], Japan's reaction to its situation was to turn to increasingly more brutal and depraved actions in the hope that sheer terror, including massive use of chemical and biological weapons against civilians and use of living civilians for medical and chemical experiments, would break the will of the Chinese population.
Especially if Strike-South were taken, which would inevitably impact European allies of the United States, and quite possibly U.S. bases proper, the Japanese military strategy was to force the United States Fleet, after being attrited by peripheral attacks, to steam into the Western Pacific, where it would be vulnerable both to Japanese naval forces and land-based air forces.  In support of this strategy, Japan had been building up a system of Pacific island bases since the 1920s.


== War spreads in the East ==
While Japan joined the [[Tripartite Pact]] in 1940, there had already been cooperation with Nazi Germany, and to a lesser extent with Italy. Japan also sought a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. Prior joining the pact but with known German support, it moved into what was then [[French Indochina]] to support its war in China, asking then [[Vichy France]] for assistance. These moves were unacceptable within the [[Indochina and the Second World War|foreign policy of the United States regarding Southeast Asia]], and led to economic embargoes against Japan.
This, however, only had the effect of turning world public opinion against it. In an effort to discourage Japan's war efforts in [[China]], the [[United States]], [[Britain]], and the [[Dutch government in exile]] (still in control of the oil-rich [[Dutch East Indies]]) stopped selling oil and steel to Japan. It was known as the "ABCD encirclement" (American-British-Chinese-Dutch) designed to deny Japan of the raw materials needed to continue its war in China. Japan saw this as an act of aggression, as without these resources Japan's military machine would grind to a halt. On [[December 8]], [[1941]], Japanese forces attacked the British [[crown colony]] of [[Hong Kong]], the [[Shanghai International Settlement|International Settlement]] in [[Shanghai]], and the [[Philippines]], which was then a United States [[Commonwealth of the Philippines|Commonwealth]]. Japan also used [[Vichy French]] bases in [[French Indochina]] to [[Japanese Invasion of Thailand|invade Thailand]], then using the gained Thai territory to launch [[Battle of Malaya|an assault against Malaya]].


Simultaneously (on [[December 7]] in the [[Western Hemisphere]]), Japanese [[aircraft carrier|carrier]]-based planes launched a massive air [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor]]. More than 2,400 people were killed. Three battleships and two destroyers were sunk, among many other losses. Although Japan knew that it could not win a sustained and prolonged war against the United States, it was the Japanese hope that, faced with this sudden and massive defeat, the United States would agree to a negotiated settlement that would allow Japan to have free reign in China. This calculated gamble did not pay off; the United States refused to negotiate.  Furthermore, the American losses were less serious than initially thought;  the American carriers were out at sea while vital base facilities like the fuel oil storage tanks, whose destruction could have crippled the whole Pacific Fleet's operating capacity by itself, were left untouched.
ADM [[Isoroku Yamamoto]], Navy Vice Minister at the time planning intensified, knew the United States and North America well. He counseled against war with the United States, and said, that under the best circumstances, he estimated Japan could maintain a strategic offense for 6-18 months, probably 12, before U.S. industrial mobilization would overwhelm Japanese objectives. His recommendation was for a bold, short-term offensive followed by negotiations, rather than a decisive victory against the United States and other Western powers. Internal Japanese opposition to his views was sufficiently intense that he was transferred to the post of Commander-in-Chief, because be could better be protected against assassination aboard his flagship. Assassination was a very real threat inside Japanese military and government circles in the 1920s and 19302.


=== The United States enters the war ===
It was not clear, to the Japanese, what they would do next after they conquered what they called the Southern Resource Area. Their military forces had always glorified the attack, and had little experience in consolidation, strategic defense, and logistics.


Until the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], the United States had remained out of the Asian and European conflict. The [[America First Committee]], 800,000 members strong, had until that day vehemently opposed ''any'' American intervention in the foreign conflict, even as America provided military aid to Britain and Soviet Union through the [[Lend-Lease]] program. Opposition to war in the United States vanished after the attack. Four days after Pearl Harbor, on [[December 11]], [[Nazi Germany]] declared war on the United States, drawing America into a two-theater war. In 1941, Japan had only a fraction of the manufacturing capacity of the United States, and was therefore perceived as a lesser threat than Germany.
===U.S. contingency strategy ===
The United States strongly supported China. There was little "isolationist" sentiment as American opinion, led by President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] was strongly hostile to Japan because of its efforts to conquer China.


British, Indian and Dutch forces, already drained of personnel and [[matériel]] by two years of war with [[Nazi Germany]], and heavily committed in the [[Middle East]], [[North Africa]] and elsewhere, were unable to provide much more than token resistance to the battle-hardened Japanese. The Allies suffered many disastrous defeats in the first six months of the war. Two major British warships, [[HMS Repulse (1916)|HMS ''Repulse'']] and [[HMS Prince of Wales (1939)|HMS ''Prince of Wales'']] were [[Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse|sunk by a Japanese air attack]] off [[Malaya]] on [[December 10]], [[1941]]. The government of [[Thailand]] surrendered within 24 hours of [[Japanese Invasion of Thailand|Japanese aggression]] and formally allied itself with [[Japan]] on [[December 21]], allowing its military bases to be used as a launchpad against Singapore and Malaya. [[Hong Kong]] fell on [[December 25]] and U.S. bases on [[Guam]] and [[Wake Island]] were lost at around the same time.
Army Chief of Staff [[George C. Marshall]] explained American strategy three weeks before Pearl Harbor:<ref>
Robert L. Sherrod "Memorandum for David W. Hulburd, Jr." November 15, 1941.
''The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland et al. vol. 2, ''We Cannot Delay, July 1, 1939-December 6, 1941'' (1986), #2-602 pp. 676-681. Marshall made the statement to a secret press conference. </ref>
:"We are preparing for an offensive war against Japan, whereas the Japs believe we are preparing only to defend the Philippines. ...We have 35 Flying Fortresses already there—the largest concentration anywhere in the world. Twenty more will be added next month, and 60 more in January....If war with the Japanese does come, we'll fight mercilessly. Flying fortresses will be dispatched immediately to set the paper cities of Japan on fire. There won't be any hesitation about bombing civilians—it will be all-out."


Following the [[January 1]], [[1942]] [[Declaration by the United Nations]] (not to be confused with the [[United Nations]], organised after World War II), the Allied governments appointed the British General Sir [[Archibald Wavell]] as supreme commander of all "American-British-Dutch-Australian" ([[ABDA]]) forces in [[South East Asia]]. This gave Wavell nominal control of a huge but thinly-spread force covering an area from [[Burma]] to the [[Dutch East Indies]] and the [[Philippines]]. Other areas, including India, Australia and Hawaii remained under separate local commands. On [[January 15]], Wavell moved to [[Bandung]] in [[Java (island)|Java]] to assume control of ABDA Command (ABDACOM).
The main U.S. contingency plan was called RAINBOW 5. U.S. counteroffensive strategy derived from the 1921 paper by Marine Major [[Earl Ellis]].


==Japanese offensives, 1941-42==
===Initial Japanese attacks ===
January saw the invasions of [[Burma]], the [[Dutch East Indies]], [[New Guinea]], the [[Solomon Islands]] and the capture of [[Manila]], [[Kuala Lumpur]] and [[Rabaul]]. After being driven out of Malaya, Allied forces were trapped in the Singapore and surrendered to the Japanese on February 15, 1942; about 130,000[http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/remembering1942/singapore/transcript.htm] Indian, Australian and British troops along with Dutch sailors, became prisoners of war. The pace of conquest was rapid: [[Bali]] and [[Timor]] also fell in February. The rapid collapse of Allied resistance had left the "ABDA area" split in two.<ref> Wavell resigned from ABDACOM in February 25, handing control of the ABDA Area to local commanders and returning to the post of [[Commander-in-Chief, India]].</ref>
Japan executed its [[Strike-South Faction|Strike-South]] plans with movements at [[Pearl Harbor]], the [[Malay Peninsula]] and [[Singapore]], and the [[Philippines]].
 
On December 7,  the Japanese carrier-based [[Mobile Fleet]], led by Vice Admiral [[Chuichi Nagumo]] under the direction of [[Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet]] [[Isoroku Yamamoto]], launched a air attack on the American air bases and naval fleet in the [[Pearl Harbor (World War II)|attack on Pearl Harbor]], sinking or damaging the entire American battleship fleet. U.S. [[aircraft carrier]]s were not in the harbor, and the attack left [[submarine]]s and the logistical facilities undamaged.
[[Image:USS West Virginia Pearl Harbor.jpg|thumb|250px|Survivors from the ''USS West Virginia'' being rescued. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor forced the United States into the war.]]


At the [[Battle of the Java Sea]], in late February and early March, the [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] inflicted a resounding defeat on the main ABDA naval force, under Admiral Karel Doorman. The [[Netherlands East Indies campaign]] subsequently ended with the surrender of Allied forces on Java.  
Although Japan knew that it could not win a sustained and prolonged war against the United States, it was the Japanese hope that, faced with this sudden and massive defeat, the United States would agree to a negotiated settlement that would allow Japan to have free reign in China. This calculated gamble did not pay off; the United States refused to negotiate.  Furthermore, the American losses were less serious than initially thought;  the American carriers were out at sea while vital base facilities like the fuel oil storage tanks, whose destruction could have crippled the whole Pacific Fleet's operating capacity by itself, were left untouched.


The British, under intense pressure, made a fighting retreat from Rangoon to the Indo-Burmese border. This cut the [[Burma Road]] which was the western Allies' supply line to the Chinese National army commanded by [[Chiang Kai-shek]]. Cooperation between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists had waned from its zenith at [[Battle of Wuhan]], and the relationship between the two had gone sour as both attempted to expand their area of operations in occupied territories. Most of the Nationalist guerrilla areas were eventually overtaken by the Communists. On the other hand, some Nationalist units, along with collaborationists, were deployed for blockading the Communists rather than against the Japanese. Further, many of the forces of the Chinese Nationalists were warlords allied to Chiang Kai-Shek, but not directly under his command. "Of the 1,200,000 troops under Chiang's control, only 650,000 were directly controlled by his generals, and another 550,000 controlled by warlords who claimed loyalty to his government; the strongest force was the Szechuan army of 320,000 men. The defeat of this army would do much to end Chiang's power."<ref> Edwin P. Hoyt, ''Japan's War'' (1986) pp. 262-263.</ref> The Japanese used these divisions to press ahead in their offenses.
Until the Pearl Harbor, the United States had officially neutral, but in fact was the main supplier of money and munitions to Britain and China, and a major supplier to Soviet Union as wee. The aid went through the [[Lend-Lease]] program. Opposition to war in the United States vanished after the attack. On December 11, Nazi Germany declared war on the United States, drawing America into a two-theater war. In 1941, Japan had only a fraction of the manufacturing capacity of the United States, and was therefore perceived as a lesser threat than Germany.


Filipino and U.S. forces put up a fierce resistance in the Philippines until May 8, 1942; in all than 80,000 men surrendered. By this time, General [[Douglas MacArthur]], who had been appointed Supreme Allied Commander South West Pacific, had relocated his headquarters to Australia. The U.S. Navy, under Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]], had responsibility for the rest of the Pacific Ocean.
British, Indian and Dutch forces, already drained of personnel and matériel by two years of war with Germany, and heavily committed in the [[Middle East]], [[North Africa]] and elsewhere, were unable to provide much more than token resistance to the battle-hardened Japanese. The Allies suffered many disastrous defeats in the first six months of the war. Two major British warships, ''HMS Repulse'' and ''HMS Prince of Wales'' were sunk by a Japanese air attack off Malaya on December 10, 1941. The government of Thailand surrendered within 24 hours of Japanese invasion and formally allied itself with Japan.  Thai military bases were used as a launchpad against Singapore and Malaya. [[Hong Kong]] fell on December 25 and U.S. bases on [[Guam]] and [[Wake Island]] were lost at around the same time.


Meanwhile, Japanese aircraft had all but eliminated Allied air power in South-East Asia and were making attacks on Darwin in northern Australia, beginning with a disproportionately large and psychologically devastating raid on Darwin, February 19. A raid by a powerful Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier force into the Indian Ocean resulted in the [[Battle of Ceylon]] and sinking of the only British carrier, [[HMS Hermes (95)|HMS Hermes]] in the theatre as well as 2 cruisers and other ships effectively driving the British fleet out of the Indian ocean and paving the way for Japanese conquest of [[Burma]] and a drive towards India. Air attacks on the U.S. mainland were insignificant, comprising of a submarine-based seaplane fire-bombing a forest in [[Oregon]] on [[September 9]], [[1942]] (in 1944 [[fire balloon]] attacks were made using bombs carried to the states from the Japanese mainland by the [[jetstream]]).
The Allied governments appointed the British General Sir [[Archibald Wavell]] as supreme commander of all "American-British-Dutch-Australian" (ABDA) forces in South East Asia. This gave Wavell nominal control of a huge but thinly-spread force covering an area from [[Burma]] to the [[Dutch East Indies]] and the [[Philippines]]. Other areas, including India, Australia and Hawaii remained under separate local commands.
==Japanese strategy and offensives 1942==
By early 1942, Japan was unsure what to do next. Their first concern was consolidating their gains in Southeast Asia, which provided adequate resources. They needed, however, more military buffer for their security; Australia was a potential Allied base for counterattacks.<ref>{{citation
| url = http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=11&ved=0CBEQFjAAOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aph.gov.au%2Flibrary%2Fpubs%2Fbp%2F1992%2F92bp06.pdf&ei=6zh8TPT0CcH38Ab7uPTFBg&usg=AFQjCNFajFhagoAIeyNZ554aBnRy1Eh1hQ
}}</ref>
*West into India
*South into Australia
*East towards Midway, Polynesia and Hawaii


==The Allies re-group==
1942 began with the Allies in rout, but several major actions showed the turning of the tide. The [[Battle of the Coral Sea]] was the first engagement in which a Japanese force turned back from an invasion. The [[Doolittle Raid]] made the Japanese believe their eastern perimeter did not extend far enough, and, of a variety of options, selected the invasion of Midway.
In early 1942, the governments of smaller powers began to push for an inter-governmental Asia-Pacific war council, based in [[Washington D.C.]]. A council was established in [[London]], with a subsidiary body in Washington. However the smaller powers continued to push for a U.S.-based body. The [[Pacific War Council]] was formed in Washington on [[April 1]], [[1942]], with a membership consisting of President [[Franklin Delano Roosevelt|Franklin D. Roosevelt]], his key advisor [[Harry Hopkins]], and representatives from Britain, China, Australia, the Netherlands, [[New Zealand]] and [[Canada]]. Representatives from India and the Philippines were later added. The council never had any direct operational control and any decisions it made were referred to the U.S.-British [[Combined Chiefs of Staff]], which was also in Washington.


Allied resistance, at first symbolic, gradually began to stiffen. Australian and Dutch forces led civilians in a prolonged guerilla campaign in Portuguese Timor. The [[Doolittle Raid]] did minimal damage, but was a huge morale booster for the Allies, especially the United States, and caused repercussions throughout the Japanese military because they were sworn to protect the Japanese emperor and homeland, but did not intercept, down, or damage a single bomber[http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/misc-42/dooltl.htm].
===Early Japanese attacks===
January, 1942 saw the invasions of Burma, the [[Dutch East Indies]], [[New Guinea]], the [[Solomon Islands]] and the capture of Manila, [[Kuala Lumpur]] and [[Rabaul, battle of|Rabaul]]. After being driven out of Malaya, Allied forces were trapped in the Singapore and, approximately 130,000 surrendered to the Japanese on February 15, 1942<ref>[http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/remembering1942/singapore/transcript.htm]</ref> Indian, Australian and British troops along with Dutch sailors, became prisoners of war. The pace of conquest was rapid: [[Bali]] and [[Timor]] also fell in February. The rapid collapse of Allied resistance had left the "ABDA area" split in two.


===Coral Sea and Midway: the turning point===
At the [[Battle of the Java Sea]], in late February and early March, the Japanese Navy inflicted a resounding defeat on the main ABDA naval force, under Admiral Karel Doorman. The Netherlands East Indies campaign subsequently ended with the surrender of Allied forces on Java.


By mid-1942, the [[Japanese Combined Fleet]] found itself holding a vast area, even though it lacked the aircraft carriers, aircraft, and aircrew to defend it, and the freighters, tankers, and destroyers necessary to sustain it. Moreover, Fleet [[doctrine]] was incompetent to execute the proposed "barrier" defense.<ref>Parillo, ''Japanese Merchant Marine''; Peattie & Evans, '''Kaigun'''.</ref> Instead, they decided on additional attacks in both the south and central Pacific. While Yamamoto had used the element of surprise at Pearl Harbor, Allied codebreakers now turned the tables. They discovered an attack against [[Port Moresby]], New Guinea was imminent with intent to invade and conquer all of New Guinea. If Port Moresby fell, it would give Japan control of the seas to the immediate north of Australia. Nimitz rushed the carrier [[USS Lexington (CV-2)|USS ''Lexington'']], under Admiral [[Frank Fletcher]], to join [[USS Yorktown (CV-5)|USS ''Yorktown'']] and a U.S.-Australian task force, with orders to contest the Japanese advance. The resulting [[Battle of Coral Sea]] was the first naval battle in which ships involved never sighted each other and aircraft were solely used to attack opposing forces. Although ''Lexington'' was sunk and ''Yorktown'' seriously damaged, the Japanese lost the aircraft carrier ''[[Shōhō]]'', suffered extensive damage to ''Shōkaku'', took heavy losses to the air wing of ''Zuikaku'' (both missed the operation against Midway the following month), and saw the Moresby invasion force turn back. Even though losses were almost even, the Japanese attack on Port Moresby was thwarted and their invasion forces turned back, yielding a strategic victory for the allies.
The British, under intense pressure, made a fighting retreat from Rangoon to the Indo-Burmese border. This cut the [[Burma Road]] which was the western Allies' supply line to the Chinese National army commanded by [[Chiang Kai-shek]]. Cooperation between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists had waned from its zenith at [[Battle of Wuhan]], and the relationship between the two had gone sour as both attempted to expand their area of operations in occupied territories. Most of the Nationalist guerrilla areas were eventually overtaken by the Communists. On the other hand, some Nationalist units, along with collaborationists, were deployed for blockading the Communists rather than against the Japanese. Further, many of the forces of the Chinese Nationalists were warlords allied to Chiang Kai-shek, but not directly under his command. "Of the 1,200,000 troops under Chiang's control, only 650,000 were directly controlled by his generals, and another 550,000 controlled by warlords who claimed loyalty to his government; the strongest force was the Szechuan army of 320,000 men. The defeat of this army would do much to end Chiang's power."<ref> Edwin P. Hoyt, ''Japan's War'' (1986) pp. 262-263.</ref> The Japanese used these [[division (military)|divisions]] to press ahead in their offenses.


Destruction of U.S. carriers was Yamamoto's main objective and he planned an operation to lure them to a decisive battle. After the Battle of Coral Sea, he had four frontline carriers operational &mdash; [[Japanese aircraft carrier Sōryū|''Sōryū'']], [[Japanese aircraft carrier Kaga|''Kaga'']], [[Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi|''Akagi'']] and [[Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryū|''Hiryū'']] &mdash; and believed Nimitz had a maximum of two: [[USS Enterprise (CV-6)|''Enterprise'']] and/or [[USS Hornet (CV-8)|''Hornet'']]. [[USS Saratoga (CV-3)|''Saratoga'']] was out of action, undergoing repair after a torpedo attack, and ''Yorktown'' sailed after three days' work to repair her [[flight deck]] and make essential repairs, with civilian work crews still aboard.  
Filipino and U.S. forces put up a fierce conventional in the Philippines until May 8, 1942; in all than 80,000 men surrendered, but an active [[resistance movement in the Philippines]] formed.


Yamamoto planned to lure Nimitz's carriers into battle, splitting his fleet and thereby gaining a further advantage. A large Japanese force was sent north to [[Battle of the Aleutian Islands|attack and invade the Aleutian Islands]], off Alaska. The next stage of Yamamoto's plan called for the capture of [[Midway Atoll]], after which it would be turned into a major Japanese airbase. This would give Yamamoto control of the central Pacific, a much better opportunity to destroy Nimitz's remaining carriers, or both. In May, however, Allied codebreakers discovered Midway was the true target. Nagumo was again in tactical command, but was focused on the invasion of Midway; Yamamoto's complex plan had no provision for intervention by Nimitz before the Japanese expected him. Planned surveillance of the U.S. fleet by long range seaplane did not happen (as a result of an abortive identical operation in March), so U.S. carriers were able to proceed to a flanking position on the approaching Japanese fleet without being detected. Nagumo had 272 planes operating from his four carriers, the U.S. 348 (of which 115 were land-based).  
Meanwhile, Japanese aircraft had all but eliminated Allied air power in South-East Asia and were making attacks on Darwin in northern Australia, beginning with a disproportionately large and psychologically devastating raid on Darwin, February 19.  
===Battle of Ceylon===
A raid by a powerful Japanese Navy aircraft carrier force into the Indian Ocean resulted in the [[Battle of Ceylon]] and sinking of the only British carrier, ''HMS Hermes'' in the theater, as well as 2 cruisers and other ships. This effectively drove British naval forces from the Indian ocean and paving the way for Japanese conquest of Burma and a drive towards India.


As anticipated by U.S. commanders, the Japanese fleet arrived off Midway on June 4 and was spotted by [[PBY]] patrol aircraft[http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/midway/mid-1m.htm]. By the time the Japanese had launched planes against the island, U.S. planes had scrambled and were heading for Nagumo's carriers. However, initial U.S. attacks were poorly coordinated, piecemeal, and ineffectual; they failed to score a single hit and half of them were lost. At 09:20 the first carrier aircraft arrived when ''Hornet'''s [[TBD Devastator]] torpedo bombers attacked; [[A6M Zero|Zero]] fighters shot down all 15. At 09:35, 15 TBDs from ''Enterprise'' skimmed in over the water; 14 were shot down by Zeroes. The carrier aircraft had launched without coordinating their own dive bomber and fighter escort coverage so the torpedo bombers had arrived first, distracted Nagumo's Zeros. When the last of the U.S. Navy strike aircraft arrived, the Zeros could not protect his ships against a high-level dive bomber attack. In addition, his four carriers had drifted out of formation, reducing the concentration of their anti-aircraft fire. In his most-criticized error, although Nagumo ordered aircraft armed for shipping attack as a hedge against discovery of U.S. carriers, he changed arming orders twice, based on reports an additional strike was needed against Midway and the sighting of the American task force, wasting time and leaving his hangar decks crowded with refueling and rearming strike aircraft and ordnance stowed outside the magazines. Yamamoto's dispositions, which left Nagumo with inadequate reconnaissance to detect Fletcher before he launched, are often ignored.<ref>Willmott, ''Barrier and the Javelin''.</ref>
===First Japanese reverse: Coral Sea===
[[Image:Air Attack on Japanese Carriers Kagi and Akagi, Midway Battle.jpg|thumb|250px|From the air attack on the Japanese carriers ''Kagi'' and ''Akagi'' at the Battle of Midway. Midway was a decisive victory for the U.S. Navy and the high point in Japanese aspirations in the Pacific.
{{main|Battle of the Coral Sea}}
]]
By mid-1942, the [[Japanese Combined Fleet]] found itself holding a vast area, even though it lacked the aircraft carriers, aircraft, and aircrew to defend it, and the freighters, tankers, and destroyers necessary to sustain it. Moreover, Fleet doctrine was incompetent to execute the proposed "barrier" defense.<ref>Parillo, ''Japanese Merchant Marine''; Peattie & Evans, '''Kaigun'''.</ref> Instead, they decided on additional attacks in both the south and central Pacific. While Yamamoto had used the element of surprise at Pearl Harbor, Allied codebreakers now turned the tables. They discovered an attack against [[Port Moresby]], New Guinea was imminent.  
When [[SBD]] [[Dauntless]] dive bombers from ''Enterprise'' and ''Yorktown'' appeared at an altitude of 10,000 feet, the Zeroes at sea level were unable to respond before the bombers tipped over in their dives. The U.S. bombers scored significant hits; ''Sōryū'', ''Kaga'', and ''Akagi'' all caught fire. ''Hiryū'' survived this wave of attacks and launched an attack against the American carriers which caused severe damage to ''Yorktown'' (which was later finished off by a Japanese submarine). A second attack from the U.S. carriers a few hours later found ''Hiryū'' and finished her off. Yamamoto had four reserve carriers with his separate surface forces, all too slow to keep up with the ''Kido Butai'' and therefore never in action. Yamamoto's enormous superiority in terms of naval artillery was irrelevant because the U.S. now had air superiority at Midway and could refuse a surface gunfight; his flawed dispositions had made closing to engage after dark on 4 June impossible.<ref>Willmott, ''op. cit.''</ref> Midway was a decisive victory for the U.S. Navy and the high point in Japanese aspirations in the Pacific.


=== New Guinea and the Solomons ===
If Port Moresby fell, it would give Japan control of the seas to the immediate north of Australia. Nimitz rushed the carrier ''[[USS Lexington (CV-2)]]'', under Admiral [[Frank Fletcher]], to join ''[[USS Yorktown (CV-5)]]'' and a U.S.-Australian task force, with orders to contest the Japanese advance. The resulting [[Battle of the Coral Sea]] was the first naval battle in which ships involved never sighted each other and aircraft were solely used to attack opposing forces.
Japanese land forces continued to advance in the [[Solomon Islands]] and [[New Guinea]]. From July, 1942, a few Australian [[Australian Citizens Military Forces|Militia]] (reserve) battalions, many of them very young and untrained, fought a stubborn rearguard action in [[New Guinea]], against a Japanese advance along the [[Kokoda Track Campaign|Kokoda Track]], towards [[Port Moresby]], over the rugged [[Owen Stanley Ranges]]. The Militia, worn out and severely depleted by casualties, were relieved in late August by regular troops from the [[Second Australian Imperial Force]], returning from action in the [[Middle East]].
===Reorganization===
[[Image:Ww2-pacific-theater.jpg|thumb|Map of the theater of operations in the Pacific Ocean and East Asia during the [[Second World War]]. Charles W. Boggs Jr., ''[http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-M-AvPhil/USMC-M-AvPhil-1.html Marine Aviation in Philippines]'' (Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1951), 2. ]]
After ABDA became defunct, the Americans set up four commands, the [[Southwest Pacific Area]], under General [[Douglas MacArthur]] in Australia, and three Pacific areas (North, Central and South), all under Admiral [[Chester W. Nimitz]] at Pearl Harbor.  The China-Burma-India (CBI) theater was a separate command, involving the British and Chinese, as well as Americans.


In early September 1942, [[Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces]] (commonly, but erroneously, called "Japanese marines") attacked a strategic [[Royal Australian Air Force]] base at [[Battle of Milne Bay|Milne Bay]], near the eastern tip of New Guinea. They were beaten back by the [[Australian Army]] and some U.S. forces, inflicting the first outright defeat on Japanese land forces since 1939.  
In early 1942, the governments of smaller powers began to push for an inter-governmental Asia-Pacific war council, based in Washington. The Pacific War Council was set up in Washington on April 1, 1942, but it never had any direct operational control and any recommendations it made were referred to the U.S.-British [[Combined Chiefs of Staff]], which was also in Washington.


====Guadalcanal====
Allied resistance, at first symbolic, gradually began to stiffen. Australian and Dutch forces led civilians in a prolonged guerrilla campaign in Portuguese Timor.
At the same time as major battles raged in New Guinea, Allied forces spotted a Japanese airfield under construction at Guadacanal. The Allies made an amphibious landing in August to convert it to their use and start to reverse the tide of Japanese conquests. As a result, Japanese and Allied forces both occupied various parts of [[Battle of Guadalcanal|Guadalcanal]]. Over the following six months, both sides fed resources into an escalating battle of attrition on the island, at sea, and in the sky, with eventual victory going to the Allies in February 1943. It was a campaign the Japanese could ill afford. A majority of Japanese aircraft from the entire South Pacific area was drained into the Japanese defense of Guadalcanal. The U.S. Air Forces based at Henderson Field became known as the Cactus Air Force (from the codename for the island), and held their own. The Japanese launched a pair of ill-coordinated attacks on U.S. positions around Henderson Field to suffer bloody repulse and then to suffer even worse losses to starvation and disease during the retreat. These offensives were suppiled by a series of ill-considered supply runs (called the "Tokyo Express" by the Americans), often also bringing about night battles with the U.S. Navy, expending [[destroyer]]s IJN could not spare. Japanese troops named Guadacanal "The Island of Death" as their fortunes declined. The Japanese survivors were evacuated in another series of "Toyoko Express" runs. The final American assaults found empty camps.
===Striking East===
{{main|Battle of Midway}}
The [[Doolittle Raid]] did minimal damage, but was a huge morale booster for the Allies. Only after the war was its immense strategic impact realized. Not only did the Japanese transfer air defense resources, needed in the field, back to the home islands, they concluded that their defense perimeter needed to extend further east. To extend it, they concluded they needed to seize [[Midway Island]]. They overextended themselves to fight the [[Battle of Midway]], a major Japanese defeat that was, arguably, the turning point of the Pacific War.


===Allied advances in New Guinea and the Solomons===
Yamamoto's primary goal was the seizure of the airfield on [[Midway]]; a secondary goal was to destroy U.S. fleet resources. Midway was a decisive victory for the U.S. Navy and the end of Japanese offensive aspirations in the Pacific. It cost the Japanese four fleet carriers, but, even more important, superbly trained pilots. One of Japan's great mistakes was not developing a continuous pipeline to train new pilots, and share the expertise of experienced pilots while giving them needed rest and preparing them for higher levels of command and staff.
By late 1942, the Japanese were also retreating along the Kokoda Track in the highlands of New Guinea. Australian and U.S. counteroffensives culminated in the capture of the key Japanese beachhead in eastern New Guinea, the [[Battle of Buna-Gona|Buna-Gona area]], in early 1943.              


In June 1943, the Allies launched [[Operation Cartwheel]], which defined their offensive strategy in the South Pacific. The operation was aimed at isolating the major Japanese forward base, at [[Rabaul]], and cutting its supply and communication lines. This prepared the way for [[Chester Nimitz|Nimitz]]'s [[island-hopping]] campaign towards Japan.
==Counteroffensive: New Guinea and the Solomons ==
Japanese land forces continued to advance in the [[Solomon Islands]] and [[New Guinea]]. From July, 1942, a few Australian militia battalions, many of them very young and untrained, fought a stubborn rearguard action in [[New Guinea]], against a Japanese advance along the Kokoda Track, towards [[Port Moresby]], over the rugged Owen Stanley Ranges. The Militia, worn out and severely depleted by casualties, were relieved in late August by regular troops from the Second Australian Imperial Force, returning from action in the Middle East.


==Stalemate in China and South-East Asia==
In early September 1942, Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces ("Japanese marines") attacked a strategic Australian Air Force base at Milne Bay, near the eastern tip of New Guinea. They were beaten back by the [[Australian Army]] and some U.S. forces, inflicting the first outright defeat on Japanese land forces since 1939.
===Guadalcanal===
{{main|Guadalcanal campaign}}
At the same time as major battles raged in New Guinea, Allied forces spotted a Japanese airfield under construction at Guadalcanal. The Allies made an amphibious landing in August to convert it to their use and start to reverse the tide of Japanese conquests. As a result, Japanese and Allied forces both occupied various parts of [[Guadalcanal campaign|Guadalcanal]]. Over the following six months, both sides fed resources into an escalating battle of attrition on the island, at sea, and in the sky, with eventual victory going to the Allies in February 1943.


British Commonwealth forces were also counter-attacking in Burma, albeit with limited success.
The [[Battle of Midway]] cost the Japanese a critical number of aircraft carriers and pilots. The [[Guadalcanal campaign]], however, signaled the shift of the Allies to systematic offense.<ref name=Potter-Halsey>{{citation
| author = E. B. Potter
| publisher = U.S. Naval Institute | year = 1985
| isbn = 0870211463
| title = Bull Halsey}}, p. 179</ref>


In August 1943, the western Allies formed a new [[South East Asia Command]] (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the [[British India Command]], under Wavell. In October 1943, Churchill appointed Admiral Lord [[Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma|Louis Mountbatten]] as Supreme Allied Commander, SEAC. General [[William Slim]] was commander of Commonwealth land forces and directed the Burma Campaign. General [[Joseph Warren Stilwell|Joseph Stilwell]] commanded [[China Burma India Theater|U.S. forces in the CBI Theater]], directed aid to China and assisted in the coordination of Chinese operations.
It was a campaign the Japanese could ill afford. A majority of Japanese aircraft from the entire South Pacific area was drained into the Japanese defense of Guadalcanal. Japanese logistics, as happened time and again, failed; only 20% of the supplies dispatched from Rabaul to Guadalcanal ever reached there. As a result the 30,000 Japanese troops on Guadalcanal lacked heavy equipment, adequate ammunition and even enough food, and were subjected to continuous harassment from the air.  10,000 were killed, 10,000 starved to death, and the remaining 10,000 were evacuated in February 1943, in a greatly weakened condition.  


In November, 1943 U.S. President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and ROC leader Chiang Kai-Shek met in Cairo, Egypt, to discuss a strategy to defeat Japan. The meeting was also known as [[Cairo Conference]] and concluded with the [[Cairo Declaration]].
The U.S. Air Forces based at Henderson Field became known as the Cactus Air Force (from the codename for the island), and held their own. The Japanese launched a pair of ill-coordinated attacks on U.S. positions around Henderson Field to suffer bloody repulse and then to suffer even worse losses to starvation and disease during the retreat.  
===New Guinea and the Solomons===
By late 1942, the Japanese were also retreating along the Kokoda Track in the highlands of New Guinea. Australian and U.S. counteroffensives culminated in the capture of the key Japanese beachhead in eastern New Guinea, the Buna-Gona area, in early 1943.              


In June 1943, the Allies launched [[Operation CARTWHEEL]], aimed at isolating the major Japanese forward base, at Rabaul, and cutting its supply and communication lines without actually invading it. This prepared the way for [[Chester Nimitz|Nimitz]]'s island-hopping campaign towards Japan.
==Allied offensives, 1943-44==
==Allied offensives, 1943-44==
Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. U.S. Admiral [[Ernest J. King]] complained that the Pacific deserved 30% of Allied resources but was getting only 15%; he used what he had to neutralize the Japanese forward bases at [[Rabaul]] and [[Truk]].  
[[Alfred Thayer Mahan|Mahanian]] doctrine called for a decisive naval battle. The Japanese repeatedly sought such a battle, but the U.S. did not. Instead it pushed closer and closer to the Japanese home islands. The Allied advance could only be stopped by a Japanese naval attack, which became increasingly difficult as Japan ran low on fuel, modern planes, trained pilots and major warships.
 
Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul and Formosa were neutralized by air attack and bypassed. The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the submarine blockade, and finally (if necessary) execute an invasion. The technique of amphibious landings to seize forward bases in preparation for a great fleet battle was propounded in 1921 by U.S. Marine MAJ [[Earl Ellis]].


The United States used the two years to turn its vast industrial potential into actual ships, planes, and trained aircrew. At the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or technological strategy, and lacking a good aircrew training program, fell further and further behind. In strategic terms the Allies began a long movement across the Pacific, seizing one island base after another. Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul and Formosa were neutralized by air attack and bypassed. The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the submarine blockade, and finally (if necessary) execute an invasion.
Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. Admiral King complained that the Pacific deserved 30% of Allied resources but was getting only 15%; he used what he had to neutralize the Japanese forward bases at [[Rabaul, battle of|Rabaul]] and [[Truk]].  


In November 1943, U.S. Marines sustained high casualties when they overwhelmed the 4,500-strong garrison at [[Battle of Tarawa|Tarawa]]. This helped the allies to improve the techniques of amphibious landings, learning from their mistakes and implementing changes such as thorough pre-emptive bombings and bombardment, more careful planning regarding tides and landing craft schedules, and better overall coordination.  
The United States used the two years to turn its vast industrial potential into actual ships, planes, and trained aircrew. At the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or technological strategy, and lacking a good aircrew training program, fell further and further behind.  


The U.S. Navy did not seek out the Japanese fleet for a decisive battle, as [[Alfred Thayer Mahan|Mahan]]ian doctrine would suggest (and as Japan did); the Allied advance could only be stopped by a Japanese naval attack, which oil shortages (induced by submarine attack) made impossible.<ref>Blair, ''Silent Victory''; Parillo, ''Japanese Merchant Marine''</ref>
On 18 October 1943, land-based aircraft bombed [[Rabaul, battle of|Rabaul]] <ref name=Cleaver>{{citation
| title = Raid on Rabaul: B-25 gunships terrorize Japanese shipping
| author = Cleaver, Thomas McKelvey
| journal = Flight Journal
| date = August 2004
| url = http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3897/is_200408/ai_n9458149/print}}</ref> This was followed, on 5 November, by a carrier raid that rendered Rabaul ineffective. <ref name=>{{citation
| url = http://www.combinedfleet.com/btl_rab.htm
| title = Carrier Raid on Rabaul (November 5, 1943)
}}</ref>  Still, the U.S. continued to harass Rabaul by air, and with a destroyer raid, into 1944.
===[[Operation GALVANIC]] (Gilberts)===
<blockquote>This force will seize, occupy, and develop Makin, Tarawa, and Abemama, and will vigorously deny Nauru to the enemy, in order to gain control of the Gilbert Islands and to prepare for operations against the Marshalls. <ref>{{citation
| url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/BBBO/BBBO-9.html
| contribution = Chapter IX: Operation GALVANIC (the Gilbert Islands)
| title = Beans, Bullets and Black Oil
| author = Worrall Reed Carter
| publisher = U.S. Navy}}</ref></blockquote>


===The submarine war in the Pacific===
The major combat operations, therefore, would be the [[Battle of Makin]], [[Battle of Tarawa]], the [[Battle of Abemana]], and [[Raids against Nauru]].
U.S. submarines (with some aid from the British and Dutch), operating from bases in Australia, Hawaii, and Ceylon, played a major role in defeating Japan. This was the case even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the U.S. Navy.<ref>Clay Blair, ''Silent Victory: The U. S. Submarine War Against Japan'' (Lippincott, 1975) and Theodore Roscoe, ''United States Submarine Operations in World War II'' (US Naval Institute Press, 1949). </ref> Submarines strangled Japan by sinking its merchant fleet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off nearly all the oil imports that were essential to warfare. By early 1945 the oil tanks were dry.<ref>Submariners systematically avoided publicity, in order to encourage enemy overconfidence. Japan thought its defensive techniques sank 468 American subs; the true figure was only 42. (Ten others went down in accidents, the [[Atlantic Ocean]], or as the result of [[friendly fire]].) Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers. </ref>  
====Battle of Tarawa====
{{main|Battle of Tarawa}}
In November 1943, Marines sustained high casualties when they overwhelmed the 4,500-strong Japanese garrison on the island of Betio in the Tarawa atoll. This helped the allies to improve the techniques of [[amphibious warfare]], learning from their mistakes and implementing changes such as thorough pre-emptive bombings and bombardment, more careful planning regarding tides and landing craft schedules, and better overall coordination.  
===[[Operation Flintlock]] (Marshalls)===
===Intercepting Yamamoto===
On April 13, 1943, American communications intelligence intercepted messages, in a relatively low-level cryptosystem, giving the inspection itinerary of Admiral [[Isoroku Yamamoto]], commanding the Japanese Combined Fleet. There were points along his inspection tour where long-range fighters could intercept and shoot down his aircraft. <ref name=Layton>{{citation
| title = "And I was There": Pearl Harbor and Midway: Breaking the Secrets
| author =Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau and John Costello
| publisher = William Morrow & Company  | year = 1985 | isbn-0688948838
}}, pp. 474-479</ref>


U.S. submarines alone accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; most of the rest were hit by planes at the end of the war, or were destroyed by mines. U.S. submariners also claimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed.<ref name="UsSubs">Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis, [http://www.navpublishing.com/subtour1.htm U.S. Submarines in World War II]</ref> Furthermore they played important reconnaissance roles, as at the battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf, when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. Submarines operated from secure bases in [[Fremantle, Western Australia|Fremantle]], [[Australia]]; Pearl Harbor; [[Trincomalee]], Ceylon; and later [[Guam]]. These had to be protected by surface fleets and aircraft.
The decision to intercept his aircraft and kill him required Joint Chiefs and Presidential approval, first because it could suggest to the Japanese that their communications had been broken, and other reasons such as the precedent of using assassination.  Pacific Fleet intelligence officer Layton, and possibly others in the decisionmaking, had the added burden of having known and admired Yamamoto the man.


Submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours of Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt ordered a new doctrine into effect: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.<ref> The U.S. thereby reversed its opposition to unrestricted submarine warfare. After the war, when moralistic doubts about Hiroshima and other raids on civilian targets were loudly voiced, no one ever criticized Roosevelt's submarine policy. The top German admirals, [[Erich Raeder]] and [[Karl Dönitz]], were charged at the [[Nuremberg Trials|Nuremberg War Crimes Trials]] of violating international law through unrestricted submarine warfare; they were acquitted after proving British merchantmen were legitimate military targets under the rules in force at the time.</ref>
On April 18, Yamamoto died when a force of 18 U.S. Army Air Force [[P-38 Lightning]] fighters intercepted and shot down the two bombers carrying staff officers, which were escorted by six Japanese fighters.
{{quotation|There was only one Yamamoto, and no one is able to replace him His loss is an unsupportable blow to us|Adm. Mineichi Koga, Yamamoto's successor}}.
===Recapture of the Aleutians===
On 11 May, U.S. Army forces landed on the Japanese-held island of Attu, in the Alaskan Aleutian chain. It was secured after two weeks of hard fighting.  An extensive bombardment preceded the 15 August invasion of nearby Kiska, but the Japanese had evacuated Kiska without the U.S. becoming aware of it. <ref>Layton, pp. 476-477</ref>
===The submarine war===
{{main|World War II, submarine operations}}
U.S. [[submarine]]s (with some aid from the British and Dutch), operating from bases in Australia, Hawaii, and Ceylon, played a major role in defeating Japan. Japanese submarines, however, played a minimal role, although they had the best torpedoes of any nation in the Second World War, and quite good submarines. The difference in results is due to the very different doctrines of the sides, which, on the Japanese side, were based on cultural traditions.
 
==The beginning of the end in the Pacific, 1944==


While Japan had some of the best-quality submarines of World War II, including many with ranges exceeding 16,000 kilometres (10,000 miles), these did not have a significant impact, for they were not used to systematicaly attack Amerioca's very long supply line. The Japanese intended them for use in battles between fleets.  In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and prewar U.S.) [[doctrine]] stipulated naval campaigns are won only by fleet battles, not [[guerre de course]] (commerce raiding). So, while the U.S. had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas that was vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan's submarines were instead used for long range reconnaissance and to resupply strongholds which had been cut off, such as [[Truk]] and [[Rabaul]]. In addition, Japan honored its neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union, and ignored U.S. freighters shipping millions of tons of war supplies from San Francisco to [[Vladivostok]].<ref> Carl Boyd, "The Japanese Submarine Force and the Legacy of Strategic and Operational Doctrine Developed Between the World Wars," in Larry Addington ed. ''Selected Papers from the Citadel Conference on War and Diplomacy: 1978'' (Charleston, 1979) 27–40; Clark G. Reynolds, ''Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires'' (1974) 512.</ref>
U.S. strategy for the war in the Pacific derived from [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] (JCS) decisions at the [[Cairo Conference (1943)]] to obtain "bases from which the unconditional surrender of Japan can be forced."<ref name=Morison>{{citation
| title = History of United States Naval Operations in World War II
| author = Samuel Eliot Morison
| volume = Volume XII: Leyte, June 1944-January 1945
| publisher = Atlantic Monthly/Little, Brown
| year = 1970
}}, p. 4</ref> There was, however, little clarity and much argument among the Joint Chiefs and the two theater commanders, [[Douglas MacArthur]] for the [[Southwest Pacific Area]] and [[Chester Nimitz]] for the [[Pacific Ocean Areas]]. JCS guidance to Nimitz and MacArthur, dated March 12, 1944, stated "The JCS have decided that the most feasible approach to Formosa, Luzon and China is by way of the Marianas, the Carolines, Palau, and Mindonoro."


The U.S. Navy, by contrast, relied on commerce raiding from the outset. In addition, however, the problems of [[Douglas MacArthur|MacArthur]]'s forces trapped in the [[Philippines]] led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla submarine" missions. As well, basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese aerial threat while ''en route'' to patrol areas, inhibiting effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for close surveillance of enemy bases. Furthermore, the standard issue [[Mark 14 torpedo|Mark XIV]] [[torpedo]] and its [[Mark VI exploder]] were both defective, problems not corrected until September 1943. Worst of all, before the war, an uninformed [[United States Customs|Customs]] officer had seized a copy of the Japanese merchant marine code (called the "''maru'' code" in the USN), not knowing [[Office of Naval Intelligence]] (ONI) had broken it;<ref>Farago, Ladislas. ''Broken Seal''.</ref> Japan promptly changed it, and it was not recovered until 1943.
The great distance of Formosa and Luzon from Japan made these objectives unusable as bases for attacks on the Japanese home islands. Bases in China may have supported ultra-long range bombers, but events soon marginalized this option as well. In May 1944, the Japanese Army, moved into Eastern China. After this, the JCS suggested bypassing all the intermediate bases (such as Luzon and Formosa) and directly attacking [[Kyushu]].<ref>Morison, 5-7.</ref>  This suggestion outraged MacArthur, whose personal agenda required the liberation of the Philippines above all else, but it reflected the desire of Army Chief of Staff [[George C. Marshall]] to avoid unnecessary land campaigns.  MacArthur was told that that personal and political considerations should not override the goal of defeating Japan.<ref>Courtney Whitney, ''MacArthur, His Rendevous with History'' (1966), quoted in Morison, 7.</ref>


Thus it was not until 1944 the U.S. Navy learned to use its 150 submarines to maximum effect: effective shipboard radar installed, commanders seen to be lacking in aggression replaced, and faults in torpedoes fixed. Fortunately, Japanese [[convoy|commerce protection]] was "shiftless beyond description"<ref>Chihaya Masataka, in ''Pearl Harbor Papers'', p.323. Chihaya went on to note, when IJN belatedly improved its ASW methods, the Sub Force responded by increasing Japanese loses.</ref> and convoys were poorly organized and defended compared to Allied ones, a product of flawed IJN doctrine and training, errors concealed by American faults as much as Japanese overconfidence. The number of U.S. submarines on patrol at any one time increased from 13 in 1942, to 18 in 1943, to 43 in late 1944. Half of their kills came in 1944, when over 200 subs were operating.<ref name="UsSubs"/> By 1945, patrols had decreased because so few targets dared to move on the high seas. In all, Allied submarines destroyed 1,200 merchant ships. Most were small cargo carriers, but 124 were tankers bringing desperately needed oil from the East Indies. Another 320 were passenger ships and troop transports. At critical stages of the Guadalcanal, Saipan, and Leyte campaigns, thousands of Japanese troops were killed before they could be landed. Over 200 warships were sunk, ranging from many auxiliaries and destroyers to eight carriers and one battleship. Underwater warfare was especially dangerous; of the 16,000 Americans who went out on patrol, 3,500 (22%) never returned, the highest casualty rate of any American force in World War II.<ref>Roscoe, ''op. cit.''</ref> The Japanese losses were even worse.
MacArthur had a deep emotional bond to the Philippines. MacArthur's personal ambition since leaving the Philippines in 1942 was to return.<ref name=Mac-7>"The Philippine Islands constituted the main objective of General MacArthur's planning from the time of his departure from Corregidor in March 1942 until his dramatic return to Leyte two and one half years later," {{citation
| url = http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v1/ch07.htm
| chapter = CHAPTER VII--THE PHILIPPINES: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE
| title = Reports of General MacArthur
| publisher = Office of the Chief of Military History, [[U.S. Army]]
| year = 1966
}}</ref> He believed that the honor of the United States required the liberation of the islands and that such an objective was strategically sound.  He saw Leyte as the base from which the rest of the Philippines could be taken. <ref name=Mac-Ch8>{{citation
| title=Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific
| chapter = Chapter VIII, The Leyte Operation
| url = http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v1/ch08.htm
| publisher = Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army | year = 1966}}</ref>


== Japanese counteroffensives in China, 1944==
MacArthur and his staff responded to Marshall's suggestion on June 15, 1944, with the Reno V plan.  This plan called for an October invasion of [[Mindanao]] to cover a November invasion of Leyte and further movements on a line [[Luzon]]-[[Bicol Peninsula]]-[[Mindonoro]]-[[Lingayen Gulf]]-[[Manila]].  As a bold, risky, and expensive plan, it had lots of detractors; Admiral King, and even MacArthur's air commander, General Kinney, criticized it. 
{{main|Battle of Henan-Hunan-Guangxi}}


In mid-1944, [[Japan]] launched a masssive [[invasion]] across [[China]], under the code name [[Operation Ichigo]]. These attacks, the biggest in several years, gained much ground for Japan before they were stopped in [[Guangxi]].
Eventually, President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] intervened to break the deadlock between King and Nimitz versus MacArthur. Roosevelt traveled to Honolulu, accompanied by his chief of staff, Admiral Leahy, and met with MacArthur in July.<ref>Morison, 8-11</ref> 


==The beginning of the end in the Pacific, 1944==
===Saipan ===
===Saipan and Philippine Sea: ===
{{main|Battle of Saipan}}
{{main|Battle of Saipan|Battle of the Philippine Sea}}  
On June 15, 1944, 535 ships began landing 128,000 U.S. Army and Marine personnel on on the island of [[Saipan]]. The Allied objective was the creation of airfields  &mdash; within [[B-29]] range of Tokyo. The ability to plan and execute such a complex operation in the space of 90 days was indicative of Allied logistical superiority.  
On June 15, 1944, 535 ships began landing 128,000 U.S. Army and Marine personnel on on the island of [[Saipan]]. The Allied objective was the creation of airfields  &mdash; within [[B-29]] range of Tokyo. The ability to plan and execute such a complex operation in the space of 90 days was indicative of Allied logistical superiority.  


It was imperative for Japanese commanders to hold Saipan. The only way to do this was to destroy the [[U.S. 5th Fleet]], which had 15 big carriers and 956 planes, 28 battleships and cruisers, and 69 destroyers.  Vice Admiral [[Jisaburo Ozawa]] attacked with nine-tenths of Japan's fighting fleet, which included nine carriers with 473 planes, 18 battleships and cruisers, and 28 destroyers. Ozawa's pilots were outnumbered 2-1 and their aircraft were becoming obsolete. The Japanese had substantial [[anti-aircraft gun|AA guns]], but lacked [[proximity fuzes]] and good [[radar]]. With the odds stacked against him, Ozawa devised an appropriate strategy. His planes had greater range because they were not weighed down with protective armor; they could attack at about 480 km (300 mi), and could search a radius of 900 km (560 mi). U.S. Navy [[Grumman Hellcat|Hellcat]] fighters could only attack within 200 miles, and only search within a 325 mile radius. Ozawa planned to use this advantage by positioning his fleet 300 miles out. The Japanese planes would hit the U.S. carriers, land at Guam to refuel, then hit the enemy again, when returning to their carriers. Ozawa also counted on about 500 ground-based planes at [[Guam]] and other islands.
It was imperative for Japanese commanders to hold Saipan, as inside Japan, Saipan was regarded as part of the innermost defense perimeter, and its capture would strengthen the peace faction, unknown outside Japan.  To help the land battle, the Japanese sent the Mobile Fleet, under Admiral [[Jisaburo Ozawa]], to attack the Fifth Fleet in what became known as the [[Battle of the Philippine Sea]], or, informally, the "Marianas Turkey Shoot".


Admiral [[Raymond A. Spruance]] was in overall command of the 5th Fleet. The Japanese plan would have failed if the much larger U.S. fleet had closed on Ozawa and attacked aggressively; Ozawa had the correct insight that the unaggressive Spruance would not attack. U.S. Admiral [[Marc Mitscher]], in tactical command of Task Force 58, with its 15 carriers, was aggressive but Spruance vetoed Mitscher's plan to hunt down Ozawa because Spruance's personal doctrine made it his first priority to protect the soldiers landing on Saipan.
When it fell, so did the government of [[Hideki Tojo]], who was replaced as Prime Minister by [[Prince Konoye]].  The new cabinet was more inclined toward peace, but certainly not to immediate capitulation; Army elements still insisted on total war.
===Battle of the Philippine Sea===
{{main|Philippine Sea, battle of|Battle of the Philippine Sea}}
The only way to do this was to destroy the [[Fifth United States Fleet]], which had 15 big carriers and 956 planes, 28 battleships and cruisers, and 69 destroyers.  Vice Admiral [[Jisaburo Ozawa]] attacked with nine-tenths of Japan's fighting fleet, which included nine carriers with 473 planes, 18 battleships and cruisers, and 28 destroyers. Ozawa's pilots were outnumbered 2-1 and their aircraft were becoming obsolete. The Japanese had substantial [[anti-aircraft artillery]], but lacked [[proximity fuze]]s and good [[radar]]. With the odds stacked against him, Ozawa devised an appropriate strategy. His planes had greater range because they were not weighed down with protective armor; they could attack at about 480 km (300 mi), and could search a radius of 900 km (560 mi). U.S. Navy [[F6F Hellcat]] fighters could only attack within 200 miles, and only search within a 325 mile radius. Ozawa planned to use this advantage by positioning his fleet 300 miles out. The Japanese planes would hit the U.S. carriers, land at Guam to refuel, then hit the enemy again, when returning to their carriers. Ozawa also counted on about 500 ground-based planes at [[Guam]] and other islands.
 
Admiral [[Raymond Spruance]] was in overall command of the 5th Fleet. The Japanese plan would have failed if the much larger U.S. fleet had closed on Ozawa and attacked aggressively; Ozawa had the correct insight that the unaggressive Spruance would not attack. U.S. Admiral [[Marc Mitscher]], in tactical command of Task Force 58, with its 15 carriers, was aggressive but Spruance vetoed Mitscher's plan to hunt down Ozawa because Spruance's decisions made his first priority protection of the Saipan landing.


The forces converged in the largest sea battle of World War II up to that point. Over the previous month American destroyers had destroyed 17 of the 25 submarines Ozawa had sent ahead. Repeated U.S. raids destroyed the Japanese land-based planes. Ozawa's main attack lacked coordination, with the Japanese planes arriving at their targets in a staggered sequence. Following a directive from Nimitz, the U.S. carriers all had combat information centers, which interpreted the flow of radar data instantaneously and radioed interception orders to the Hellcats. The result was later dubbed the ''Great Marianas Turkey Shoot''. The few attackers to reach the U.S. fleet encountered massive AA fire with proximity fuzes. Only one American warship was slightly damaged.
The forces converged in the largest sea battle of World War II up to that point. Over the previous month American destroyers had destroyed 17 of the 25 submarines Ozawa had sent ahead. Repeated U.S. raids destroyed the Japanese land-based planes. Ozawa's main attack lacked coordination, with the Japanese planes arriving at their targets in a staggered sequence. Following a directive from Nimitz, the U.S. carriers all had combat information centers, which interpreted the flow of radar data instantaneously and radioed interception orders to the Hellcats. The result was later dubbed the ''Great Marianas Turkey Shoot''. The few attackers to reach the U.S. fleet encountered massive AA fire with proximity fuzes. Only one American warship was slightly damaged.
Line 136: Line 223:
On the second day U.S. reconnaissance planes finally located Ozawa's fleet, 275 miles away and submarines sank two Japanese carriers. Mitscher launched 230 torpedo planes and dive bombers. He then discovered that the enemy was actually another 60 miles further off, out of aircraft range. Mitscher decided that this chance to destroy the Japanese fleet was worth the risk of aircraft losses.  Overall, the U.S. lost 130 planes and 76 aircrew. However, Japan lost 450 planes, three carriers and 445 pilots. The Imperial Japanese Navy's carrier force was effectively destroyed.
On the second day U.S. reconnaissance planes finally located Ozawa's fleet, 275 miles away and submarines sank two Japanese carriers. Mitscher launched 230 torpedo planes and dive bombers. He then discovered that the enemy was actually another 60 miles further off, out of aircraft range. Mitscher decided that this chance to destroy the Japanese fleet was worth the risk of aircraft losses.  Overall, the U.S. lost 130 planes and 76 aircrew. However, Japan lost 450 planes, three carriers and 445 pilots. The Imperial Japanese Navy's carrier force was effectively destroyed.


===Leyte Gulf 1944===
===Philippines counteroffensive===
The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the largest naval battle in history. It was a series of four distinct engagements fought off the Philippine island of Leyte from 23 October to 26 October 1944. Leyte Gulf featured the largest battleships ever built, it was the last time in history that battleships engaged each other, and was also notable as the first time that [[kamikaze]] aircraft were used. Allied victory in the Philippine Sea (see above) established Allied air and sea superiority in the western Pacific. Nimitz favored blockading the Philippines and landing on Formosa. This would give the Allies control of the sea routes to Japan from southern Asia, cutting off substantial Japanese garrisons. MacArthur favoured an invasion of the Philippines, which also lay across the supply lines to Japan. Roosevelt adjudicated in favor of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Japanese Combined Fleet Chief [[Toyoda Soemu]] prepared four plans to cover all Allied offensive scenarios. On 12 October, Nimitz launched a carrier raid against Formosa to make sure that planes based there could not intervene in the landings on Leyte. Soemu put Plan ''Sho-2'' into effect, launching a series of air attacks against the U.S. carriers. However the Japanese lost 600 planes in three days, leaving them without air cover.
{{main|Philippines counteroffensive}}
 
[{Douglas MacArthur]] was deeply committed to ousting the Japanese from the Philippines. He had had opposition on the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] to a strategy making them a priority, but a combination of factors changed that.
''Sho-1'' called for Vice Admiral[[Jisaburo Ozawa]]'s force to use an apparently vulnerable carrier force to lure the [[U.S. 3rd Fleet]] away from Leyte and remove air cover from the Allied landing forces, which would then be attacked from the west by three Japanese forces: V. Adm. [[Takeo Kurita]]'s force would enter [[Leyte Gulf]] and attack the landing forces; Rear Admiral Shoji Nishimura's force and V. Adm. Kiyohide Shima's force would act as mobile strike forces. The plan was likely to result in the destruction of one or more of the Japanese forces, but Toyoda justified it by saying that there would be no sense in saving the fleet and losing the Philippines.
[[Image:Leyte-1944.jpg|thumb|right|525px|American reconquest of Philippines, 1944-45]]
 
Third and Fifth Fleet staff agreed on three naval objectives in support of land operations:<ref>Morison, 57.</ref>
Kurita's "Center Force" consisted of five battleships, 12 cruisers and 13 destroyers. As they passed Palawan Island after midnight on October 23, the force was spotted and U.S. submarines sank two cruisers. On October 24, as Kurita's force entered the [[Sibuyan Sea]], USS ''Intrepid'' and USS ''Cabot '' launched 260 planes, which scored hits on several ships. A second wave of planes scored many direct hits on ''Musashi''. A third wave, from USS ''Enterprise'' and USS ''Franklin'' hit ''Musashi'' with 11 bombs and eight torpedoes. Kurita retreated, but in the evening turned around to head for San Bernardino Strait. ''Musashi'' sank at about 19:30.
*Air strikes by Third Fleet and long-range land-based aircraft on Okinawa, Formosa, and Northern Leyte on October 10-13.
*Attacks by the Seventh Fleet on Bicol Peninsula, Leyte, Cebu and Negros, and direct supports of the actual landings, October 16-20.
*"Strategic support" (which wasn't clearly defined) by the Third Fleet from October 21 onwards.


Meanwhile, V. Adm. Onishi Takijiro had directed his First Air Fleet, 80 land-based planes, against U.S. carriers, whose planes were attacking airfields on Luzon. USS ''Princeton'' was hit by an armour-piercing bomb, and suffered a major explosion which killed 200 crew and 80 on a cruiser which was alongside. ''Princeton'' sank and the cruiser was forced to retire.
On the Allied side, the main battle fleet, under Admiral [[Chester W. Nimitz]], Commander of the Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas. alternated between two commanders and staffs; one would carry out an operation while the other would plan the next. It was designated Third Fleet while under Vice Admiral [[William Halsey]] and  Fifth Fleet  while under Vice Admiral [[Raymond Spruance]]. This was not the key American command problem, which was more at the level of conflict between Nimitz and Southwest Pacific Area commander [[Douglas MacArthur]]. Under MacArthur was the Seventh Fleet, principally an amphibious rather than a sea battle force. Air command was also divided, with the heaviest bombers directly under the command of Washington.


Nishimura's force consisted of two battleships, one cruiser and four destroyers. Because they were observing radio silence, Nishimura was unable to synchronise with Shima and Kurita. When he entered the narrow [[Surigao Strait]] at about 02:00, Shima was 40&nbsp;km behind him, and Kurita was still in the Sibuyan Sea, several hours from the beaches at Leyte. As they passed Panaon Island, Nishimura's force ran into a trap set for them by the U.S.-Australian 7th Fleet Support Force. R. Adm. [[Jesse Oldendorf]] had six battleships, four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, 29 destroyers and 39 PT boats. To pass the strait and reach the landings, Nishimura had to run the gauntlet. At about 03:00 the Japanese battleship ''Fuso'' and three destroyers were hit by torpedoes and ''Fuso'' broke in two. At 03:50 the U.S. battleships opened fire. Radar fire control meant they could hit targets from a much greater distance than the Japanese. The battleship ''Yamashiro'', a cruiser and a destroyer were crippled by 16-inch (406&nbsp;mm) shells. ''Yamashiro'' sank at 04:19. Only one of Nishimura's force of seven ships survived the engagement. At 04:25 Shima's force of two cruisers and eight destroyers reached the battle. Seeing ''Fuso'' and believing it to be the wrecks of two battleships, Shima ordered a retreat.  
Both Halsey and Spruance were strong commanders with very different styles. Halsey himself speculated that the outcome, for the Allies, might have been better if he, rather than Spruance, had commanded at the Philippine Sea, while Spruance had taken his place at Leyte Gulf. War is filled with might-have-beens.


Ozawa's "Northern Force" had four aircraft carriers, two obsolete battleships partly converted to carriers, three cruisers and nine destroyers. The carriers had only 108 planes. The force was not spotted by the Allies until 16:40 on October 24. At 20:00 Soemu ordered all remaining Japanese forces to attack. Halsey saw an opportunity to destroy the remnants of the Japanese carrier force. The U.S. Third Fleet was formidable &mdash; nine large carriers, eight light carriers, six battleships, 17 cruisers, 63 destroyers and 1,000 planes &mdash; and completely outgunned Ozawa's force. Halsey's ships set out in pursuit of Ozawa just after midnight. U.S. commanders ignored reports that Kurita had turned back towards San Bernardino Strait. They had taken the bait set by Ozawa. On the morning of October 25, Ozawa launched 75 planes. Most were shot down by U.S. fighter patrols. By 08:00 U.S. fighters had destroyed the screen of Japanese fighters and were hitting ships. By evening, they had sunk the carriers ''Zuikaku'', ''Zuiho'',  and ''Chiyoda'' and a destroyer. The fourth carrier, ''Chitose'' and a cruiser were disabled and later sank.
====Preparatory operations====
On 9-10 September, Third Fleet units, supporting impending landings on Morotai and Palau, made air strikes on Mindonoro, and discovered significant weaknesses in Japanese air defense. It was determined that Southwest Pacific land-based bombers, operating out of New Guinea fields, had caused severe damage to enemy air installations on the island. Exploiting the weakness, the Third Fleet raided the [[Visayas]] on 12-13 September, causing substantial damage to aircraft and airfields. <ref>Macarthur Reports, Chapter 7, pp. 172-173</ref>


Kurita passed through [[San Bernardino Strait]] at 03:00 on 25 October and headed along the coast of Samar. The only thing standing in his path was three groups (Taffy 1, 2 and 3) of the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Admiral [[Thomas Kinkaid]]. Each group had six escort carriers, with a total of more than 500 planes, and seven or eight destroyers or destroyer escorts (DE). Kinkaid still believed that Lee's force was guarding the north, so the Japanese had the element of surprise when they attacked Taffy 3 at 06:45. Kurita mistook the Taffy carriers for large fleet carriers and thought he had the whole Third Fleet in his sights. As escort carriers stood little chance against a battleship, Adm. [[Clifton Sprague]] directed the carriers of Taffy 3 to turn and flee eastward, hoping that bad visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire, and used his destroyers in to divert the Japanese battleships. The destroyers made harassing torpedo attacks against the Japanese. For ten minutes ''Yamato'' was caught up in evasive action. Two U.S. destroyers and a DE were sunk, but they had bought enough time for the Taffy groups to launch planes. Taffy 3 turned and fled south, with shells scoring hits on some of its carriers, and sinking one of them. The superior speed of the Japanese force allowed it to draw closer and fire on the other two Taffy groups. However, at 09:20 Kurita suddenly turned and retreated north. Signals had disabused him of the notion that he was attacking the Third Fleet, and the longer Kurita continued to engage, the greater the risk of major air strikes. Destroyer attacks had broken the Japanese formations, shattering tactical control, and two of Kurita's heavy cruisers had been sunk. The Japanese retreated through the San Bernardino Strait, under continuous air attack. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was over.
MacArthur chose to occupy Morotai Island, off Halmahera, as an intermediate base, with landings starting on 15 September by the U.S. Army 31st Division and 126th Regimental Combat Team of the 32nd Division plus supporting combat and service troops, directed by XI Corps. Simultaneously, the 1st Division, [[United States Marine Corps|U.S. Marine Corps]], followed by the Army's 81st Division, took Palau and Angaur in the Palau group. Ulithi was taken on the 23rd.<ref>Macarthur Reports, Chapter 7, pp. 175-178</ref>


The battle secured the beachheads of the [[U.S. Sixth Army]] on Leyte against attack from the sea, broke the back of Japanese naval power and opened the way for an advance to the [[Ryukyu Islands]] in 1945. The only significant Japanese naval operation afterwards was the disastrous [[Operation Ten-Go]], in April 1945. Kurita's force had begun the battle with five battleships; when he returned to Japan, only ''Yamato'' was combat-worthy. Nishimura's sunken ''Yamashiro'' was the last battleship to engage another in combat.
Morotai and Palau, 350-500 miles from Leyte, became the main bases for Army fighters, still distant for WWII aircraft. Ulithi became the main staging harbor.
Two-pronged drives to capture Japanese-held islands, building a ever-closer set of airfields for attacks on the Japanese home islands. In two key cases, an initial American landing was followed by a sea battle against supporting and reinforcing forces. While the Allies won the sea battles, both were troubled by problems of divided command. 
====Initial landings====
[[Image:Douglas MacArthur lands Leyte.jpg|thumb|350px|left|General [[Douglas MacArthur]] wades ashore during the landings at Leyte, the Philippines]]
On 20 October 1944, the [[Sixth United States Army]], under Gen. [[Walter Krueger]], supported by naval and air bombardment, landed on the favorable eastern shore of [[Leyte]], one of the three large Philippine Islands, north of [[Mindanao]]. [[United States Seventh Fleet]], under [[Thomas Kinkaid]], conducted the amphibious operations and remained in support.
====Leyte Gulf 1944====
{{main|Battle of Leyte Gulf}}
[[Image:Leyte-map1.jpg|thumb|300px|right]]
The Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23-26, 1944, was the largest naval battle in history. It involved coordinated Japanese attacks designed to hit the hundreds of thousands of American soldiers who had just landed at Leyte Gulf, and their supply ships. Severe communications failures on both sides characterized the battle, which ended in a total American victory and the end of Japanese sea power.  


===The Philippines, 1944-45===
Japan was heavily outgunned, so it designed a trick that would neutralize American strength. ''Sho-1'' called for using the remaining Japanese carriers as a decoy, knowing they would all be destroyed, to pull the main American battle fleet, the Third Fleet, north away from the real action. Then two other Japanese fleets would attack Leyte from the center and the south.<ref> For the relative strengths of the fleets see Vincent P. O'Hara, ''The U.S. Navy Against the Axis: Surface Combat, 1941-1945'' (2007) pp 261-2</ref> The plan almost worked, but the Japanese had poor radios and the different units were not in touch; the Japanese Army knew what was happening but it never talked to the Navy and did not help out.
[[Image:Douglas MacArthur lands Leyte.jpg|thumb|250px|General [[Douglas MacArthur]] wades ashore during the landings at Leyte, the Philippines]]


On [[20 October]] [[1944]], the [[Sixth United States Army|U.S. Sixth Army]], supported by naval and air bombardment, landed on the favorable eastern shore of [[Leyte]], one of the three large Philippine Islands, north of [[Mindanao]]. The U.S. Sixth Army continued its advance from the east, as the Japanese rushed reinforcements to the [[Ormoc Bay]] area on the western side of the island. While the Sixth Army was reinforced successfully, the [[Fifth Air Force|U.S. Fifth Air Force]] was able to devastate the Japanese attempts to resupply. In torrential rains and over difficult terrain, the advance continued across Leyte and the neighboring island of Samar to the north. On [[7 December]] [[1944]], U.S. Army units landed at Ormoc Bay and, after a major land and air battle, cut off the Japanese ability to reinforce and supply Leyte. Although fierce fighting continued on Leyte for months, the U.S. Army was in control.
====Land invasion expands====
The U.S. Sixth Army continued its advance from the east, as the Japanese rushed reinforcements to the [[Ormoc Bay]] area on the western side of the island. While the Sixth Army was reinforced successfully, the U.S. Fifth Air Force was able to devastate the Japanese attempts to resupply. In torrential rains and over difficult terrain, the advance continued across Leyte and the neighboring island of Samar to the north. On 7 December 1944, U.S. Army units landed at Ormoc Bay and, after a major land and air battle, cut off the Japanese ability to reinforce and supply Leyte. Although fierce fighting continued on Leyte for months, the U.S. Army was in control.


On [[15 December]] [[1944]], landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of [[Mindoro]], a key location in the planned [[Lingayen Gulf]] operations, in support of major landings scheduled on [[Luzon]]. On [[9 January]] [[1945]], on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf on the western coast of Luzon, [[Walter Krueger|General Krueger]]'s Sixth Army landed his first units. Almost 175,000 men followed across the twenty-mile beachhead within a few days. With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking [[Clark Air Base|Clark Field]], 40 miles northwest of [[Manila]], in the last week of January.
On 15 December 1944, landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of [[Mindoro]], a key location in the planned [[Lingayen Gulf]] operations, in support of major landings scheduled on [[Luzon]]. On 9 January 1945, on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf on the western coast of Luzon, General Krueger's Sixth Army landed his first units. Almost 175,000 men followed across the twenty-mile beachhead within a few days. With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking Clark Field, 40 miles northwest of [[Manila]], in the last week of January.


Two more major landings followed, one to cut off the [[Bataan Peninsula]], and another, that included a parachute drop, south of Manila. Pincers closed on the city and, on [[3 February]] [[1945]], elements of the [[1st Cavalry Division (United States)|1st Cavalry Division]] pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila and the 8th Cavalry passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.
Two more major landings followed, one to cut off the [[Bataan Peninsula]], and another, that included a parachute drop, south of Manila. Pincers closed on the city and, on 3 February 1945, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila and the 8th Cavalry passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.


As the advance on Manila continued from the north and the south, the Bataan Peninsula was rapidly secured. On [[16 February]], paratroopers and amphibious units assaulted [[Corregidor]], and resistance ended there on [[27 February]].  
As the advance on Manila continued from the north and the south, the Bataan Peninsula was rapidly secured. On 16 February, paratroopers and amphibious units assaulted [[Corregidor]], and resistance ended there on 27 February.  


In all, ten U.S. divisions and five independent regiments battled on Luzon, making it the largest campaign of the Pacific war, involving more troops than the United States had used in North Africa, Italy, or southern France.
In all, ten U.S. divisions and five independent regiments battled on Luzon, making it the largest campaign of the Pacific war, involving more troops than the United States had used in North Africa, Italy, or southern France.


[[Palawan Island]], between [[Borneo]] and Mindoro, the fifth largest and western-most Philippine Island, was invaded on [[28 February]], with landings of the [[Eighth United States Army|Eighth Army]] at [[Puerto Princesa City|Puerto Princesa]]. The Japanese put up little direct defense of Palawan, but cleaning up pockets of Japanese resistance lasted until late April, as the Japanese used their common tactic of withdrawing into the mountain jungles, disbursed as small units. Throughout the Philippines, U.S. forces were aided by Filipino guerrillas to find and dispatch the holdouts.
[[Palawan Island]], between [[Borneo]] and Mindoro, the fifth largest and western-most Philippine Island, was invaded on 28 February, with landings of the Eighth Army at Puerto Princesa. The Japanese put up little direct defense of Palawan, but cleaning up pockets of Japanese resistance lasted until late April, as the Japanese used their common tactic of withdrawing into the mountain jungles, disbursed as small units. Throughout the Philippines, U.S. forces were aided by Filipino guerrillas to find and dispatch the holdouts.


The U.S. Eighth Army then moved on to its first landing on Mindanao ([[17 April]]), the last of the major Philippine Islands to be taken. Mindanao was followed by invasion and occupation of [[Panay]], [[Cebu]], [[Negros]] and several islands in the [[Sulu Archipelago]]. These islands provided bases for the U.S. Fifth and [[Thirteenth Air Force]]s to attack targets throughout the Philippines and the [[South China Sea]].
The U.S. Eighth Army then moved on to its first landing on Mindanao (17 April), the last of the major Philippine Islands to be taken. Mindanao was followed by invasion and occupation of Panay, Cebu, Negros and several islands in the Sulu Archipelago. These islands provided bases for the U.S. Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces to attack targets throughout the Philippines and the [[South China Sea]].


==The final stages of the war==
==The final stages of the war==
===Allied offensives in Burma, 1944-45===
===China-Burma-India===
The British launched a series of offensive operations back into Burma during late 1944 and the first half of 1945. Command of the British formations on the front was rearranged in November 1944; the 11th Army Group was replaced with Allied Land Forces South East Asia.
===Southwest Pacific===
 
The Borneo Campaign of 1945 was the last major Allied campaign in the South West Pacific Area. In a series of amphibious assaults between May 1 and July 21, the Australian I Corps, under General Leslie Morshead, attacked Japanese forces occupying the island. Allied naval and air forces, centred on the [[U.S. 7th Fleet]] under Admiral [[Thomas Kinkaid]], the Australian First Tactical Air Force and the U.S. Thirteenth Air Force also played important roles in the campaign.
The Japanese Burma Area Army withdrew the 15th Army behind the [[Irrawaddy River]] (Operation BAN). 28th Army was to continue to defend the [[Rakhine State|Arakan]] and lower Irrawaddy valley (Operation KAN), while 33rd Army would attempt to prevent the completion of the new [[Ledo Road]] between India and China by defending [[Bhamo]] and [[Lashio]], and mounting guerrilla raids (Operation DAN).
 
In Arakan, as the monsoon ended, the British Commonwealth [[XV Corps (India)|XV Corps]] resumed its advance on Akyab Island for the third year in succession. This time the Japanese were numerically far weaker, and had already lost the most favorable defensive positions. The Indian 25th Infantry Division advanced on Foul Point and Rathedaung at the end of the Mayu Peninsula, while the West African 81st Division and [[British 82nd (West Africa) Division|West African 82nd Division]] converged on Myohaung at the mouth of the Kaladan River. The Japanese evacuated Akyab Island on December 31, 1944. It was occupied by XV Corps without resistance two days later.
 
Following the incursion into western Burma, XV Corps operations were halted in order to transfer transport aircraft to support [[Fourteenth Army (United Kingdom)|Fourteenth Army]]. With the coastal area secured the Allies were free to build sea-supplied airbases on the two offshore islands, [[Ramree Island]] and [[Cheduba Island|Cheduba]]. Cheduba, the smaller of the two islands, had no Japanese garrison, but the [[Battle of Ramree Island|clearing]] of the small but typically tenacious Japanese garrison on Ramree took about six weeks
 
[[Northern Combat Area Command|NCAC's]] operations were limited from late 1944 onwards by the need for Chinese troops on the main front in China. The American and British commanders attacked the Chinese leadership's decision to focus their limited resources on the defensive of Chinese cities rather than the defeat of the Japanese in Burma. In spite of these limitations, General Sultan was still able to resume his advance against the Japanese 33rd Army.
 
On his right, the British [[36th Infantry Division (United Kingdom)|36th Infantry Division]], brought in to replace the [[Chindits]], made contact with the Indian [[19th Infantry Division (India)|19th Infantry Division]] near Indaw on [[December 10]], [[1944]], and Fourteenth Army and NCAC now had a continuous front. Meanwhile, three Chinese divisions and a US Force known as the "Mars Brigade" (which had replaced [[Merrill's Marauders]]) advanced slowly from [[Myitkyina]] to Bhamo. The Japanese resisted for several weeks, but Bhamo fell on [[December 15]].
 
Sultan's forces made contact with Chiang's Yunnan armies on January 21, 1945, and the Ledo road could finally be completed, although it was not yet secure. The Ledo road by this point in the war was also of uncertain value. It would not be completed soon enough to change the overall military situation in China. Chiang, to the annoyance of the British and Americans, ordered Sultan to halt his advance at Lashio, which was captured on March 7. In April, [[OSS Detachment 101]] took over control of American forces from the NCAC, which had withdrawn to China, while the 36th Division withdrew to India.
 
Fourteenth Army made the main thrust into central Burma. It had IV Corps and XXXIII Corps under its command, with six infantry divisions, two armoured brigades and three independent infantry brigades. Logistics were the primary problem the advance faced. A carefully designed system involving large amounts of supply by air was introduced as well endless construction projects designed to improve the land route from India into Burma.
 
When it was realised that the Japanese had fallen back behind the Irrawaddy River, the plan was modified. Initially both corps had been attacking into the Shwebo Plain between the Chindwin and Irrawaddy rivers. Now, only XXXIII Corps would continue this attack, while IV Corps changed its axis of advance to the Gangaw Valley west of the Chindwin, aiming to cross the Irrawaddy close to Pakokku and then capture the main Japanese line of communication centre of [[Meiktila]]. Diversionary measures (such as dummy radio traffic) would persuade the Japanese that both corps were aimed at [[Mandalay]].
 
The plan was completely successful. Allied air superiority and the thin Japanese presence on the ground meant that the Japanese were unaware of the strength of the force moving on Pakokku. During January and February, XXXIII Corps seized crossings over the Irrawaddy River near Mandalay. There was heavy fighting, which attracted Japanese reserves and fixed their attention. Late in February, Indian 7th Division, leading IV Corps, seized crossings at Nyaungu, near Pakokku. Indian 17th Division and 255th Indian Armoured brigade followed them across and struck for Meiktila.
 
While the Japanese were distracted by events at Meiktila, XXXIII Corps had renewed its attack on Mandalay. It fell to Indian 19th Division on March 20, though the Japanese held the former citadel of Fort Dufferin for another week. The battle was extremely costly in that much of the historically and culturally significant portions of Mandalay, including the old royal palace were burned to the ground. With the fall of Mandalay (and of Maymyo to its east), communications to the Japanese front in the north of Burma were cut. The Japanese 15th Army was completely scattered, leaving only small detachments and parties of stragglers making their way east.
 
The Allied armies continued their southward drive towards [[Yangon|Rangoon]], with the goal of capturing the vital port before the monsoon season cut the overland supply routes. IV Corps made the main attack, down the "Railway Valley" by striking at the delaying position held by the remnants of Japanese 33rd Army at Pyawbwe. The Indian 17th Division and 255th Armoured Brigade were initially halted by a strong defensive position behind a dry chaung, but a flanking move by tanks and mechanized infantry struck the Japanese from the rear and shattered them. Following the route of the 33rd Army, organized resistance along the route to Rangoon all but ceased.
 
A general uprising delayed the Japanese 15th Division long enough for the Allied forces to reach the city of [[Toungoo]], only 136 miles from Rangoon. The Indian 17th Division reached [[Bago, Myanmar|Pegu]], 40 miles north of Rangoon by April 25th. Kimura had formed the various service troops, naval personnel and even Japanese civilians in Rangoon into the Japanese 105 Independent Mixed Brigade. This scratch formation used buried aircraft bombs, anti-aircraft guns and suicide attacks with pole charges to delay the British advance, holding the British off until April 30, and covered the evacuation of the Rangoon area.
 
General Slim feared that the Japanese would defend Rangoon to the last man through the monsoon, which would put Fouteenth Army in a disastrous supply situation. His lines of communication by land were impossibly long, and the troops relied on supplies ferried by aircraft to airfields close behind the leading troops. Heavy rain would make these airfields unusable, and curtail flying. However, Kimura had ordered Rangoon to be evacuated, starting on April 22. Many troops were evacuated by sea, although British submarines claimed several ships. Kimura's own HQ left by land. The Japanese 105 Independent Mixed Brigade, by holding Pegu, covered this evacuation.
 
On May 1, a Gurkha parachute battalion was [[Operation Dracula|dropped]] on Elephant Point, and cleared Japanese rearguards from the mouth of the Rangoon River. The Indian 26th Infantry Division landed the next day and took over Rangoon, which had seen an orgy of looting and lawlessness similar to the last days of the British in the city in 1942. Following the capture of Rangoon, there were still Japanese forces to take care of in Burma, but it was largely a mopping up operation.
 
===The liberation of Borneo===
The Borneo Campaign of 1945 was the last major Allied campaign in the South West Pacific Area. In a series of amphibious assaults between May 1 and July 21, the Australian I Corps, under General Leslie Morshead, attacked Japanese forces occupying the island. Allied naval and air forces, centred on the [[U.S. 7th Fleet]] under Admiral [[Thomas Kinkaid]], the [[Australian First Tactical Air Force]] and the U.S. [[Thirteenth Air Force]] also played important roles in the campaign.


The campaign opened with a landing on the small island of Tarakan on May 1. This was followed on June 1 by simultaneous assaults in the north west, on the island of Labuan and the coast of [[Brunei]]. A week later the Australians attacked Japanese positions in North Borneo. The attention of the Allies then switched back to the central east coast, with the last major amphibious assault of World War II, at Balikpapan on July 1.
The campaign opened with a landing on the small island of Tarakan on May 1. This was followed on June 1 by simultaneous assaults in the north west, on the island of Labuan and the coast of [[Brunei]]. A week later the Australians attacked Japanese positions in North Borneo. The attention of the Allies then switched back to the central east coast, with the last major amphibious assault of World War II, at Balikpapan on July 1.


Although the campaign was criticised in Australia at the time, and in subsequent years, as pointless or a "waste" of the lives of soldiers, it did achieve a number of objectives, such as increasing the isolation of significant Japanese forces occupying the main part of the [[Dutch East Indies]], capturing major oil supplies and freeing Allied prisoners of war, who were being held in deteriorating conditions.
Although the campaign was criticised in Australia at the time, and in subsequent years, as pointless or a "waste" of the lives of soldiers, it did achieve a number of objectives, such as increasing the isolation of significant Japanese forces occupying the main part of the [[Dutch East Indies]], capturing major oil supplies and freeing Allied prisoners of war, who were being held in deteriorating conditions.
===Pacific Ocean===
{{seealso|Battle of Iwo Jima}}
{{seealso|Battle of Okinawa}}


===Landings in the Japanese home islands===
===Attacks on Japan===
 
 
Hard-fought battles on the [[Japanese Archipelago|Japanese home islands]] of [[Battle of Iwo Jima|Iwo Jima]], [[Battle of Okinawa|Okinawa]], and others resulted in horrific casualties on both sides, but finally produced a Japanese retreat. Faced with the loss of most of their experienced pilots, the Japanese increased their use of [[kamikaze]] tactics in an attempt to create unacceptably high casualties for the [[Allies]]. Upwards of a third of the U.S. fleet was hit, and the U.S. Navy recommended against an invasion of Japan in 1945. It proposed to force a Japanese surrender through a total naval blockade and air raids.
 
Towards the end of the war as the role of strategic bombing became more important, a new command for the [[U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific]] was created to oversee all U.S. strategic bombing in the hemisphere, under [[United States Army Air Forces]] General [[Curtis LeMay]]. Japanese industrial production plunged as nearly half of the built-up areas of 64 cities were destroyed by [[B-29]] [[Incendiary bomb|firebombing]] raids. On [[March 9]]-10 [[1945]] alone, about 100,000 people were killed in a [[fire storm]] caused by an attack on [[Bombing of Tokyo in World War II|Tokyo]].  In addition, LeMay also oversaw [[Operation Starvation]] which the interior waterways of Japan were extensively mined by air which seriously disrupted the enemy's logistical operations.
===The atomic bomb===
In August of 1945 the U.S. attacked two cities with [[nuclear weapon]]s; on August 6 , [[Hiroshima]] was destroyed with a single [[atomic bomb]], as was [[Nagasaki]] on August 9. More than 200,000 people died as a direct result of these two bombings, but policy makers argued that even more lives were saved because Japan quickly ended the war.<ref> Precise figures are not available, but the firebombing together with the nuclear bombing between March and August 1945 may have killed more than one million Japanese civilians. Official estimates from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey put the figures at 330,000 people killed, 476,000 injured, 8.5 million people made homeless and 2.5 million buildings destroyed.</ref>
 
In February, 1945, Stalin agreed with Roosevelt to enter the Pacific conflict. He promised to act 90 days after the war ended in Europe and did so exactly on schedule on [[August 9]], by launching [[Operation August Storm]]. A battle-hardened, one million-strong Soviet force, transferred from Europe attacked Japanese forces in [[Manchuria]] and quickly defeated their [[Kwantung Army]].
 
Imperial Japan surrendered on [[August 15]] and this day became known in the English-speaking countries as "[[V-J Day]]" (Victory in Japan).  [http://www.wanpela.com/holdouts/list.html] The formal [[Japanese Instrument of Surrender (1945)|Instrument of Surrender]] was signed on [[September 2]], [[1945]], on the battleship [[USS Missouri (BB-63)|USS ''Missouri'']] in [[Tokyo Bay]]. The surrender was accepted by General [[Douglas MacArthur]] as Supreme Allied Commander, with representatives of each Allied nation, from a Japanese delegation led by [[Mamoru Shigemitsu]].
 
A separate surrender ceremony between Japan and China was held in [[Nanking]] on September 9, 1945.
 
Following this period, MacArthur went to Tokyo to oversee the postwar development of the country. This period in Japanese history is known as the [[Occupied Japan Post WWII|occupation]].
 
==Timeline==
'''Second Sino-Japanese war'''
* 7 July 1937 &ndash; 9 September 1945
 
'''Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia and Pacific'''
* 1941-12-07 (12-08 Japan Standard Time|Asian Time) Attack on Pearl Harbor
* 1941-12-08 Japanese Invasion of Thailand
* 1941-12-08 &ndash; 1941-12-25 Battle of Hong Kong
* 1941-12-08 &ndash; 1942-01-31 Battle of Malaya
* 1941-12-10 Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse|Sinking of HMS Prince of Wales (1939)|HMS ''Prince of Wales'' and HMS Repulse (1916)|HMS ''Repulse''
* 1941-12-11 &ndash; 1941-12-24 Wake Island#World War II|Battle of Wake Island
* 1941-12-16 &ndash; 1942-04-01 Borneo campaign (1942)
* 1941-12-22 &ndash; 1942-05-06 Battle of the Philippines (1941-42)|Battle of the Philippines
* 1942-01-01 &ndash; 1945-10-25 Transport of POWs via Hell Ships
* 1942-01-11 &ndash; 1942-01-12 Battle of Tarakan (1942)|Battle of Tarakan
* 1942-01-23 Battle of Rabaul (1942)
* 1942-01-24 Naval Battle of Balikpapan
* 1942-01-25 Thailand declares war on the Allies
* 1942-01-30 &ndash; 1942-02-03 Battle of Ambon
* 1942-01-30 &ndash; 1942-02-15 Battle of Singapore
* 1942-02-04 Battle of Makassar Strait
* 1942-02-14 &ndash; 1942-02-15 Battle of Palembang
* 1942-02-19 Air raids on Darwin, February 19, 1942|Air raids on Darwin, Australia
* 1942-02-19 &ndash; 1942-02-20 Battle of Badung Strait
*1942-02-19 &ndash; 1943-02-10 Battle of Timor (1942-43)
* 1942-02-27 &ndash; 1942-03-01 Battle of the Java Sea
* 1942-03-01 Battle of Sunda Strait
* 1942-03-01 &ndash; 1942-03-09 Battle of Java (1942)|Battle of Java
* 1942-03-31 &ndash; 1942-04-10 Indian Ocean raid
* 1942-04-09 Bataan Death March begins
* 1942-04-18 Doolittle Raid
* 1942-05-03 invasion of Tulagi (May 1942)|Japanese invasion of Tulagi
* 1942-05-04 &ndash; 1942-05-08 Battle of the Coral Sea
* 1942-05-31 &ndash; 1942-06-08 Attack on Sydney Harbour|Attacks on Sydney Harbour area, Australia
* 1942-06-04 &ndash; 1942-06-06 Battle of Midway
 
==Pacific War campaigns==
 
'''Burma Campaign''': 1941-12-16 &ndash; 1945-08-15
 
'''New Guinea campaign'''
* 1942-01-23 &ndash;  Battle of Rabaul
* 1942-03-07 &ndash;  Operation Mo (Japanese invasion of New Guinea)
* 1942-05-04 &ndash; 1942-05-08 Battle of the Coral Sea
* 1942-07-01 &ndash; 1943-01-31 Kokoda Track Campaign
* 1942-08-25 &ndash; 1942-09-05 Battle of Milne Bay
* 1942-11-19 &ndash; 1942-01-23 Battle of Buna-Gona
* 1943-01-28 &ndash; 1943-01-30 Battle of Wau
* 1943-03-02 &ndash; 1943-03-04 Battle of the Bismarck Sea
* 1943-06-29 &ndash; 1943-09-16 Battle of Lae
* 1943-06-30 &ndash; 1944-03-25 Operation Cartwheel
* 1943-09-19 &ndash; 1944-04-24 Finisterre Range campaign
* 1943-09-22 &ndash; 1944-01-15 Huon Peninsula campaign
* 1943-11-01 &ndash; 1943-11-11 Attack on Rabaul
* 1943-12-15 &ndash; 1945-08-15 New Britain campaign
* 1944-02-29 &ndash; 1944-03-25 Admiralty Islands campaign
* 1944-04-22 &ndash; 1945-08-15 Western New Guinea campaign
 
'''Aleutian Islands campaign'''
* 1942-06-07 &ndash; 1943-08-15 Battle of Kiska
 
'''Guadalcanal campaign'''
* 1942-08-07 &ndash; 1943-02-09 Battle of Guadalcanal
* 1942-08-09 Battle of Savo Island
* 1942-08-24 &ndash; 1942-08-25 Battle of the Eastern Solomons
* 1942-10-11 &ndash; 1942-10-12 Battle of Cape Esperance
* 1942-10-25 &ndash; 1942-10-27 Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands
* 1942-11-13 &ndash; 1942-11-15 Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
* 1942-11-30 Battle of Tassafaronga
 
'''Solomon Islands campaign'''
* 1943-01-29 &ndash; 1943-01-30 Battle of Rennell Island
* 1943-03-06 Battle of Blackett Strait
* 1943-06-10 &ndash; 1943-08-25 Battle of New Georgia
* 1943-07-06 Battle of Kula Gulf
* 1943-07-12 &ndash; 1943-07-13 Battle of Kolombangara
* 1943-08-06 &ndash; 1943-08-07 Battle of Vella Gulf
* 1943-08-17 &ndash; 1943-08-18 Battle off Horaniu
* 1943-10-07 Battle of Vella Lavella
* 1943-11-01 &ndash; 1945-08-21 Battle of Bougainville
* 1943-11-01 &ndash; 1943-11-02 Battle of Empress Augusta Bay
* 1943-11-26 Battle of Cape St. George
 
'''Gilbert Islands campaign'''
* 1943-11-20 &ndash; 1943-11-23 Battle of Tarawa
* 1943-11-20 &ndash; 1943-11-24 Battle of Makin
 
'''Marshall Islands campaign'''
* 1944-01-31 &ndash; 1944-02-07 Battle of Kwajalein
* 1944-02-16 &ndash; 1944-02-17 Operation Hailstone (attack on Truk)
* 1944-02-16 &ndash; 1944-02-23 Battle of Eniwetok
 
'''Mariana Islands campaign'''
* 1944-06-15 &ndash; 1944-07-09 Battle of Saipan
* 1944-06-19 &ndash; 1944-06-20 Battle of the Philippine Sea
* 1944-07-21 &ndash; 1944-08-10 Battle of Guam
* 1944-07-24 &ndash; 1944-08-01 Battle of Tinian
 
'''Palau Islands campaign'''
* 1944-09-15 &ndash; 1944-11-25 Battle of Peleliu
* 1944-09-17 &ndash; 1944-09-30 Battle of Angaur
 
'''Philippines campaign'''
* 1944-10-20 &ndash; 1944-12-10 Battle of Leyte
* 1944-10-24 &ndash; 1944-10-25 Battle of Leyte Gulf
* 1944-11-11 &ndash; 1944-12-21 Battle of Ormoc Bay
* 1944-12-15 &ndash; 1945-07-04 Battle of Luzon
* 1945-01-09 Invasion of Lingayen Gulf
* 1945-02-27 &ndash; 1945-07-04 Southern Philippines campaign
 
'''Ryukyu Islands campaign'''
* 1945-02-16 &ndash; 1945-03-26 Battle of Iwo Jima
* 1945-04-01 &ndash; 1945-06-21 Battle of Okinawa
* 1945-04-07 Operation Ten-Go


'''Borneo campaign'''
Hard-fought battles on the Iwo Jima and Okinawa resulted in horrific casualties on both sides, but finally produced a Japanese retreat. Faced with the loss of most of their experienced pilots, the Japanese increased their use of [[Kamikaze]] tactics in an attempt to create unacceptably high casualties for the Allies, who were now joined by the British fleet. Upwards of a third of the U.S. fleet was hit, and the U.S. Navy recommended against an invasion of Japan in 1945. It proposed to force a Japanese surrender through a total naval blockade and air raids.
* 1945-05-01 &ndash; 1945-05-25 Battle of Tarakan
====Strategic bombing====
* 1945-06-10 &ndash; 1945-06-15 Battle of Brunei
Towards the end of the war as the [[World War II, air war|role of strategic bombing]] became more important, a new command for the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific was created to oversee all U.S. strategic bombing in the hemisphere, under Air Force General Carl Spaatz, who reported directly to Hap Arnold in Washington. General  [[Curtis LeMay]] was in operational command.  Japanese industrial production plunged as nearly half of the built-up areas of 64 cities were destroyed by [[B-29]] firebombing raids. On March 9-10, 1945 alone, about 100,000 people were killed in a fire storm caused by an attack on Tokyo. 
* 1945-06-10 &ndash; 1945-06-22 Battle of Labuan
====Mine warfare====
* 1945-06-17 &ndash; 1945-08-15 Battle of North Borneo
LeMay oversaw "Operation Starvation" which the interior waterways of Japan were extensively mined by air which seriously disrupted the enemy's logistical operations.
* 1945-07-07 &ndash; 1945-07-21 Battle of Balikpapan (1945)|Battle of Balikpapan


'''Japan campaign'''
====The atomic bomb====
* 1944-45 Bombings of Japanese cities
In August of 1945 the U.S. attacked two cities with nuclear weapons; on August 6 , [[Hiroshima]] was destroyed with a single weapon, as was [[Nagasaki]] on August 9. More than 200,000 people died as a direct result of these two bombings, but policy makers argued that even more lives were saved because Japan quickly ended the war. Precise figures are not available, but the firebombing together with the nuclear bombing between March and August 1945 may have killed more than one million Japanese civilians. Official estimates from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey put the figures at 330,000 people killed, 476,000 injured, 8.5 million people made homeless and 2.5 million buildings destroyed.
* 194-45 Mining Inland Sea
===Soviet entry===
* 1945-07-22 Battle of Tokyo Bay
In February, 1945, Stalin agreed with Roosevelt to enter the Pacific conflict. He promised to act 90 days after the war ended in Europe and did so exactly on schedule on August 9, by launching [[Operation August Storm]]. A battle-hardened, one million-strong Soviet force, transferred from Europe attacked Japanese forces in [[Manchuria]] and quickly defeated their [[Kwantung Army]].
* 1945-08-06 &ndash; 1945-08-09 Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
===Surrender===
[[Image:Ww2-japan-end.jpg|thumb|right|350px|When the war ended in Aug. 1945, Japan still controlled large areas (in red) in China, as well as many islands that had been leap-frogged.]]
Imperial Japan surrendered on August 15, "V-J Day". The formal surrender was signed on September 2, 1945, on an American battleship in Tokyo Bay. The surrender was accepted by General [[Douglas MacArthur]] as Supreme Allied Commander, with representatives of each Allied nation..


==Bibliography==
A separate surrender ceremony between Japan and China was held in Nanking on September 9, 1945.
* Bergerud, Eric M. ''Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific'' (2000) [[http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=82355094  online edition]
===Occupation===
*  Blair Jr., Clay,  ''Silent Victory'' 1975, on submarines
In September MacArthur went to Tokyo to oversee the postwar development of the country. This period in Japanese history is known as the occupation.
* Buell, Thomas. ''Master of Seapower: A Biography of Admiral Ernest J. King'' Naval Institute Press, 1976.
===Averted invasion===
* Buell, Thomas. ''The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond Spruance''. 1974.
[[Image:Ww2-invade.jpg|thumb|left|300px|The planned invasions of Kyushu (left) and Honshu islands did not happen]]
* Costello, John. ''The Pacific War''. 1982.
Under the overall plan [[Operation Downfall]], the Kyushu invasion [[Operation Olympic]] and Honshu invasion [[Operation CORONET]] did not take place. Nine nuclear weapons had been scheduled for use in the Kyushu operations, so it was not a strict alternative to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
* Craven, Wesley, and James Cate, eds. ''The Army Air Forces in World War II.'' (1958). Official history in 7 vol;  [http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/I/index.html Vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942'' online edition] [http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/IV/index.html Vol. 4, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944''. 1950 online edition];  [http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/V/index.html Vol. 5, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki''. 1953. parts on-line]
*  Dunnigan, James F., and Albert A. Nofi. ''The Pacific War Encyclopedia.'' Facts on File, 1998. 2 vols. 772p.  
* Gailey, Harry A. ''The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay'' (1995) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=94432774  online edition]
*  Hayashi, Saburo,  and Alvin Coox. ''Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War''. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Assoc., 1959.
*  Hsiung, James C.  and Steven I. Levine, eds. ''China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945''  M. E. Sharpe, 1992
* Hsi-sheng, Ch'i. ''Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937–1945'' University of Michigan Press, 1982
* Inoguchi, Rikihei, Tadashi Nakajima, and Robert Pineau. ''The Divine Wind''. 1958. Kamikaze.
* Kirby, S. Woodburn.  ''The War Against Japan''. 4 vols. London: H.M.S.O., 1957-1965. Highly detailed official Royal Navy history.
* Leary, William M.  ''We Shall Return: MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan''. University Press of Kentucky, 1988.
* Long, Gavin. ''Australia in the War of 1939–45'', Army. Vol. 7, The Final Campaigns. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1963.
* McCarthy, Dudley. ''Australia in the War of 1939–45, Army. Vol. 5, South-West Pacific Area—First Year: Kokoda to Wau''. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1959.  
*  James, D. Clayton ''The Years of MacArthur''. Vol. 2., 1972.
* Matloff, Maurice, and Edwin M. Snell [http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/Sp1941-42/index.htm ''Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941–1942''], Center of Military History United States Army Washington, D. C., 1990
* Morison, Samuel Eliot. ''History of United States Naval Operations in World War II''. Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961; Vol. 4, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions.  1949; Vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal. 1949; Vol. 6, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier. 1950; Vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls. 1951; Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas. 1962; Vol. 12, Leyte. 1958; vol. 13, The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas. 1959; Vol. 14, Victory in the Pacific.  1961.
* Okumiya, Masatake and Mitso Fuchida. ''Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan''. Naval Institute Press, 1955.
* Potter, E. B.  and Chester W. Nimitz. ''Triumph in the Pacific''. 1963. Naval battles
* Potter, E. B.  ''Bull Halsey''  1985.
* Potter, E. B.  ''Nimitz''.  1976.
* Potter, John D. ''Yamamoto'' 1967.
* Prange, Gordon W. ''At Dawn We Slept''. 1982. Pearl Harbor
* Prange, Gordon W. ''Miracle at Midway''. , 1982.
* Shaw, Henry et al. ''History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II. Vol. I: Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal; Vol. II: Isolation of Rabaul; Vol. III: Central Pacific Drive; Vol. IV: Western Pacific Operations; and Vol. V: Victory and Occupation[http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/index.html online edition]
* Sledge, E. B. ''With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa.'' Presidio, 1981. Memoir.
*  Smith, J. Douglas and Richard Jensen. ''World War II on the Web: A Guide to the Very Best Sites''. (2002)
* Spector, Ronald. ''Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan'' Free Press, 1985.
* Toland, John. ''The Rising Sun''. 2 vols. 1970. Japan's war.
* Willmott, H. P. ''Empires in Balance''. Naval Institute Press, 1982.
*  Weinberg, Gerhard L. ''A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II,'' Cambridge University Press. (2005), the most thorough coverage of grand strategy
* Y'Blood, William. ''Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the Philippine Sea''. , 1980.


==External links==
==References==
* [http://www.ww2incolor.com/gallery/movies/carrier_ops Pacific Combat Footage] - Watch color footage of Pacific carrier operations
{{reflist|2}}
* [http://www.historyanimated.com/PWindex.html Animated History of the Pacific War]
* [http://allworldwars.com/index.php/Photo_Interpreter%27s_Guide_to_Japanese_Military_Installations Photo Interpreter's Guide to Japanese Military Installations] Aerial pictures of Japanese field fortifications, weapons and vehicles.
* [http://wwii.ca/index.php?page=Page&action=showpage&id=32 Canada at the Pacific War] - Canadians in Asia & the Pacific


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Scope of the Second World War in the Pacific

World War Two in the Pacific, called the Pacific War in Japan, was the part of World War II that took place in the Pacific Ocean, its islands, and in East and South Asia between 1937 and 1945. There is no absolutely accepted starting date, but it is mos commonly accepted as e Japanese invasion of China (Second Sino-Japanese War)) in 1937, but the most decisive actions took place after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the colonies of the U.S., the U.K., and the Netherlands in December 1941.

The war, however, did not magically appear out of context, any more than World War Two in Europe clearly began on 1 September 1939. Czechoslovakia and the Sudetenland were clearly precursors, and arguments can be made for proxies such as the Spanish Civil War. The rise of German National Socialism and Italian Fascism were necessary. The European conflict certainly was influenced by World War I and the Versailles Peace Treaty, and not only World War I, but the Russo-Japanese War and First Sino-Japanese War, as well as the Japanese militarism before World War Two, all played a role.

Participants

The major Allied participants were the United States, Britain and is Commonwealth, including Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and India, and the Netherlands played significant roles. China played a major role. Mexico, DeGaulle's Free French Forces, Canada and other countries also took part, especially forces from other British colonies. The Soviet Union fought two short, undeclared border conflicts with Japan in 1938 and 1939, then remained neutral until August 1945, when it joined the Allies and invaded Manchukuo and Korea.

The Axis states which assisted Japan included the Japanese puppet states of Manchukuo and the Wang Jingwei Government]] in China. Thailand joined the Axis powers under duress. Japan enlisted many soldiers from its colonies of Korea and Formosa (now called Taiwan). Some German submarines operated in the Indian Ocean.

Background

For more information, see: Japanese militarism.

Japan had a complex national desire to become a great power, which would require more resources. The initial approach, dating back to the nineteenth century, was exploitation of China,which, while not yet in outright civil war, had a national government under Chiang Kai-shek challenged by regional warlords and revolutionaries. These included Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, and the growing Chinese Communist movement.

Japan's position at the 1922 Washington Naval Conference was recognized although not to the extent that Japan nationalists would have liked (they saw any situation not at parity with Great Britain and the U.S. as an insult).

Operating without knowledge of the high command but possibly with knowledge of th Palace, officers of the Kwangtung Army staged the September 1931 Manchurian Incident by which it claimed the right to exact military retribution against China and established the puppet state of Manchukuo. Subsequent incidents led the Japanese army to invade parts of Northern China. Japan also occupied for a time Shanghai, and following a protest by the League of Nations, Japan withdrew from the League.

Exploitation of China

By the summer of 1937 Japan had seized Chinese territory to the outskirts of Beijing and began the Second Sino-Japanese War. Japan had established regional dominance over Manchuria and parts of Mongolia, but still saw a need to expand to gain resources. Within government circles in the 1930s, alternative strategies included greater exploitation of China, Strike-North into the Soviet Union and Siberia, and Strike-South into Southeast Asia and Pacific islands.

The Nine-Power Treaty was somewhat as a compromise; signatory nations agreed to abide by the Open Door Policy while the territorial integrity of China was to be respected.

China, French Indochina, and Strike South

Following the German defeat of France in 1940, Japan saw opportunity to further squeeze China. It prevailed on the Vichy French government to allow Japan to occupy and use airbases in Northern French Indochina from which it could bomb China and interdict the flow of western aid to China through French Indochina. The U.S., in response, authorized a loan to China and passed the Export Control Act which authorized the president to restrict the export of strategic materials to nations he deemed threatened national security. Roosevelt used the act to embargo aviation fuel, scrap steel, and other materials to Japan.

Once the Japanese had settled on the Strike-South strategy, they soon realized that they needed at least partial control of French Indochina, both to cut off supplies moving north into China, and to provide air bases in range of targets further south and west. This led to complex relationships with Indochina, reflecting both the creation of Vichy France, and the stronger German control of France through the Tripartite Pact.

In September 1940, Japan entered the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy pledging to aid each other if attacked by another power. Vastly confusing this situation was, however, the April 1941 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact pledging nonaggression between Germany and the Soviet Union. The inherent conflict between the two pacts, if the Strike-North Faction had not already been killed by poor Japanese performance against Soviet troops, made Strike-South the only expansionist strategy left.

Even in Strike-South, Japan preferred to limit its confrontations with the Western colonial powers. At first, it believed it might hold the conflict to Great Britain.

US-Japanese tensions

Negotiations between the United States and Japan proved unproductive. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull maintained an inflexible position that the first step in any resumption of trade between the U.S. and Japan would be a complete withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indochina, a step that the militant nationalists controlling Japan were unwilling to take. Their other alternative was to seize the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies, an alternative for which they began war plans. In order to secure their lines of supply between Indonesia and Japan, they would need control of the British base at Singapore and the U.S. colony of the Philippines. Invasion of the Philippines, the Japanese correctly figured, would lead to war with the U.S., and given the strength of the U.S. navy in the Pacific as well as the productive capacity of the United States, the best hope for a Japanese victory in this war would be a decisive victory from which the U.S. would have little other alternatives than to negotiate a peace. To decisively defeat the U.S. fleet, would require a massive blow at a time when the U.S. Navy was least prepared and least expecting a Japanese attack: at the very beginning of the war.

The Pacific at war

In an effort to discourage Japan's war efforts in China, the United States, Britain, and the Dutch government in exile (still in control of the oil-rich Dutch East Indies) stopped selling oil and steel to Japan. This was the "ABCD encirclement" (American-British-Chinese-Dutch) designed to deny Japan of the raw materials needed to continue its war in China. Japan saw this as an act of aggression, as without these resources Japan's military machine would grind to a halt. On December 8, 1941, Japanese forces attacked the British colony of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and the Philippines, which was then a United States possession. Japan also used Vichy French bases in French Indochina to invade Thailand, then used the gained Thai territory to launch an assault against Malaya, a British colony, headed toward the great British naval base at Singapore.

Japanese strategy

Japan had a grand strategy based both on establishing its regional dominance, and also to obtain economic resources it did not believe it could obtain by peaceful means. Within the military-dominated government, there had been a "Strike-South" and a "Strike-North" faction, respectively, seeing the needed resources in Southeast Asia or in Siberia. In either case, it had been conducting large-scale operations in Manchuria and China since 1931.

Especially if Strike-South were taken, which would inevitably impact European allies of the United States, and quite possibly U.S. bases proper, the Japanese military strategy was to force the United States Fleet, after being attrited by peripheral attacks, to steam into the Western Pacific, where it would be vulnerable both to Japanese naval forces and land-based air forces. In support of this strategy, Japan had been building up a system of Pacific island bases since the 1920s.

While Japan joined the Tripartite Pact in 1940, there had already been cooperation with Nazi Germany, and to a lesser extent with Italy. Japan also sought a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. Prior joining the pact but with known German support, it moved into what was then French Indochina to support its war in China, asking then Vichy France for assistance. These moves were unacceptable within the foreign policy of the United States regarding Southeast Asia, and led to economic embargoes against Japan.

ADM Isoroku Yamamoto, Navy Vice Minister at the time planning intensified, knew the United States and North America well. He counseled against war with the United States, and said, that under the best circumstances, he estimated Japan could maintain a strategic offense for 6-18 months, probably 12, before U.S. industrial mobilization would overwhelm Japanese objectives. His recommendation was for a bold, short-term offensive followed by negotiations, rather than a decisive victory against the United States and other Western powers. Internal Japanese opposition to his views was sufficiently intense that he was transferred to the post of Commander-in-Chief, because be could better be protected against assassination aboard his flagship. Assassination was a very real threat inside Japanese military and government circles in the 1920s and 19302.

It was not clear, to the Japanese, what they would do next after they conquered what they called the Southern Resource Area. Their military forces had always glorified the attack, and had little experience in consolidation, strategic defense, and logistics.

U.S. contingency strategy

The United States strongly supported China. There was little "isolationist" sentiment as American opinion, led by President Franklin D. Roosevelt was strongly hostile to Japan because of its efforts to conquer China.

Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall explained American strategy three weeks before Pearl Harbor:[1]

"We are preparing for an offensive war against Japan, whereas the Japs believe we are preparing only to defend the Philippines. ...We have 35 Flying Fortresses already there—the largest concentration anywhere in the world. Twenty more will be added next month, and 60 more in January....If war with the Japanese does come, we'll fight mercilessly. Flying fortresses will be dispatched immediately to set the paper cities of Japan on fire. There won't be any hesitation about bombing civilians—it will be all-out."

The main U.S. contingency plan was called RAINBOW 5. U.S. counteroffensive strategy derived from the 1921 paper by Marine Major Earl Ellis.

Initial Japanese attacks

Japan executed its Strike-South plans with movements at Pearl Harbor, the Malay Peninsula and Singapore, and the Philippines.

On December 7, the Japanese carrier-based Mobile Fleet, led by Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo under the direction of Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet Isoroku Yamamoto, launched a air attack on the American air bases and naval fleet in the attack on Pearl Harbor, sinking or damaging the entire American battleship fleet. U.S. aircraft carriers were not in the harbor, and the attack left submarines and the logistical facilities undamaged.

Survivors from the USS West Virginia being rescued. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor forced the United States into the war.

Although Japan knew that it could not win a sustained and prolonged war against the United States, it was the Japanese hope that, faced with this sudden and massive defeat, the United States would agree to a negotiated settlement that would allow Japan to have free reign in China. This calculated gamble did not pay off; the United States refused to negotiate. Furthermore, the American losses were less serious than initially thought; the American carriers were out at sea while vital base facilities like the fuel oil storage tanks, whose destruction could have crippled the whole Pacific Fleet's operating capacity by itself, were left untouched.

Until the Pearl Harbor, the United States had officially neutral, but in fact was the main supplier of money and munitions to Britain and China, and a major supplier to Soviet Union as wee. The aid went through the Lend-Lease program. Opposition to war in the United States vanished after the attack. On December 11, Nazi Germany declared war on the United States, drawing America into a two-theater war. In 1941, Japan had only a fraction of the manufacturing capacity of the United States, and was therefore perceived as a lesser threat than Germany.

British, Indian and Dutch forces, already drained of personnel and matériel by two years of war with Germany, and heavily committed in the Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere, were unable to provide much more than token resistance to the battle-hardened Japanese. The Allies suffered many disastrous defeats in the first six months of the war. Two major British warships, HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales were sunk by a Japanese air attack off Malaya on December 10, 1941. The government of Thailand surrendered within 24 hours of Japanese invasion and formally allied itself with Japan. Thai military bases were used as a launchpad against Singapore and Malaya. Hong Kong fell on December 25 and U.S. bases on Guam and Wake Island were lost at around the same time.

The Allied governments appointed the British General Sir Archibald Wavell as supreme commander of all "American-British-Dutch-Australian" (ABDA) forces in South East Asia. This gave Wavell nominal control of a huge but thinly-spread force covering an area from Burma to the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. Other areas, including India, Australia and Hawaii remained under separate local commands.

Japanese strategy and offensives 1942

By early 1942, Japan was unsure what to do next. Their first concern was consolidating their gains in Southeast Asia, which provided adequate resources. They needed, however, more military buffer for their security; Australia was a potential Allied base for counterattacks.[2]

  • West into India
  • South into Australia
  • East towards Midway, Polynesia and Hawaii

1942 began with the Allies in rout, but several major actions showed the turning of the tide. The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first engagement in which a Japanese force turned back from an invasion. The Doolittle Raid made the Japanese believe their eastern perimeter did not extend far enough, and, of a variety of options, selected the invasion of Midway.

Early Japanese attacks

January, 1942 saw the invasions of Burma, the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and the capture of Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Rabaul. After being driven out of Malaya, Allied forces were trapped in the Singapore and, approximately 130,000 surrendered to the Japanese on February 15, 1942[3] Indian, Australian and British troops along with Dutch sailors, became prisoners of war. The pace of conquest was rapid: Bali and Timor also fell in February. The rapid collapse of Allied resistance had left the "ABDA area" split in two.

At the Battle of the Java Sea, in late February and early March, the Japanese Navy inflicted a resounding defeat on the main ABDA naval force, under Admiral Karel Doorman. The Netherlands East Indies campaign subsequently ended with the surrender of Allied forces on Java.

The British, under intense pressure, made a fighting retreat from Rangoon to the Indo-Burmese border. This cut the Burma Road which was the western Allies' supply line to the Chinese National army commanded by Chiang Kai-shek. Cooperation between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists had waned from its zenith at Battle of Wuhan, and the relationship between the two had gone sour as both attempted to expand their area of operations in occupied territories. Most of the Nationalist guerrilla areas were eventually overtaken by the Communists. On the other hand, some Nationalist units, along with collaborationists, were deployed for blockading the Communists rather than against the Japanese. Further, many of the forces of the Chinese Nationalists were warlords allied to Chiang Kai-shek, but not directly under his command. "Of the 1,200,000 troops under Chiang's control, only 650,000 were directly controlled by his generals, and another 550,000 controlled by warlords who claimed loyalty to his government; the strongest force was the Szechuan army of 320,000 men. The defeat of this army would do much to end Chiang's power."[4] The Japanese used these divisions to press ahead in their offenses.

Filipino and U.S. forces put up a fierce conventional in the Philippines until May 8, 1942; in all than 80,000 men surrendered, but an active resistance movement in the Philippines formed.

Meanwhile, Japanese aircraft had all but eliminated Allied air power in South-East Asia and were making attacks on Darwin in northern Australia, beginning with a disproportionately large and psychologically devastating raid on Darwin, February 19.

Battle of Ceylon

A raid by a powerful Japanese Navy aircraft carrier force into the Indian Ocean resulted in the Battle of Ceylon and sinking of the only British carrier, HMS Hermes in the theater, as well as 2 cruisers and other ships. This effectively drove British naval forces from the Indian ocean and paving the way for Japanese conquest of Burma and a drive towards India.

First Japanese reverse: Coral Sea

For more information, see: Battle of the Coral Sea.

By mid-1942, the Japanese Combined Fleet found itself holding a vast area, even though it lacked the aircraft carriers, aircraft, and aircrew to defend it, and the freighters, tankers, and destroyers necessary to sustain it. Moreover, Fleet doctrine was incompetent to execute the proposed "barrier" defense.[5] Instead, they decided on additional attacks in both the south and central Pacific. While Yamamoto had used the element of surprise at Pearl Harbor, Allied codebreakers now turned the tables. They discovered an attack against Port Moresby, New Guinea was imminent.

If Port Moresby fell, it would give Japan control of the seas to the immediate north of Australia. Nimitz rushed the carrier USS Lexington (CV-2), under Admiral Frank Fletcher, to join USS Yorktown (CV-5) and a U.S.-Australian task force, with orders to contest the Japanese advance. The resulting Battle of the Coral Sea was the first naval battle in which ships involved never sighted each other and aircraft were solely used to attack opposing forces.

Reorganization

Map of the theater of operations in the Pacific Ocean and East Asia during the Second World War. Charles W. Boggs Jr., Marine Aviation in Philippines (Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1951), 2.

After ABDA became defunct, the Americans set up four commands, the Southwest Pacific Area, under General Douglas MacArthur in Australia, and three Pacific areas (North, Central and South), all under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz at Pearl Harbor. The China-Burma-India (CBI) theater was a separate command, involving the British and Chinese, as well as Americans.

In early 1942, the governments of smaller powers began to push for an inter-governmental Asia-Pacific war council, based in Washington. The Pacific War Council was set up in Washington on April 1, 1942, but it never had any direct operational control and any recommendations it made were referred to the U.S.-British Combined Chiefs of Staff, which was also in Washington.

Allied resistance, at first symbolic, gradually began to stiffen. Australian and Dutch forces led civilians in a prolonged guerrilla campaign in Portuguese Timor.

Striking East

For more information, see: Battle of Midway.

The Doolittle Raid did minimal damage, but was a huge morale booster for the Allies. Only after the war was its immense strategic impact realized. Not only did the Japanese transfer air defense resources, needed in the field, back to the home islands, they concluded that their defense perimeter needed to extend further east. To extend it, they concluded they needed to seize Midway Island. They overextended themselves to fight the Battle of Midway, a major Japanese defeat that was, arguably, the turning point of the Pacific War.

Yamamoto's primary goal was the seizure of the airfield on Midway; a secondary goal was to destroy U.S. fleet resources. Midway was a decisive victory for the U.S. Navy and the end of Japanese offensive aspirations in the Pacific. It cost the Japanese four fleet carriers, but, even more important, superbly trained pilots. One of Japan's great mistakes was not developing a continuous pipeline to train new pilots, and share the expertise of experienced pilots while giving them needed rest and preparing them for higher levels of command and staff.

Counteroffensive: New Guinea and the Solomons

Japanese land forces continued to advance in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. From July, 1942, a few Australian militia battalions, many of them very young and untrained, fought a stubborn rearguard action in New Guinea, against a Japanese advance along the Kokoda Track, towards Port Moresby, over the rugged Owen Stanley Ranges. The Militia, worn out and severely depleted by casualties, were relieved in late August by regular troops from the Second Australian Imperial Force, returning from action in the Middle East.

In early September 1942, Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces ("Japanese marines") attacked a strategic Australian Air Force base at Milne Bay, near the eastern tip of New Guinea. They were beaten back by the Australian Army and some U.S. forces, inflicting the first outright defeat on Japanese land forces since 1939.

Guadalcanal

For more information, see: Guadalcanal campaign.

At the same time as major battles raged in New Guinea, Allied forces spotted a Japanese airfield under construction at Guadalcanal. The Allies made an amphibious landing in August to convert it to their use and start to reverse the tide of Japanese conquests. As a result, Japanese and Allied forces both occupied various parts of Guadalcanal. Over the following six months, both sides fed resources into an escalating battle of attrition on the island, at sea, and in the sky, with eventual victory going to the Allies in February 1943.

The Battle of Midway cost the Japanese a critical number of aircraft carriers and pilots. The Guadalcanal campaign, however, signaled the shift of the Allies to systematic offense.[6]

It was a campaign the Japanese could ill afford. A majority of Japanese aircraft from the entire South Pacific area was drained into the Japanese defense of Guadalcanal. Japanese logistics, as happened time and again, failed; only 20% of the supplies dispatched from Rabaul to Guadalcanal ever reached there. As a result the 30,000 Japanese troops on Guadalcanal lacked heavy equipment, adequate ammunition and even enough food, and were subjected to continuous harassment from the air. 10,000 were killed, 10,000 starved to death, and the remaining 10,000 were evacuated in February 1943, in a greatly weakened condition.

The U.S. Air Forces based at Henderson Field became known as the Cactus Air Force (from the codename for the island), and held their own. The Japanese launched a pair of ill-coordinated attacks on U.S. positions around Henderson Field to suffer bloody repulse and then to suffer even worse losses to starvation and disease during the retreat.

New Guinea and the Solomons

By late 1942, the Japanese were also retreating along the Kokoda Track in the highlands of New Guinea. Australian and U.S. counteroffensives culminated in the capture of the key Japanese beachhead in eastern New Guinea, the Buna-Gona area, in early 1943.

In June 1943, the Allies launched Operation CARTWHEEL, aimed at isolating the major Japanese forward base, at Rabaul, and cutting its supply and communication lines without actually invading it. This prepared the way for Nimitz's island-hopping campaign towards Japan.

Allied offensives, 1943-44

Mahanian doctrine called for a decisive naval battle. The Japanese repeatedly sought such a battle, but the U.S. did not. Instead it pushed closer and closer to the Japanese home islands. The Allied advance could only be stopped by a Japanese naval attack, which became increasingly difficult as Japan ran low on fuel, modern planes, trained pilots and major warships.

Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul and Formosa were neutralized by air attack and bypassed. The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the submarine blockade, and finally (if necessary) execute an invasion. The technique of amphibious landings to seize forward bases in preparation for a great fleet battle was propounded in 1921 by U.S. Marine MAJ Earl Ellis.

Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. Admiral King complained that the Pacific deserved 30% of Allied resources but was getting only 15%; he used what he had to neutralize the Japanese forward bases at Rabaul and Truk.

The United States used the two years to turn its vast industrial potential into actual ships, planes, and trained aircrew. At the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or technological strategy, and lacking a good aircrew training program, fell further and further behind.

On 18 October 1943, land-based aircraft bombed Rabaul [7] This was followed, on 5 November, by a carrier raid that rendered Rabaul ineffective. [8] Still, the U.S. continued to harass Rabaul by air, and with a destroyer raid, into 1944.

Operation GALVANIC (Gilberts)

This force will seize, occupy, and develop Makin, Tarawa, and Abemama, and will vigorously deny Nauru to the enemy, in order to gain control of the Gilbert Islands and to prepare for operations against the Marshalls. [9]

The major combat operations, therefore, would be the Battle of Makin, Battle of Tarawa, the Battle of Abemana, and Raids against Nauru.

Battle of Tarawa

For more information, see: Battle of Tarawa.

In November 1943, Marines sustained high casualties when they overwhelmed the 4,500-strong Japanese garrison on the island of Betio in the Tarawa atoll. This helped the allies to improve the techniques of amphibious warfare, learning from their mistakes and implementing changes such as thorough pre-emptive bombings and bombardment, more careful planning regarding tides and landing craft schedules, and better overall coordination.

Operation Flintlock (Marshalls)

Intercepting Yamamoto

On April 13, 1943, American communications intelligence intercepted messages, in a relatively low-level cryptosystem, giving the inspection itinerary of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commanding the Japanese Combined Fleet. There were points along his inspection tour where long-range fighters could intercept and shoot down his aircraft. [10]

The decision to intercept his aircraft and kill him required Joint Chiefs and Presidential approval, first because it could suggest to the Japanese that their communications had been broken, and other reasons such as the precedent of using assassination. Pacific Fleet intelligence officer Layton, and possibly others in the decisionmaking, had the added burden of having known and admired Yamamoto the man.

On April 18, Yamamoto died when a force of 18 U.S. Army Air Force P-38 Lightning fighters intercepted and shot down the two bombers carrying staff officers, which were escorted by six Japanese fighters.

There was only one Yamamoto, and no one is able to replace him His loss is an unsupportable blow to us — Adm. Mineichi Koga, Yamamoto's successor

.

Recapture of the Aleutians

On 11 May, U.S. Army forces landed on the Japanese-held island of Attu, in the Alaskan Aleutian chain. It was secured after two weeks of hard fighting. An extensive bombardment preceded the 15 August invasion of nearby Kiska, but the Japanese had evacuated Kiska without the U.S. becoming aware of it. [11]

The submarine war

For more information, see: World War II, submarine operations.

U.S. submarines (with some aid from the British and Dutch), operating from bases in Australia, Hawaii, and Ceylon, played a major role in defeating Japan. Japanese submarines, however, played a minimal role, although they had the best torpedoes of any nation in the Second World War, and quite good submarines. The difference in results is due to the very different doctrines of the sides, which, on the Japanese side, were based on cultural traditions.

The beginning of the end in the Pacific, 1944

U.S. strategy for the war in the Pacific derived from Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decisions at the Cairo Conference (1943) to obtain "bases from which the unconditional surrender of Japan can be forced."[12] There was, however, little clarity and much argument among the Joint Chiefs and the two theater commanders, Douglas MacArthur for the Southwest Pacific Area and Chester Nimitz for the Pacific Ocean Areas. JCS guidance to Nimitz and MacArthur, dated March 12, 1944, stated "The JCS have decided that the most feasible approach to Formosa, Luzon and China is by way of the Marianas, the Carolines, Palau, and Mindonoro."

The great distance of Formosa and Luzon from Japan made these objectives unusable as bases for attacks on the Japanese home islands. Bases in China may have supported ultra-long range bombers, but events soon marginalized this option as well. In May 1944, the Japanese Army, moved into Eastern China. After this, the JCS suggested bypassing all the intermediate bases (such as Luzon and Formosa) and directly attacking Kyushu.[13] This suggestion outraged MacArthur, whose personal agenda required the liberation of the Philippines above all else, but it reflected the desire of Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall to avoid unnecessary land campaigns. MacArthur was told that that personal and political considerations should not override the goal of defeating Japan.[14]

MacArthur had a deep emotional bond to the Philippines. MacArthur's personal ambition since leaving the Philippines in 1942 was to return.[15] He believed that the honor of the United States required the liberation of the islands and that such an objective was strategically sound. He saw Leyte as the base from which the rest of the Philippines could be taken. [16]

MacArthur and his staff responded to Marshall's suggestion on June 15, 1944, with the Reno V plan. This plan called for an October invasion of Mindanao to cover a November invasion of Leyte and further movements on a line Luzon-Bicol Peninsula-Mindonoro-Lingayen Gulf-Manila. As a bold, risky, and expensive plan, it had lots of detractors; Admiral King, and even MacArthur's air commander, General Kinney, criticized it.

Eventually, President Franklin D. Roosevelt intervened to break the deadlock between King and Nimitz versus MacArthur. Roosevelt traveled to Honolulu, accompanied by his chief of staff, Admiral Leahy, and met with MacArthur in July.[17]

Saipan

For more information, see: Battle of Saipan.

On June 15, 1944, 535 ships began landing 128,000 U.S. Army and Marine personnel on on the island of Saipan. The Allied objective was the creation of airfields — within B-29 range of Tokyo. The ability to plan and execute such a complex operation in the space of 90 days was indicative of Allied logistical superiority.

It was imperative for Japanese commanders to hold Saipan, as inside Japan, Saipan was regarded as part of the innermost defense perimeter, and its capture would strengthen the peace faction, unknown outside Japan. To help the land battle, the Japanese sent the Mobile Fleet, under Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, to attack the Fifth Fleet in what became known as the Battle of the Philippine Sea, or, informally, the "Marianas Turkey Shoot".

When it fell, so did the government of Hideki Tojo, who was replaced as Prime Minister by Prince Konoye. The new cabinet was more inclined toward peace, but certainly not to immediate capitulation; Army elements still insisted on total war.

Battle of the Philippine Sea

For more information, see: Philippine Sea, battle of and Battle of the Philippine Sea.

The only way to do this was to destroy the Fifth United States Fleet, which had 15 big carriers and 956 planes, 28 battleships and cruisers, and 69 destroyers. Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa attacked with nine-tenths of Japan's fighting fleet, which included nine carriers with 473 planes, 18 battleships and cruisers, and 28 destroyers. Ozawa's pilots were outnumbered 2-1 and their aircraft were becoming obsolete. The Japanese had substantial anti-aircraft artillery, but lacked proximity fuzes and good radar. With the odds stacked against him, Ozawa devised an appropriate strategy. His planes had greater range because they were not weighed down with protective armor; they could attack at about 480 km (300 mi), and could search a radius of 900 km (560 mi). U.S. Navy F6F Hellcat fighters could only attack within 200 miles, and only search within a 325 mile radius. Ozawa planned to use this advantage by positioning his fleet 300 miles out. The Japanese planes would hit the U.S. carriers, land at Guam to refuel, then hit the enemy again, when returning to their carriers. Ozawa also counted on about 500 ground-based planes at Guam and other islands.

Admiral Raymond Spruance was in overall command of the 5th Fleet. The Japanese plan would have failed if the much larger U.S. fleet had closed on Ozawa and attacked aggressively; Ozawa had the correct insight that the unaggressive Spruance would not attack. U.S. Admiral Marc Mitscher, in tactical command of Task Force 58, with its 15 carriers, was aggressive but Spruance vetoed Mitscher's plan to hunt down Ozawa because Spruance's decisions made his first priority protection of the Saipan landing.

The forces converged in the largest sea battle of World War II up to that point. Over the previous month American destroyers had destroyed 17 of the 25 submarines Ozawa had sent ahead. Repeated U.S. raids destroyed the Japanese land-based planes. Ozawa's main attack lacked coordination, with the Japanese planes arriving at their targets in a staggered sequence. Following a directive from Nimitz, the U.S. carriers all had combat information centers, which interpreted the flow of radar data instantaneously and radioed interception orders to the Hellcats. The result was later dubbed the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The few attackers to reach the U.S. fleet encountered massive AA fire with proximity fuzes. Only one American warship was slightly damaged.

On the second day U.S. reconnaissance planes finally located Ozawa's fleet, 275 miles away and submarines sank two Japanese carriers. Mitscher launched 230 torpedo planes and dive bombers. He then discovered that the enemy was actually another 60 miles further off, out of aircraft range. Mitscher decided that this chance to destroy the Japanese fleet was worth the risk of aircraft losses. Overall, the U.S. lost 130 planes and 76 aircrew. However, Japan lost 450 planes, three carriers and 445 pilots. The Imperial Japanese Navy's carrier force was effectively destroyed.

Philippines counteroffensive

For more information, see: Philippines counteroffensive.

[{Douglas MacArthur]] was deeply committed to ousting the Japanese from the Philippines. He had had opposition on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a strategy making them a priority, but a combination of factors changed that.

American reconquest of Philippines, 1944-45

Third and Fifth Fleet staff agreed on three naval objectives in support of land operations:[18]

  • Air strikes by Third Fleet and long-range land-based aircraft on Okinawa, Formosa, and Northern Leyte on October 10-13.
  • Attacks by the Seventh Fleet on Bicol Peninsula, Leyte, Cebu and Negros, and direct supports of the actual landings, October 16-20.
  • "Strategic support" (which wasn't clearly defined) by the Third Fleet from October 21 onwards.

On the Allied side, the main battle fleet, under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander of the Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas. alternated between two commanders and staffs; one would carry out an operation while the other would plan the next. It was designated Third Fleet while under Vice Admiral William Halsey and Fifth Fleet while under Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance. This was not the key American command problem, which was more at the level of conflict between Nimitz and Southwest Pacific Area commander Douglas MacArthur. Under MacArthur was the Seventh Fleet, principally an amphibious rather than a sea battle force. Air command was also divided, with the heaviest bombers directly under the command of Washington.

Both Halsey and Spruance were strong commanders with very different styles. Halsey himself speculated that the outcome, for the Allies, might have been better if he, rather than Spruance, had commanded at the Philippine Sea, while Spruance had taken his place at Leyte Gulf. War is filled with might-have-beens.

Preparatory operations

On 9-10 September, Third Fleet units, supporting impending landings on Morotai and Palau, made air strikes on Mindonoro, and discovered significant weaknesses in Japanese air defense. It was determined that Southwest Pacific land-based bombers, operating out of New Guinea fields, had caused severe damage to enemy air installations on the island. Exploiting the weakness, the Third Fleet raided the Visayas on 12-13 September, causing substantial damage to aircraft and airfields. [19]

MacArthur chose to occupy Morotai Island, off Halmahera, as an intermediate base, with landings starting on 15 September by the U.S. Army 31st Division and 126th Regimental Combat Team of the 32nd Division plus supporting combat and service troops, directed by XI Corps. Simultaneously, the 1st Division, U.S. Marine Corps, followed by the Army's 81st Division, took Palau and Angaur in the Palau group. Ulithi was taken on the 23rd.[20]

Morotai and Palau, 350-500 miles from Leyte, became the main bases for Army fighters, still distant for WWII aircraft. Ulithi became the main staging harbor. Two-pronged drives to capture Japanese-held islands, building a ever-closer set of airfields for attacks on the Japanese home islands. In two key cases, an initial American landing was followed by a sea battle against supporting and reinforcing forces. While the Allies won the sea battles, both were troubled by problems of divided command.

Initial landings

General Douglas MacArthur wades ashore during the landings at Leyte, the Philippines

On 20 October 1944, the Sixth United States Army, under Gen. Walter Krueger, supported by naval and air bombardment, landed on the favorable eastern shore of Leyte, one of the three large Philippine Islands, north of Mindanao. United States Seventh Fleet, under Thomas Kinkaid, conducted the amphibious operations and remained in support.

Leyte Gulf 1944

For more information, see: Battle of Leyte Gulf.
Leyte-map1.jpg

The Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23-26, 1944, was the largest naval battle in history. It involved coordinated Japanese attacks designed to hit the hundreds of thousands of American soldiers who had just landed at Leyte Gulf, and their supply ships. Severe communications failures on both sides characterized the battle, which ended in a total American victory and the end of Japanese sea power.

Japan was heavily outgunned, so it designed a trick that would neutralize American strength. Sho-1 called for using the remaining Japanese carriers as a decoy, knowing they would all be destroyed, to pull the main American battle fleet, the Third Fleet, north away from the real action. Then two other Japanese fleets would attack Leyte from the center and the south.[21] The plan almost worked, but the Japanese had poor radios and the different units were not in touch; the Japanese Army knew what was happening but it never talked to the Navy and did not help out.

Land invasion expands

The U.S. Sixth Army continued its advance from the east, as the Japanese rushed reinforcements to the Ormoc Bay area on the western side of the island. While the Sixth Army was reinforced successfully, the U.S. Fifth Air Force was able to devastate the Japanese attempts to resupply. In torrential rains and over difficult terrain, the advance continued across Leyte and the neighboring island of Samar to the north. On 7 December 1944, U.S. Army units landed at Ormoc Bay and, after a major land and air battle, cut off the Japanese ability to reinforce and supply Leyte. Although fierce fighting continued on Leyte for months, the U.S. Army was in control.

On 15 December 1944, landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in support of major landings scheduled on Luzon. On 9 January 1945, on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf on the western coast of Luzon, General Krueger's Sixth Army landed his first units. Almost 175,000 men followed across the twenty-mile beachhead within a few days. With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking Clark Field, 40 miles northwest of Manila, in the last week of January.

Two more major landings followed, one to cut off the Bataan Peninsula, and another, that included a parachute drop, south of Manila. Pincers closed on the city and, on 3 February 1945, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila and the 8th Cavalry passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.

As the advance on Manila continued from the north and the south, the Bataan Peninsula was rapidly secured. On 16 February, paratroopers and amphibious units assaulted Corregidor, and resistance ended there on 27 February.

In all, ten U.S. divisions and five independent regiments battled on Luzon, making it the largest campaign of the Pacific war, involving more troops than the United States had used in North Africa, Italy, or southern France.

Palawan Island, between Borneo and Mindoro, the fifth largest and western-most Philippine Island, was invaded on 28 February, with landings of the Eighth Army at Puerto Princesa. The Japanese put up little direct defense of Palawan, but cleaning up pockets of Japanese resistance lasted until late April, as the Japanese used their common tactic of withdrawing into the mountain jungles, disbursed as small units. Throughout the Philippines, U.S. forces were aided by Filipino guerrillas to find and dispatch the holdouts.

The U.S. Eighth Army then moved on to its first landing on Mindanao (17 April), the last of the major Philippine Islands to be taken. Mindanao was followed by invasion and occupation of Panay, Cebu, Negros and several islands in the Sulu Archipelago. These islands provided bases for the U.S. Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces to attack targets throughout the Philippines and the South China Sea.

The final stages of the war

China-Burma-India

Southwest Pacific

The Borneo Campaign of 1945 was the last major Allied campaign in the South West Pacific Area. In a series of amphibious assaults between May 1 and July 21, the Australian I Corps, under General Leslie Morshead, attacked Japanese forces occupying the island. Allied naval and air forces, centred on the U.S. 7th Fleet under Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, the Australian First Tactical Air Force and the U.S. Thirteenth Air Force also played important roles in the campaign.

The campaign opened with a landing on the small island of Tarakan on May 1. This was followed on June 1 by simultaneous assaults in the north west, on the island of Labuan and the coast of Brunei. A week later the Australians attacked Japanese positions in North Borneo. The attention of the Allies then switched back to the central east coast, with the last major amphibious assault of World War II, at Balikpapan on July 1.

Although the campaign was criticised in Australia at the time, and in subsequent years, as pointless or a "waste" of the lives of soldiers, it did achieve a number of objectives, such as increasing the isolation of significant Japanese forces occupying the main part of the Dutch East Indies, capturing major oil supplies and freeing Allied prisoners of war, who were being held in deteriorating conditions.

Pacific Ocean

See also: Battle of Iwo Jima
See also: Battle of Okinawa

Attacks on Japan

Hard-fought battles on the Iwo Jima and Okinawa resulted in horrific casualties on both sides, but finally produced a Japanese retreat. Faced with the loss of most of their experienced pilots, the Japanese increased their use of Kamikaze tactics in an attempt to create unacceptably high casualties for the Allies, who were now joined by the British fleet. Upwards of a third of the U.S. fleet was hit, and the U.S. Navy recommended against an invasion of Japan in 1945. It proposed to force a Japanese surrender through a total naval blockade and air raids.

Strategic bombing

Towards the end of the war as the role of strategic bombing became more important, a new command for the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific was created to oversee all U.S. strategic bombing in the hemisphere, under Air Force General Carl Spaatz, who reported directly to Hap Arnold in Washington. General Curtis LeMay was in operational command. Japanese industrial production plunged as nearly half of the built-up areas of 64 cities were destroyed by B-29 firebombing raids. On March 9-10, 1945 alone, about 100,000 people were killed in a fire storm caused by an attack on Tokyo.

Mine warfare

LeMay oversaw "Operation Starvation" which the interior waterways of Japan were extensively mined by air which seriously disrupted the enemy's logistical operations.

The atomic bomb

In August of 1945 the U.S. attacked two cities with nuclear weapons; on August 6 , Hiroshima was destroyed with a single weapon, as was Nagasaki on August 9. More than 200,000 people died as a direct result of these two bombings, but policy makers argued that even more lives were saved because Japan quickly ended the war. Precise figures are not available, but the firebombing together with the nuclear bombing between March and August 1945 may have killed more than one million Japanese civilians. Official estimates from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey put the figures at 330,000 people killed, 476,000 injured, 8.5 million people made homeless and 2.5 million buildings destroyed.

Soviet entry

In February, 1945, Stalin agreed with Roosevelt to enter the Pacific conflict. He promised to act 90 days after the war ended in Europe and did so exactly on schedule on August 9, by launching Operation August Storm. A battle-hardened, one million-strong Soviet force, transferred from Europe attacked Japanese forces in Manchuria and quickly defeated their Kwantung Army.

Surrender

When the war ended in Aug. 1945, Japan still controlled large areas (in red) in China, as well as many islands that had been leap-frogged.

Imperial Japan surrendered on August 15, "V-J Day". The formal surrender was signed on September 2, 1945, on an American battleship in Tokyo Bay. The surrender was accepted by General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Allied Commander, with representatives of each Allied nation..

A separate surrender ceremony between Japan and China was held in Nanking on September 9, 1945.

Occupation

In September MacArthur went to Tokyo to oversee the postwar development of the country. This period in Japanese history is known as the occupation.

Averted invasion

The planned invasions of Kyushu (left) and Honshu islands did not happen

Under the overall plan Operation Downfall, the Kyushu invasion Operation Olympic and Honshu invasion Operation CORONET did not take place. Nine nuclear weapons had been scheduled for use in the Kyushu operations, so it was not a strict alternative to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

References

  1. ↑ Robert L. Sherrod "Memorandum for David W. Hulburd, Jr." November 15, 1941. The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland et al. vol. 2, We Cannot Delay, July 1, 1939-December 6, 1941 (1986), #2-602 pp. 676-681. Marshall made the statement to a secret press conference.
  2. ↑
  3. ↑ [1]
  4. ↑ Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War (1986) pp. 262-263.
  5. ↑ Parillo, Japanese Merchant Marine; Peattie & Evans, Kaigun.
  6. ↑ E. B. Potter (1985), Bull Halsey, U.S. Naval Institute, ISBN 0870211463, p. 179
  7. ↑ Cleaver, Thomas McKelvey (August 2004), "Raid on Rabaul: B-25 gunships terrorize Japanese shipping", Flight Journal
  8. ↑ Carrier Raid on Rabaul (November 5, 1943)
  9. ↑ Worrall Reed Carter, Chapter IX: Operation GALVANIC (the Gilbert Islands), Beans, Bullets and Black Oil, U.S. Navy
  10. ↑ Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau and John Costello (1985), "And I was There": Pearl Harbor and Midway: Breaking the Secrets, William Morrow & Company, pp. 474-479
  11. ↑ Layton, pp. 476-477
  12. ↑ Samuel Eliot Morison (1970), History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. Volume XII: Leyte, June 1944-January 1945, Atlantic Monthly/Little, Brown, p. 4
  13. ↑ Morison, 5-7.
  14. ↑ Courtney Whitney, MacArthur, His Rendevous with History (1966), quoted in Morison, 7.
  15. ↑ "The Philippine Islands constituted the main objective of General MacArthur's planning from the time of his departure from Corregidor in March 1942 until his dramatic return to Leyte two and one half years later," , CHAPTER VII--THE PHILIPPINES: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE, Reports of General MacArthur, Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1966
  16. ↑ , Chapter VIII, The Leyte Operation, Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1966
  17. ↑ Morison, 8-11
  18. ↑ Morison, 57.
  19. ↑ Macarthur Reports, Chapter 7, pp. 172-173
  20. ↑ Macarthur Reports, Chapter 7, pp. 175-178
  21. ↑ For the relative strengths of the fleets see Vincent P. O'Hara, The U.S. Navy Against the Axis: Surface Combat, 1941-1945 (2007) pp 261-2
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